As we finish up the semester, I wanted to do a quick summary of what I hope you will take away from this course. It has been a pleasure reading your reflection papers and reading your comments about public policy issues. This is the first time I have taught this course online, and I certainly learned a lot; I hope you did, too.
Many people come into this class hoping to find out the "right" answer for how government can solve a problem, be it undocumented or illegal immigration, inequality in the education system, or housing the homeless. I hope that this course has taught you that the world of public policy is never so simple that a single "right" answer is easy to find. The United States, in particular, has a very complex system of government with three branches at the national level, states with at least two branches, and local governments all working alone and in concert to solve problems. Not to mention that nonprofit and for-profit organizations also play an important role in creating, advocating for, and implementing public policies. While the dream of "three-page" bills would certainly increase transparency, it seems as though our system of government is too complex to make such a goal a reality. Next time a politician suggests a simple answer to a complex problem, I hope that you will view such a suggestion skeptically.
I hope that our discussions of substantive policy issues peaked your interest, as well. Although our department does not currently have the capacity to offer classes in each of these substantive areas, there are classes in departments like sustainability, criminology, sociology, social work, and economics where you can explore these substantive areas in more depth. Further, for those of you who are planning to pursue the public service and public policy major, I hope that this gave you some ideas in terms of where you might want to do your internship and possible topics for your capstone. The CQ researcher briefs are all accessible online through the library and they provide a good starting point for understanding the "players" and major debates in each policy area. Peters' book provides a more straightforward look at the background of each of these larger policy areas. I hope you will refer back to these resources as you continue your studies of public policy.
In comparison to some of the other courses you may take in this department, this course attempts to instill more of a critical perspective in each of you. While some may see this perspective as oppositional to the more "scientific" and "objective" courses in cost-benefit, statistical, and economic analysis; I believe that both perspectives are essential to the evaluation of public policy proposals. Without this perspective, you may miss some of the underlying assumptions or as Stone would say "counting as" used in these analyses that can fundamentally alter the results of an analysis. You may also miss assumptions that can alienate or confuse policy targets. Ultimately, I hope that those of you who pursue a career in policy, administration, or politics will take your skills in economics, statistics, and critical thinking and combine them to approach each policy skeptically and then choose the policy alternative that fares the best on all three criteria.
Most of all, I hope that you take away the idea that although we may disagree with each other on these issues we can still have a civil discussion about each of them, and generally find at least some point of common ground. It seems as though our policy discourse will only become more fractured and hostile as the 2012 election approaches, and it's important to keep in mind that those who support a different candidate or take a different perspective on an issue are not our enemy. We can learn a lot more about ourselves and our opinions when we take the time to listen to and understand the other side of arguments, and why others may disagree with our own perspectives.
Thank you all for a great class and I hope you enjoy your winter break!
P.S. Don't forget to turn in your policy memos on the 11th. Make sure you refer back to the rubric from policy memo 1, as we will be using that same rubric to grade your second memos.
Monday, December 5, 2011
Thursday, December 1, 2011
The National Debt
I scheduled our discussion of the national debt for this week in the hopes that we would have a deal from the "supercommittee" (officially known as the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction) to discuss. Unfortunately, they were unable to come to any agreement. Instead, I'll talk a little about the readings and then discuss the implications of the lack of a deal.
This week's reading on the national debt is one of the most up to date that we've read so far. Although the chapter was written before the "debt ceiling crisis" of the summer, it asks many of the same questions that the supercommittee has tried to reconcile over the past few months. Most notably, how can we work to reduce our large deficit without stalling or preventing an economic recovery. Of course, the supercommittee is also concerned with the political ramifications of their actions. We have had two bipartisan committees tasked with reducing the national debt, the Bowles-Simpson National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and the Rivlin-Domenici Debt Reduction Task Force. Both of these committees were bipartisan and offered recommendations for reducing the debt as models from which the supercommittee could work (even though the Bowles-Simpson commission failed to reach the supermajority among commission members necessary to fully endorse their plan). Even with these blueprints, the committee was unable to make a recommendation for action. As the chapter points out, Americans want to balance the budget while cutting taxes and increasing spending, an impossible task. Any cuts or tax-increases would run the risk of being politically unpopular less than a year before a major national election.
When the Supercommittee was formed as part of the debt ceiling deal this summer, a system of sequestration or automatic cuts to defense, Medicare (providers only), and Social Security was created as a consequence of the supercommittee failing to pass an additional $1.5 trillion in cuts. The good news is that these cuts will not occur until FY2013, so there is still time for Congress to reach an agreement. Policymakers on both sides are already attempting to over-ride sequestration for their preferred programs, but the Obama administration has vowed to veto any such attempts. It seems as though we have reached an impasse.
So, now that the supercommittee has failed, what can we expect? The Obama administration is hoping that the full Congress can pass extensions on the payroll tax cut and extended unemployment benefits before recessing in December. The Republicans are hoping to avoid raising taxes and to make the Bush tax cuts permanent while further cutting domestic spending and fundamentally altering entitlement programs (Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security). Democratic members of the legislature are hoping to preserve Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security while letting the Bush tax cuts on the wealthiest members of society expire. Regardless of what happens, as we saw with the debt-ceiling debate, the appearance of a "do-nothing Congress" may be the most damaging aspect of these negotiations to the economy, our democracy, and the faith-and-credit of the US government.
This week's reading on the national debt is one of the most up to date that we've read so far. Although the chapter was written before the "debt ceiling crisis" of the summer, it asks many of the same questions that the supercommittee has tried to reconcile over the past few months. Most notably, how can we work to reduce our large deficit without stalling or preventing an economic recovery. Of course, the supercommittee is also concerned with the political ramifications of their actions. We have had two bipartisan committees tasked with reducing the national debt, the Bowles-Simpson National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform and the Rivlin-Domenici Debt Reduction Task Force. Both of these committees were bipartisan and offered recommendations for reducing the debt as models from which the supercommittee could work (even though the Bowles-Simpson commission failed to reach the supermajority among commission members necessary to fully endorse their plan). Even with these blueprints, the committee was unable to make a recommendation for action. As the chapter points out, Americans want to balance the budget while cutting taxes and increasing spending, an impossible task. Any cuts or tax-increases would run the risk of being politically unpopular less than a year before a major national election.
When the Supercommittee was formed as part of the debt ceiling deal this summer, a system of sequestration or automatic cuts to defense, Medicare (providers only), and Social Security was created as a consequence of the supercommittee failing to pass an additional $1.5 trillion in cuts. The good news is that these cuts will not occur until FY2013, so there is still time for Congress to reach an agreement. Policymakers on both sides are already attempting to over-ride sequestration for their preferred programs, but the Obama administration has vowed to veto any such attempts. It seems as though we have reached an impasse.
