Theories Explaining Policy Choices

Often when we discuss the study of public policy, we are actually talking about two types of analysis. For the sake of simplicity we usually separate studies where policy is treated as an outcome of political and social causes, and studies where policy is treated as a cause of some social outcome. Of course, the world is not so simple and policy is is caused by and causes politics, society, and culture simultaneously; but for the purposes of discussion and academic research it is much easier to divide the field in this way. In this class, we are primarily focused on policy as an outcome. While the substantive chapters touch on the effects of policy, we will not be doing policy evaluation in this class. We will leave that to PAF 471-Public Policy Analysis.

In this class, we are primarily concerned with studying the policy process. How do policies get passed? Why are some policies passed and not others? Why do policies persist? Chapter three introduces us to some of the major theories for understanding the policy process. We will spend all next few weeks on the policy stages heuristic (I hope you all looked up this word) so I will skip over that for now and discuss some of the other perspectives. Remember, public policy is an interdisciplinary field so you will see theories here that are based in political science, economics, and sociology.

Currently, the study of public policy in the United States is dominated by economic thinking. If you went to the annual APPAM (Association of Public Policy and Management) conference, you would, for the most part, see presentations of papers using market-based theories or institutional models to explain policy choice. The easiest assumption to make about human behavior in public policy analysis is that individuals act on their rational self-interest, but sometimes that interest is constrained by organizational culture, history, or social norms. We may also think of them as making decisions based on "bounded rationality", not only are they constrained by outside factors, they are also constrained by limited cognitive capacity. We tend to assume that they "satisfice" or choose an option that works, or seems the best, out of limited options. This may seem like the obvious way to think about human behavior, but it's not the only alternative. Think about how different our policies would be if we adopted the assumptions of psychoanalysis, that individuals acted largely based on irrational urges and passions.

Peters also offers us theories that explain policy choice based on who advocated for specific policies. The Advocacy Coalition Framework and policy networks perspectives try to explain policy choices using this logic. Both of these perspectives tell us who is working together to pass a policy and who they are working against. They can also help to explain why problems are defined in certain ways or how relevant groups change alliances over time. There's an adage that "politics makes strange bedfellows", and both ACF and policy networks analysis can help us parse out occasionally strange alliances.

Peters talks about other perspectives too. Lowi's idea that policy causes politics has been very influential in explaining why we see strong interest groups in some policy discussions and not in others. Many have used his theory in conjunction with constructivism and economic theories to understand differential power relationships, particularly in the context of redistributive and regulatory policy areas. The constructivist approach is more popular in Europe and really delves into the role that social control and stratification play in the policy process (in other words examining how race, gender, class, able-bodiedness, sexuality etc. influence policy decisions.)

I hope that you will keep these various theories for explaining policy choice in mind when we read the substantive chapters. Often, we look at policies from one single perspective and assume we have the right answer, when other perspectives can shed an interesting light on a particular substantive area. If you think about healthcare policy, constructivism might help explain why there is more support for Medicare than Medicaid even though they serve many of the same people (so-called dual-eligibles) because we perceive the recipients as two different groups; seniors and the disabled who deserve our help and poor people who do not. On the other hand, historical institutional models might explain the evolution of a public healthcare system that covers the elderly, the destitute, and veterans but not others. The optimal design perspective would explain why the market cannot provide sufficient healthcare to these groups, in particular.

What do you think of the theories that Peters discusses in this chapter were there any that sounded particularly interesting? Were there any that you just "didn't get"? Do you think that public policy experts should assume recipients are "rational actors" when designing policies? Are there better ways to explain human behavior that we should consider?