So, now that the supercommittee has failed, what can we expect? The Obama administration is hoping that the full Congress can pass extensions on the payroll tax cut and extended unemployment benefits before recessing in December. The Republicans are hoping to avoid raising taxes and to make the Bush tax cuts permanent while further cutting domestic spending and fundamentally altering entitlement programs (Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security). Democratic members of the legislature are hoping to preserve Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security while letting the Bush tax cuts on the wealthiest members of society expire. Regardless of what happens, as we saw with the debt-ceiling debate, the appearance of a "do-nothing Congress" may be the most damaging aspect of these negotiations to the economy, our democracy, and the faith-and-credit of the US government.
My Thoughts on Peters Ch. 17 - Cost-Benefit and Ethical Analysis
So here we are in the final week and back to Peters for his final chapter. In this edition, Peters combines cost-benefit and ethical analysis into a single chapter. While I generally prefer to discuss these two issues separately, I think the combined chapter works for the purposes of this class. This chapter helps serve as a teaser for two 400-level courses we offer (or will be offering) as part of the Public Service and Public Policy major. PAF 471: Public Policy Analysis will be a required course for the public policy concentration and will likely focus on economic models of policy analysis, specifically cost-benefit analysis and quantitative analysis. PAF 460: Public Service Ethics is our required ethics course and will help you navigate current ethical issues in public policy, public administration, and the non-profit sectors. I hope that this chapter sparked your excitement for these courses.
There are other reasons why it may make sense to combine these two chapters. In some ways, cost-benefit analysis can be thought of as a specific type of consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism is just a fancy way of saying "the ends justify the means". Of course, this form of ethics can lead to many actions that we would consider unethical, but it is often used in public policy creation. Basically, cost-benefit analysis is attempting to reach a Pareto Optimal outcome, where no one is made worse off but at least one person is made better off, or a Kaldor-Hicks outcome where society experiences a net-gain. In this case, the ends and the means are quantified so that the ends justify the means if the outcome is a net monetary benefit. Of course, opportunity costs, consumer surpluses, unintended consequences, and net values need to be considered in the calculation you use to determine the costs and benefits. I think Peters does a good job of walking you through these concepts using a basic example of cost-benefit analysis. It is important to note that although we rarely use Pareto Optimality as a goal in policy analysis (because it is usually an impossible standard to meet) it likely works much better as a criterion for ethical analysis. Certainly, ensuring that no one is made worse off by government action is a stronger ethical stance than assuming that the individuals who benefit from government action will somehow compensate those who are burdened by government action.
As Peters points out there are many problems associated with the use of cost-benefit analysis. It requires a lot of assumptions about risk and future circumstances. Small changes in those assumptions can drastically change the predicted net benefit of a program. In a policy world where solutions are often looking for problems, interest groups have substantial power, policymakers are politically motivated, and competition for funds is the primary rule of the game the temptation to make favorable assumptions about the future of one's preferred project is overwhelming. I believe the perception that cost-benefit analysis is preferable to other forms of analysis because it is straightforward is really an incorrect perception. Cost-benefit analysis can be just as subjective as ethical analysis.
Further, while cost-benefit analysis can help us choose projects out of a list, it offers very little normative advice. It cannot answer the question "what should government do?" We have to draw on our cultural and social values for that. Peters' discussion of "ethical analysis" is really about these value questions. After Stone, his recommendations likely seem a little quaint but they are as follows: the preservation of life, the preservation of individual autonomy, truthfulness, fairness, and deservedness. In many ways these parallel with Stone's values of security, liberty, and equity with truthfulness added for good measure. Of course as we saw with Stone, actually defining what these values mean and whose definition we should use is the difficult part.
I agree with Peters assessment that we as policy analysts are over-reliant on cost-benefit analysis because of its apparent objectivity in comparison to ethical analysis. Policymakers are a different story. Some policymakers have become little more than rubber stamps for programs with positive cost-benefit analysis, but currently values seem to be the prominent metric determining whether or not policies proceed through the policy process we discussed during the first few weeks of class. Many of the policies Congress is considering are policies that invoke those tough ethical questions such as Don't Ask, Don't Tell; defunding Planned Parenthood, immigration policies, and even the debate over the deficit. Cost-benefit analyses have played very little role in these debates. This leads me to two questions: Would we be better off if policymakers used the cost-benefit analyses provided by policy analysts rather than relying on their own definitions of values, and what is the state of the policy analyst profession if their primary means of analysis is often ignored by policymakers?
There are other reasons why it may make sense to combine these two chapters. In some ways, cost-benefit analysis can be thought of as a specific type of consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism is just a fancy way of saying "the ends justify the means". Of course, this form of ethics can lead to many actions that we would consider unethical, but it is often used in public policy creation. Basically, cost-benefit analysis is attempting to reach a Pareto Optimal outcome, where no one is made worse off but at least one person is made better off, or a Kaldor-Hicks outcome where society experiences a net-gain. In this case, the ends and the means are quantified so that the ends justify the means if the outcome is a net monetary benefit. Of course, opportunity costs, consumer surpluses, unintended consequences, and net values need to be considered in the calculation you use to determine the costs and benefits. I think Peters does a good job of walking you through these concepts using a basic example of cost-benefit analysis. It is important to note that although we rarely use Pareto Optimality as a goal in policy analysis (because it is usually an impossible standard to meet) it likely works much better as a criterion for ethical analysis. Certainly, ensuring that no one is made worse off by government action is a stronger ethical stance than assuming that the individuals who benefit from government action will somehow compensate those who are burdened by government action.
As Peters points out there are many problems associated with the use of cost-benefit analysis. It requires a lot of assumptions about risk and future circumstances. Small changes in those assumptions can drastically change the predicted net benefit of a program. In a policy world where solutions are often looking for problems, interest groups have substantial power, policymakers are politically motivated, and competition for funds is the primary rule of the game the temptation to make favorable assumptions about the future of one's preferred project is overwhelming. I believe the perception that cost-benefit analysis is preferable to other forms of analysis because it is straightforward is really an incorrect perception. Cost-benefit analysis can be just as subjective as ethical analysis.
Further, while cost-benefit analysis can help us choose projects out of a list, it offers very little normative advice. It cannot answer the question "what should government do?" We have to draw on our cultural and social values for that. Peters' discussion of "ethical analysis" is really about these value questions. After Stone, his recommendations likely seem a little quaint but they are as follows: the preservation of life, the preservation of individual autonomy, truthfulness, fairness, and deservedness. In many ways these parallel with Stone's values of security, liberty, and equity with truthfulness added for good measure. Of course as we saw with Stone, actually defining what these values mean and whose definition we should use is the difficult part.
I agree with Peters assessment that we as policy analysts are over-reliant on cost-benefit analysis because of its apparent objectivity in comparison to ethical analysis. Policymakers are a different story. Some policymakers have become little more than rubber stamps for programs with positive cost-benefit analysis, but currently values seem to be the prominent metric determining whether or not policies proceed through the policy process we discussed during the first few weeks of class. Many of the policies Congress is considering are policies that invoke those tough ethical questions such as Don't Ask, Don't Tell; defunding Planned Parenthood, immigration policies, and even the debate over the deficit. Cost-benefit analyses have played very little role in these debates. This leads me to two questions: Would we be better off if policymakers used the cost-benefit analyses provided by policy analysts rather than relying on their own definitions of values, and what is the state of the policy analyst profession if their primary means of analysis is often ignored by policymakers?
Tuesday, November 15, 2011
Policy Paradox and Homelessness
This week we aren't discussing any new theoretical topics, instead we are reviewing some of what we learned from Stone and seeing how you would use Stone's point of view to analyze policy debates. This is a transition into the week after Thanksgiving when we will briefly cover Cost Benefit and Ethical Analysis. Policy analysis is the topic for PAF 471, which will be offered next semester so if you enjoy these topics and want to learn more, I would recommend registering for the course.
In Policy Paradox in Action, Deborah Stone analyzes the history and discourse surrounding Affirmative Action using the framework she presents in this book. She illustrates how you can use the critiques she provides to critically examine policy evidence and argument. She points out where she is using each critique in her analysis. You'll notice that we didn't cover all of the goals, problems, and solutions she discusses. I hope that if you are interested in learning more about what we had to skip that you will at least go back and skim the relevant chapters.
In some ways, this may seem like another substantive chapter about Affirmative Action. While I'm happy that this is an opportunity to learn a little more about the topic, that's not what I want you to take away from this reading. I want you to see that you can combine discussions of goals, problem definition, and policy tools to think critically about public policies, legislation, and implementation. As we'll discuss in two weeks, this does not mean that statistical and cost benefit analysis do not provide valuable insight into our public policy choices. All that I ask (and that I believe Stone asks) is that you approach these analyses skeptically, engage with their methods, and question the possible agenda of those who are conducting them. After thinking critically about them, you can decide for yourself how valuable each analysis is and how close it comes to representing "the truth".
As I mentioned on Twitter, one of the challenges for this week is to read the Housing the Homeless chapter and watch the Street Vets documentary using Stone's critical lens. This chapter was chosen for this week because so many of the issues we are debating in homelessness policy have to do with the questions Stone's book challenges us to think about. Most importantly, the question of numbers and defining who to count as homeless is a major one giving the changing face of "housing insecurity" in the current recession. The chapter also raises the question of using veterans as a synecdoche for the problem of homelessness, given the changing nature of the problem. We have stories about inadvertent (PTSD), accidental (temporary job loss), and mechanical (recessionary effects, lack of mental health and substance abuse treatment) causes. We also have a variety of policy solutions that make very different assumptions about their target populations. Were you able to read this chapter without being influenced by Stone's critical viewpoint? How do you think the debates presented in the chapter held up to Stone's scrutiny? Did you see other elements associated with the polis in the chapter?
In Policy Paradox in Action, Deborah Stone analyzes the history and discourse surrounding Affirmative Action using the framework she presents in this book. She illustrates how you can use the critiques she provides to critically examine policy evidence and argument. She points out where she is using each critique in her analysis. You'll notice that we didn't cover all of the goals, problems, and solutions she discusses. I hope that if you are interested in learning more about what we had to skip that you will at least go back and skim the relevant chapters.
In some ways, this may seem like another substantive chapter about Affirmative Action. While I'm happy that this is an opportunity to learn a little more about the topic, that's not what I want you to take away from this reading. I want you to see that you can combine discussions of goals, problem definition, and policy tools to think critically about public policies, legislation, and implementation. As we'll discuss in two weeks, this does not mean that statistical and cost benefit analysis do not provide valuable insight into our public policy choices. All that I ask (and that I believe Stone asks) is that you approach these analyses skeptically, engage with their methods, and question the possible agenda of those who are conducting them. After thinking critically about them, you can decide for yourself how valuable each analysis is and how close it comes to representing "the truth".
As I mentioned on Twitter, one of the challenges for this week is to read the Housing the Homeless chapter and watch the Street Vets documentary using Stone's critical lens. This chapter was chosen for this week because so many of the issues we are debating in homelessness policy have to do with the questions Stone's book challenges us to think about. Most importantly, the question of numbers and defining who to count as homeless is a major one giving the changing face of "housing insecurity" in the current recession. The chapter also raises the question of using veterans as a synecdoche for the problem of homelessness, given the changing nature of the problem. We have stories about inadvertent (PTSD), accidental (temporary job loss), and mechanical (recessionary effects, lack of mental health and substance abuse treatment) causes. We also have a variety of policy solutions that make very different assumptions about their target populations. Were you able to read this chapter without being influenced by Stone's critical viewpoint? How do you think the debates presented in the chapter held up to Stone's scrutiny? Did you see other elements associated with the polis in the chapter?
Tuesday, November 8, 2011
My Thoughts on Inducements and Policy Paradox in Action
The fourth section in Stone's book deals with solutions to policy problems. Stone lists five possible solutions: inducements, rules, facts, rights, and powers. Sometimes we refer to these solutions as policy instruments or policy tools. They serve as the mechanisms through which government or the community exerts its power on individuals to change their behavior. I chose to assign chapter 11 on inducements rather than one of the other chapters because inducements tend to be our preferred tool in American public policy.
Inducements are the common strategy of rewarding preferred behaviors and penalizing undesired actions. Sanctions and incentives are two-sides of the same coin. They allow the individual to choose his or her behavior but seek to alter the anticipated rewards or penalties for carrying out that behavior. The removal a sanction for good behavior or an incentive for bad behavior illustrates the inter-related nature of sanctions and incentives. This is especially true when we consider research in behavioral economics. Studies have shown that we feel a loss much more sharply than we feel a lack of gain. In other words, you would feel worse about a salary reduction of $300 a month than you would feel about not getting a raise of $300 a month even though they are numerically equivalent.
Inducements are based on the understanding of human behavior characteristic of economics. It assumes that individuals are rational, that they know what will make them happy, and that they act to maximize their happiness. In order for inducements to work individuals must have control over their behavior, they must know about the possible penalty or reward, and they must be able to change their course of action. When inducements are used to act on a group or another collective entity, these assumptions usually fail. At the vary least, it makes the rational decision-making process more difficult. Inducements must be designed differently in these cases to account for the processes of group decision-making in a particular context.
Inducements are also affected by time. It is rare for an incentive or sanction to be delivered immediately after a good or bad action occurs. Even when we can deliver such an inducement, it always occurs after the act. Individuals or groups must be able to anticipate such inducements before they carry out a behavior. Many of our financial incentives and sanctions are delivered through the tax code. This creates a gap in time of up to a year from when the behavior occurs to when the inducement is delivered. If individuals or groups do not believe they will personally have to deal with long-term penalties or receive long-term benefits, then the inducement will be ineffective.
Inducements tend to imply purposeful action. They may try to alter actions with either intentional or inadvertent causes, but they do little to alter mechanical or accidental causes over which individuals have no control. This is why causal stories can be very important. If you want to benefit or burden a group using inducements you have to be able to tell a story about purposeful actions. Although not assigned for this class, the documentary and book, Freakonomics tells a story about the use of monetary inducements to encourage students in a high school to improve their grades. The program seems to work for some students but does not for most of them. This is a common story in public policy. Any time we use a policy tool, particularly inducements to alter behavior we have three groups. We have a group who will always do the desired behavior, a group that will never do the desired behavior, and a group that will change its behavior in response to the right inducement. This group is called the marginal group. Designing a good inducement is difficult because we have to decide the correct value of the inducement and target it to the changeable group. This can bring up a tension between efficiency and equity. It would be more equitable to ensure that everyone who performs a good behavior is rewarded with an incentive, but it is not efficient to reward the group who would perform a good behavior without an incentive.
Although positive and negative inducements are two-sides of the same coin, they can have different effects in the polis. Positive inducements help communities to build trust, goodwill, and cooperation while negative inducements can create conflicts and divisions. Rewards build upon a shared sacrifice. The giver gives up the reward and the receiver gives up his or her desired behavior. Sanctions result in one or both parties experiencing a cost or loss. Of course, we must remember that whether rewards or sanctions are offered, they are both based on an unequal power relationship where one group or individual is able to change the behavior of another.
The design of inducements in the polis is an art. Large positive incentives can lead to excessive competition and even cheating. Large negative sanctions can lead to a reluctance to enforce them. Sanctions or rewards that require a lot of effort on behalf of the giver are often not carried out. Incentives and sanctions can easily become guarantees when the giver is perceived as having little will or power to remove them. When the giver and receiver are very different, there may be a misunderstanding about what type of incentive or sanction will change behavior. Symbolic understandings of need come into play because behaviors that are tied to identity are often impossible to change.
Of course, no inducement operates in isolation. Individuals and groups are motivated by their own desires, but also by inducements imposed by government, business, friends, family, colleagues etc. Even if we accept the assumption that humans are calculating and weigh costs and benefits before they act, an inducement instituted through the policy process is only one small influence on behavior. This is especially true when individuals can adapt their behavior to strategically avoid the consequences of a sanction or reap the rewards of an incentive when it is not really deserved. Going back to the Freakonomics example, if we targeted our incentive only to those students who were able to bring their grades up from a D or F to an A or B, we may see a group of formerly A or B students whose grades drop significantly so they can later receive the incentive for bringing their grades back up to A's or B's. We often refer to this as a perverse incentive, but it is really a consequence of individual rational choice and adaptability.
Inducements are the common strategy of rewarding preferred behaviors and penalizing undesired actions. Sanctions and incentives are two-sides of the same coin. They allow the individual to choose his or her behavior but seek to alter the anticipated rewards or penalties for carrying out that behavior. The removal a sanction for good behavior or an incentive for bad behavior illustrates the inter-related nature of sanctions and incentives. This is especially true when we consider research in behavioral economics. Studies have shown that we feel a loss much more sharply than we feel a lack of gain. In other words, you would feel worse about a salary reduction of $300 a month than you would feel about not getting a raise of $300 a month even though they are numerically equivalent.
Inducements are based on the understanding of human behavior characteristic of economics. It assumes that individuals are rational, that they know what will make them happy, and that they act to maximize their happiness. In order for inducements to work individuals must have control over their behavior, they must know about the possible penalty or reward, and they must be able to change their course of action. When inducements are used to act on a group or another collective entity, these assumptions usually fail. At the vary least, it makes the rational decision-making process more difficult. Inducements must be designed differently in these cases to account for the processes of group decision-making in a particular context.
Inducements are also affected by time. It is rare for an incentive or sanction to be delivered immediately after a good or bad action occurs. Even when we can deliver such an inducement, it always occurs after the act. Individuals or groups must be able to anticipate such inducements before they carry out a behavior. Many of our financial incentives and sanctions are delivered through the tax code. This creates a gap in time of up to a year from when the behavior occurs to when the inducement is delivered. If individuals or groups do not believe they will personally have to deal with long-term penalties or receive long-term benefits, then the inducement will be ineffective.
Inducements tend to imply purposeful action. They may try to alter actions with either intentional or inadvertent causes, but they do little to alter mechanical or accidental causes over which individuals have no control. This is why causal stories can be very important. If you want to benefit or burden a group using inducements you have to be able to tell a story about purposeful actions. Although not assigned for this class, the documentary and book, Freakonomics tells a story about the use of monetary inducements to encourage students in a high school to improve their grades. The program seems to work for some students but does not for most of them. This is a common story in public policy. Any time we use a policy tool, particularly inducements to alter behavior we have three groups. We have a group who will always do the desired behavior, a group that will never do the desired behavior, and a group that will change its behavior in response to the right inducement. This group is called the marginal group. Designing a good inducement is difficult because we have to decide the correct value of the inducement and target it to the changeable group. This can bring up a tension between efficiency and equity. It would be more equitable to ensure that everyone who performs a good behavior is rewarded with an incentive, but it is not efficient to reward the group who would perform a good behavior without an incentive.
Although positive and negative inducements are two-sides of the same coin, they can have different effects in the polis. Positive inducements help communities to build trust, goodwill, and cooperation while negative inducements can create conflicts and divisions. Rewards build upon a shared sacrifice. The giver gives up the reward and the receiver gives up his or her desired behavior. Sanctions result in one or both parties experiencing a cost or loss. Of course, we must remember that whether rewards or sanctions are offered, they are both based on an unequal power relationship where one group or individual is able to change the behavior of another.
The design of inducements in the polis is an art. Large positive incentives can lead to excessive competition and even cheating. Large negative sanctions can lead to a reluctance to enforce them. Sanctions or rewards that require a lot of effort on behalf of the giver are often not carried out. Incentives and sanctions can easily become guarantees when the giver is perceived as having little will or power to remove them. When the giver and receiver are very different, there may be a misunderstanding about what type of incentive or sanction will change behavior. Symbolic understandings of need come into play because behaviors that are tied to identity are often impossible to change.
Of course, no inducement operates in isolation. Individuals and groups are motivated by their own desires, but also by inducements imposed by government, business, friends, family, colleagues etc. Even if we accept the assumption that humans are calculating and weigh costs and benefits before they act, an inducement instituted through the policy process is only one small influence on behavior. This is especially true when individuals can adapt their behavior to strategically avoid the consequences of a sanction or reap the rewards of an incentive when it is not really deserved. Going back to the Freakonomics example, if we targeted our incentive only to those students who were able to bring their grades up from a D or F to an A or B, we may see a group of formerly A or B students whose grades drop significantly so they can later receive the incentive for bringing their grades back up to A's or B's. We often refer to this as a perverse incentive, but it is really a consequence of individual rational choice and adaptability.
My Thoughts on Energy and the Environment
I want to preface this week's post by saying that energy and environmental policy is not my area of expertise. In fact, out of all the policy topics we are discussing this semester, it is the area where I have done the least substantive work. That being said, I think it is incredibly important. I will not be able to add much substantive information to what Peters, the podcast, and the documentary have presented, but I can use my expertise in the policy process to explain why policymaking in the environmental arena is so challenging.
First, I want to call us back to chapter three. In this chapter, Peters talks briefly about wicked problems as areas where the Advocacy Coalition Framework is particularly useful. A wicked problem is a problem that is impossible to solve because of a lack of information, contradictory demands, and complexity. I believe that environmental problems may be the most wicked of problems that policymakers and analysts face. It is impossible to separate the environment from energy use, the economy, and most essentially, our values and way of life. I think that the documentary Heat makes it clear that an American way of life as an ideal for citizens of developing countries is completely unsustainable. Further, humans are very bad at long-range thinking, and even worse at making decisions that will benefit us in the long-run but cause inconvenience in the short-run. In theory, we'd all rather engage in a small inconvenience now if it means avoiding a catastrophic outcome later, but in reality that's not what we choose. It is hard for us to cognitively accept the idea that the future will realistically be radically worse than the present. There have been many psychological and behavioral economics studies detailing this point.
Economic principles like the collective action problem are rampant in environmental policy. Business interests who have been very profitable in the context of the status quo have huge incentives to fight regulations that will immediately affect their bottom line. On the other hand, most citizens will only see diffuse benefits of environmental regulation, spread out over the whole population. Further, these benefits may not be seen immediately and may not be measurable at all. We do not take note when an environmental disaster does not occur only when it does. Measuring the success of environmental policy is nearly impossible because it so often means that something does not happen.
Environmental policy tends to be reactive. When a huge disaster like the BP oil spill, Exxon Valdez, or the failure of the nuclear plants in Japan after the earthquakes takes place we tend to try to take action immediately. Instances like these and Silver Spring lead to reactive environmental policies that try to prevent similar accidents from happening again. On the other hand, issues like global warming which do not lead to immediate and visible accidents but instead act as a contributory cause to many disperse problems become increasingly difficult to deal with from a policy standpoint. They are also easier to deny because they force us to rely on scientific expertise rather than our own experiences of the world. This becomes clear in a This American Life podcast, Act Two of Kid Politics (not assigned) where a leading scientist who studies climate change attempts to change the mind of a high-schooler who is a climate change skeptic.
Ultimately, solving our environmental problems becomes difficult for policymakers because neither of the two approaches work very well. Conservation as proposed by Jimmy Carter requires action on the part of citizens, residents and businesses. Once again we have a classic collective action problem. The benefits of conservation only accrue if substantial numbers of people engage in it. This leads to a free-rider problem where those who do not engage in conservation also see the benefits. The problem is that there are incentives for everyone to be a free-rider causing conservation to fail. Of course government could step in and create economic incentives for conservation like "cash for clunkers" which subsidized the purchase of more fuel efficient vehicles for those scrapping older less efficient vehicles. On the other hand, finding more energy sources may work in the short-run, but ultimately fossil fuels are limited, nuclear power is politically unpopular, and none of our renewable sources can come close to a substitution for fossil fuels. Here too, government can step in with more funding for research and development of new technologies and subsidize the use of hydro-power, wind power, and solar power. Of course, as the ethanol experiment has shown, subsidizing these forms of power may create undesirable unintended consequences.
One of the issues with Peters' book is that this chapter was likely written before fracking aka hydraulic fracturing became a visible problem. Peters' section on natural gas section is very short and provides little substantive information. There is a lot of information about this process from a variety of sources, but the documentary "Gasland" seems to be one of the best sources in terms of explaining the fracking risk.
First, I want to call us back to chapter three. In this chapter, Peters talks briefly about wicked problems as areas where the Advocacy Coalition Framework is particularly useful. A wicked problem is a problem that is impossible to solve because of a lack of information, contradictory demands, and complexity. I believe that environmental problems may be the most wicked of problems that policymakers and analysts face. It is impossible to separate the environment from energy use, the economy, and most essentially, our values and way of life. I think that the documentary Heat makes it clear that an American way of life as an ideal for citizens of developing countries is completely unsustainable. Further, humans are very bad at long-range thinking, and even worse at making decisions that will benefit us in the long-run but cause inconvenience in the short-run. In theory, we'd all rather engage in a small inconvenience now if it means avoiding a catastrophic outcome later, but in reality that's not what we choose. It is hard for us to cognitively accept the idea that the future will realistically be radically worse than the present. There have been many psychological and behavioral economics studies detailing this point.
Economic principles like the collective action problem are rampant in environmental policy. Business interests who have been very profitable in the context of the status quo have huge incentives to fight regulations that will immediately affect their bottom line. On the other hand, most citizens will only see diffuse benefits of environmental regulation, spread out over the whole population. Further, these benefits may not be seen immediately and may not be measurable at all. We do not take note when an environmental disaster does not occur only when it does. Measuring the success of environmental policy is nearly impossible because it so often means that something does not happen.
Environmental policy tends to be reactive. When a huge disaster like the BP oil spill, Exxon Valdez, or the failure of the nuclear plants in Japan after the earthquakes takes place we tend to try to take action immediately. Instances like these and Silver Spring lead to reactive environmental policies that try to prevent similar accidents from happening again. On the other hand, issues like global warming which do not lead to immediate and visible accidents but instead act as a contributory cause to many disperse problems become increasingly difficult to deal with from a policy standpoint. They are also easier to deny because they force us to rely on scientific expertise rather than our own experiences of the world. This becomes clear in a This American Life podcast, Act Two of Kid Politics (not assigned) where a leading scientist who studies climate change attempts to change the mind of a high-schooler who is a climate change skeptic.
Ultimately, solving our environmental problems becomes difficult for policymakers because neither of the two approaches work very well. Conservation as proposed by Jimmy Carter requires action on the part of citizens, residents and businesses. Once again we have a classic collective action problem. The benefits of conservation only accrue if substantial numbers of people engage in it. This leads to a free-rider problem where those who do not engage in conservation also see the benefits. The problem is that there are incentives for everyone to be a free-rider causing conservation to fail. Of course government could step in and create economic incentives for conservation like "cash for clunkers" which subsidized the purchase of more fuel efficient vehicles for those scrapping older less efficient vehicles. On the other hand, finding more energy sources may work in the short-run, but ultimately fossil fuels are limited, nuclear power is politically unpopular, and none of our renewable sources can come close to a substitution for fossil fuels. Here too, government can step in with more funding for research and development of new technologies and subsidize the use of hydro-power, wind power, and solar power. Of course, as the ethanol experiment has shown, subsidizing these forms of power may create undesirable unintended consequences.
One of the issues with Peters' book is that this chapter was likely written before fracking aka hydraulic fracturing became a visible problem. Peters' section on natural gas section is very short and provides little substantive information. There is a lot of information about this process from a variety of sources, but the documentary "Gasland" seems to be one of the best sources in terms of explaining the fracking risk.
Wednesday, November 2, 2011
The Cause of Our Discontent
So far, we have read about two types of problem definition in the polis: symbols and numbers. Generally, the numbers and symbols we use to make a policy argument are meant to tell, or at least imply, a causal story. When we are unhappy with the status quo, particularly when we feel that things have gone very wrong, our "nature" as humans is to try to find the cause. Quite a bit of our recent politicking has been consumed by the so-called "blame game" in which one politician attempts to claim the other is responsible for the problems we face. We see this phenomenon now, with Democrats blaming the economic crash on the trend of Wall Street deregulation and Republicans blaming the Community Reinvestment Act, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac. Like most problems in the polis, the "true" cause is likely attributed to all of these, plus many other contributory factors, some of which could have at least been partially mediated by policy and others which were out of government's control.
Turning to this week's substantive reading and documentary, another recent instance where things went horribly wrong was the 2005 response to hurricane Katrina. We can establish certain facts about what happened in this case. On August 29th, 2005 Katrina, a category 3 hurricane, hit the southeastern Louisiana coast. New Orleans, LA a southern city, built below sea-level, with large low-income and African American populations was in the path of the hurricane. New Orleans was (and is today) protected from storm surges by a series of levees built by the Army Corps of Engineers. One day prior to landfall, the Mayor of New Orleans ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city. After the storm hit, the levee system failed causing areas of the city of New Orleans, many of them historically Black and lower income, to flood. Thousands of residents who had not left the city were stranded in flooded homes and neighborhoods for days. Those who had evacuated to the Superdome and Convention Center faced overcrowding and resource shortages. Aid from local, state, and federal governments was slow to arrive, and much of the food and water aid did not arrive until seven days after the hurricane hit. Over 700 New Orleans residents lost their lives in the flood and hundreds of thousands were displaced. An estimated 100,000 have yet to return home. The government response to hurricane Katrina has generally been considered a complete failure. Controversy over who is to blame and for what, continues even today.
In her chapter on causes, Stone presents four general types of causes: accidental, mechanical, inadvertent, and intentional. We have seen arguments for all of these causes in the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Least satisfying, and least likely to be true, is the accidental cause argument. Basically, this argument would posit that a hurricane is a force of nature and no one could have anticipated or predicted what the effects of such a hurricane could be. Alternatively, one could argue that even with complete preparation and "mitigation", the levees would have failed and people would have lost their lives. In other words, what happened was out of anyone's control. I believe that evidence from the documentary and the reading shows that this explanation is incorrect in this case.
We often see the argument that FEMA's response was ineffective due to mechanical causes. The federalist system required the state and local government to authorize a federal response, and such a response was never received by the federal government from the state of Louisiana. Of course, state and local officials vehemently dispute this fact. Many have also argued that the reorganization of FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security caused the agency to lose a substantial number of highly-trained experts and funding for disaster response. The employees of FEMA were, in this story, doing their job to the best of their ability, but were hampered by systemic issues. A similar story has been told about the National Guard response to Katrina. There is more about both of these mechanical explanations in the reading and documentary.
There is also an inadvertent story at play in the Katrina story. Many have argued that the people of New Orleans would have left the city if they could but were either uninformed or unable to do so. Many lacked correct information about flood zones and the likelihood that the levees would burst. Public transportation out of the city was lacking. By the time the evacuation order was issued, it was too late for many to coordinate sufficient transportation. There may also have been an unwillingness to believe that this was "the one" or that their usual hurricane preparations would be inadequate. Some argue that the existence of government emergency response agencies was itself an inadvertent cause of the devastation, creating a false sense of security among those affected.
Finally, we heard a substantial number of intentional causal explanations for the devastation caused by Katrina and the botched government efforts to return residents to the city after the storm. As Kanye West famously stated in the televised fundraiser for Katrina relief, "George Bush doesn't care about black people." This sentiment underlies many of the arguments that the devastation caused by the hurricane was intentional. Some believed that the levees were purposely blown to flood low-income neighborhoods and preserve wealthier white New Orleans neighborhoods. Many believe that the bureaucratic red tape surrounding the Road Home program was created to keep poor African American former residents from returning home. Stories of intentional causation are sometimes labeled "conspiracy theories". While they are often untrue, the tobacco settlement discussed by Stone illustrates that some conspiracy theories contain at least a degree of truth. If you have not seen the film "The Insider", it is worth a watch to see how an intentional causal explanation evolved from conspiracy theory to truth.
In reality, the causes of social problems and natural disasters are complex and multi-faceted, but "It's complicated" is rarely a satisfying explanation in the polis. Politicians try to avoid blame for problems by shifting the blame to their political opponents. This occurs with any problem, whether it is a devastating natural disaster or a long-standing persistent issue. How would you use these causal theories to explain a longstanding problem, like poverty or health disparities, in the polis? Have you seen politicians use these theories to explain problems in the presidential primary debates?
Turning to this week's substantive reading and documentary, another recent instance where things went horribly wrong was the 2005 response to hurricane Katrina. We can establish certain facts about what happened in this case. On August 29th, 2005 Katrina, a category 3 hurricane, hit the southeastern Louisiana coast. New Orleans, LA a southern city, built below sea-level, with large low-income and African American populations was in the path of the hurricane. New Orleans was (and is today) protected from storm surges by a series of levees built by the Army Corps of Engineers. One day prior to landfall, the Mayor of New Orleans ordered a mandatory evacuation of the city. After the storm hit, the levee system failed causing areas of the city of New Orleans, many of them historically Black and lower income, to flood. Thousands of residents who had not left the city were stranded in flooded homes and neighborhoods for days. Those who had evacuated to the Superdome and Convention Center faced overcrowding and resource shortages. Aid from local, state, and federal governments was slow to arrive, and much of the food and water aid did not arrive until seven days after the hurricane hit. Over 700 New Orleans residents lost their lives in the flood and hundreds of thousands were displaced. An estimated 100,000 have yet to return home. The government response to hurricane Katrina has generally been considered a complete failure. Controversy over who is to blame and for what, continues even today.
In her chapter on causes, Stone presents four general types of causes: accidental, mechanical, inadvertent, and intentional. We have seen arguments for all of these causes in the Hurricane Katrina disaster. Least satisfying, and least likely to be true, is the accidental cause argument. Basically, this argument would posit that a hurricane is a force of nature and no one could have anticipated or predicted what the effects of such a hurricane could be. Alternatively, one could argue that even with complete preparation and "mitigation", the levees would have failed and people would have lost their lives. In other words, what happened was out of anyone's control. I believe that evidence from the documentary and the reading shows that this explanation is incorrect in this case.
We often see the argument that FEMA's response was ineffective due to mechanical causes. The federalist system required the state and local government to authorize a federal response, and such a response was never received by the federal government from the state of Louisiana. Of course, state and local officials vehemently dispute this fact. Many have also argued that the reorganization of FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security caused the agency to lose a substantial number of highly-trained experts and funding for disaster response. The employees of FEMA were, in this story, doing their job to the best of their ability, but were hampered by systemic issues. A similar story has been told about the National Guard response to Katrina. There is more about both of these mechanical explanations in the reading and documentary.
There is also an inadvertent story at play in the Katrina story. Many have argued that the people of New Orleans would have left the city if they could but were either uninformed or unable to do so. Many lacked correct information about flood zones and the likelihood that the levees would burst. Public transportation out of the city was lacking. By the time the evacuation order was issued, it was too late for many to coordinate sufficient transportation. There may also have been an unwillingness to believe that this was "the one" or that their usual hurricane preparations would be inadequate. Some argue that the existence of government emergency response agencies was itself an inadvertent cause of the devastation, creating a false sense of security among those affected.
Finally, we heard a substantial number of intentional causal explanations for the devastation caused by Katrina and the botched government efforts to return residents to the city after the storm. As Kanye West famously stated in the televised fundraiser for Katrina relief, "George Bush doesn't care about black people." This sentiment underlies many of the arguments that the devastation caused by the hurricane was intentional. Some believed that the levees were purposely blown to flood low-income neighborhoods and preserve wealthier white New Orleans neighborhoods. Many believe that the bureaucratic red tape surrounding the Road Home program was created to keep poor African American former residents from returning home. Stories of intentional causation are sometimes labeled "conspiracy theories". While they are often untrue, the tobacco settlement discussed by Stone illustrates that some conspiracy theories contain at least a degree of truth. If you have not seen the film "The Insider", it is worth a watch to see how an intentional causal explanation evolved from conspiracy theory to truth.
In reality, the causes of social problems and natural disasters are complex and multi-faceted, but "It's complicated" is rarely a satisfying explanation in the polis. Politicians try to avoid blame for problems by shifting the blame to their political opponents. This occurs with any problem, whether it is a devastating natural disaster or a long-standing persistent issue. How would you use these causal theories to explain a longstanding problem, like poverty or health disparities, in the polis? Have you seen politicians use these theories to explain problems in the presidential primary debates?
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
My Thoughts on Economic Policy
Given the current economic climate, I anticipate that this will be a busy week for discussions. I think that the materials provided for this week - the chapter from Peters, the Planet Money podcast, and the documentary - illustrate how broadly the government can intervene in the economy, how important the economy is to the political prospects of the President, and ultimately how little control the government actually has over what happens in the economy.
Although scholars agree that the government has little actual control over the economy, there is still some debate over the degree to which the government can or should intervene. If you have not already seen this "music video" explaining the difference between the Keynesian and Hayek-ian perspective, I highly recommend it.
Here we see both an Austrian school (laissez-faire) and a Keynesian (interventionist) perspective on what and how much government should do to address economic downturns. During the debt ceiling debate, Senator Dick Durbin stated that the debt ceiling bill "Put [Keynes] to his final rest", signaling a huge turning point in American macroeconomic policy and a return to a more laissez-faire approach to the economy. Of course, we have since seen President Obama present the American Jobs Act, which includes a vast array of Keynesian based proposals (government investment in infrastructure and public service and subsidized employment programs).
The video does not discuss the current prominent understanding of economics, the Chicago School neo-classical perspective associated with Milton Friedman and George Stigler. These economists prefer a laissez-faire form of capitalism similar to Hayek, but arrive at that recommendation through different assumptions and methodologies. Despite Obama's portrayal by some on the right as a "socialist", many of Obama's economic advisers follow the Chicago School approach to the economy, perhaps explaining some of his recent tax and budget compromises. Despite its popularity in conservative political circles, supply-side economics is rarely discussed as a serious theoretical approach to macroeconomic policy. Even when the Laffer curve is invoked, we often ignore the fact that there are two sides to the curve, one side where government revenue rises concurrent with taxation and another where it falls in response to higher taxation.
Perhaps the biggest disagreement among economists and politicians appears to be the mechanism through which government should act on the economy. As the podcast, How Do You Create a Job? illustrates, government can create conditions that are likely to create jobs either through reducing restrictions and taxation of business or through taxing and providing more services. We see this trade-off when localities attempt to attract business, as well. The key is finding the balance that fosters the creation of good jobs and provides services that government can deliver well. As this statement from the former CEO of Intel illustrates, low-taxes alone are not a good economic development strategy.
At this point in time, the future of the economy and government's role as a regulator and participant remains uncertain. We have seen a Keynesian approach with the stimulus package, a more supply-side approach with the extension of the Bush tax-cuts, and a Corporatist approach with the bailouts. Prior to the summer, the economy appeared to be on an upswing, although it was a comparatively anemic upswing in terms of job creation and unemployment. The manufactured debt ceiling crisis (itself a lesson in agenda-setting) seems to have stalled recovery due to uncertainty and anxiety about the American political process. Suddenly, we find ourselves in the midst of a likely double-dip recession with consumer confidence at a low-point and anger from both the political left and right coming to a head. The so-called super-committee is currently in negotiations to prevent another showdown similar to the debt ceiling crisis of the summer, but early reports seem to indicate that compromise will be difficult to achieve. The President has embarked on a "jobs tour" and is making job creation his current policy priority, but as we have seen, Congress appears unwilling to pass the American Jobs Act as it is written. In response, Obama has shifted his focus to the regulatory and implementation process to implement mortgage reform and other programs that his administration believes will stimulate the economy (If you need any further evidence that the policy stages process is not as neat and tidy as theory suggests, just look at how economic policy is currently progressing). Perhaps the biggest issue with our economy at the moment is inequality; with African Americans, Latinos, low-skilled workers, and the young facing extremely high unemployment and the erosion of wealth accumulated prior to the economic collapse. It is impossible to tell what the next few months will bring, but I can almost guarantee that discussion of the economy will dominate the 2012 elections.
Although scholars agree that the government has little actual control over the economy, there is still some debate over the degree to which the government can or should intervene. If you have not already seen this "music video" explaining the difference between the Keynesian and Hayek-ian perspective, I highly recommend it.
Here we see both an Austrian school (laissez-faire) and a Keynesian (interventionist) perspective on what and how much government should do to address economic downturns. During the debt ceiling debate, Senator Dick Durbin stated that the debt ceiling bill "Put [Keynes] to his final rest", signaling a huge turning point in American macroeconomic policy and a return to a more laissez-faire approach to the economy. Of course, we have since seen President Obama present the American Jobs Act, which includes a vast array of Keynesian based proposals (government investment in infrastructure and public service and subsidized employment programs).
The video does not discuss the current prominent understanding of economics, the Chicago School neo-classical perspective associated with Milton Friedman and George Stigler. These economists prefer a laissez-faire form of capitalism similar to Hayek, but arrive at that recommendation through different assumptions and methodologies. Despite Obama's portrayal by some on the right as a "socialist", many of Obama's economic advisers follow the Chicago School approach to the economy, perhaps explaining some of his recent tax and budget compromises. Despite its popularity in conservative political circles, supply-side economics is rarely discussed as a serious theoretical approach to macroeconomic policy. Even when the Laffer curve is invoked, we often ignore the fact that there are two sides to the curve, one side where government revenue rises concurrent with taxation and another where it falls in response to higher taxation.
Perhaps the biggest disagreement among economists and politicians appears to be the mechanism through which government should act on the economy. As the podcast, How Do You Create a Job? illustrates, government can create conditions that are likely to create jobs either through reducing restrictions and taxation of business or through taxing and providing more services. We see this trade-off when localities attempt to attract business, as well. The key is finding the balance that fosters the creation of good jobs and provides services that government can deliver well. As this statement from the former CEO of Intel illustrates, low-taxes alone are not a good economic development strategy.
At this point in time, the future of the economy and government's role as a regulator and participant remains uncertain. We have seen a Keynesian approach with the stimulus package, a more supply-side approach with the extension of the Bush tax-cuts, and a Corporatist approach with the bailouts. Prior to the summer, the economy appeared to be on an upswing, although it was a comparatively anemic upswing in terms of job creation and unemployment. The manufactured debt ceiling crisis (itself a lesson in agenda-setting) seems to have stalled recovery due to uncertainty and anxiety about the American political process. Suddenly, we find ourselves in the midst of a likely double-dip recession with consumer confidence at a low-point and anger from both the political left and right coming to a head. The so-called super-committee is currently in negotiations to prevent another showdown similar to the debt ceiling crisis of the summer, but early reports seem to indicate that compromise will be difficult to achieve. The President has embarked on a "jobs tour" and is making job creation his current policy priority, but as we have seen, Congress appears unwilling to pass the American Jobs Act as it is written. In response, Obama has shifted his focus to the regulatory and implementation process to implement mortgage reform and other programs that his administration believes will stimulate the economy (If you need any further evidence that the policy stages process is not as neat and tidy as theory suggests, just look at how economic policy is currently progressing). Perhaps the biggest issue with our economy at the moment is inequality; with African Americans, Latinos, low-skilled workers, and the young facing extremely high unemployment and the erosion of wealth accumulated prior to the economic collapse. It is impossible to tell what the next few months will bring, but I can almost guarantee that discussion of the economy will dominate the 2012 elections.
A Number's Worth a Thousand Words - Measuring Phenomena in the Polis
Numbers tend to be the gold-standard of policy analysis. Master's and doctoral policy programs rarely discuss qualitative analysis and tend to focus on the quantification of phenomena. As we learned last week, stories play a very important role in policy advocacy, but they tend to be ignored in the study of public policy. In my Master's of Public Policy program at Georgetown, for example, we took 3 required semesters of quantitative methods, but were not offered a qualitative course as an elective. Numbers are considered so important because they imply scientific analysis and objectivity. While the story of an individual is considered subjective and unrelated to the experiences of the population, a number is perceived as the objective picture of the issue as a whole.
Of course, anyone who has paid recent attention to political debate knows that both sides have numbers to support their point. Sometimes these numbers are directly contradictory. Occasionally, the number is completely made up like Senator Kyl's "not intended to be factual" statement that abortions are well over 90 percent of what planned parenthood does. Usually, both numbers contain some validity but vary in terms of how they count phenomena.
One of the major questions currently being debated is the extent of poverty in our society. In the section on security, I talked about relative versus absolute poverty and that certainly comes into play here. If you believe that relative poverty is important you would likely consider many more people to be poor than if you think absolute poverty is all that matters. We have two federal measures of poverty, the federal poverty threshold and the poverty guidelines. The federal policy threshold was developed by Mollie Orshansky in the 1970s and counts the pre-tax income, including any income provided by government assistance programs, of all family members and adjusts the count by the number and age of the family members. Non-cash benefits, benefits delivered through the tax-code and capital gains and losses are not counted. If your income falls below the poverty threshold, which is based on the cost of the basic basket of food necessary to meet dietary needs (adjusted for inflation) and an estimate (based on data from the 1960s) of what percent of their income families spend of food, then you are considered to be in poverty. The HHS poverty guidelines are used for program administration and simplify the census measure so that the age of family members is no longer taken into account.
Of course, many people find this measure to be problematic. Much of our aid to the poor is delivered through non-cash assistance and tax credits. Many scholars argue that without taking these sources of income into account the federal poverty level over-estimates the number of families in poverty. Others argue that families spend a much lower percentage of their income on food than they did in the 1960s due to the rising costs of housing and transportation so the federal poverty level under-estimates the number of people in poverty. Still others would argue that the federal poverty line doesn't take into account geographic variations in the cost of living so it under-estimates the number of people in poverty in large cities with high costs of living. When you read political and scholarly discussions of poverty in America (or of any issue) you have to pay attention to how they count who is in poverty and whether or not that measure is appropriate for the given context.
Stone also discusses some of the paradoxes of counting in the polis. Cost to government is often income to someone else. This is especially important in an era of contracted services. Whole industries have grown up to serve the needs of citizens that had once been fulfilled by government. As fiscal austerity measures are put in place, businesses who rely on government contracts will likely fail.
Averages become a paradox in the polis, as well. An average is a moving number. When a politician says "I want all students with low test scores to be brought up to the average", this becomes an impossible goal because the average test score moves (unless all high scoring students also come down to the average). All people want to be considered middle-class in America so we end up with a theoretical middle-class which bears little relationship to the actual statistical middle-class. We also end up with different definitions of the middle-class by party.
Finally, we have to remember that in the polis people adjust their behavior to adapt to measurement. There is an old adage in program evaluation that says "you get what you measure." If you measure one aspect of performance, that aspect will likely improve whereas other aspects will likely get worse. Measuring quantity of service will likely reduce the quality of service. Measuring pure numbers also creates the perverse incentives to cheat the system. The recent cheating scandal in Atlanta Public Schools illustrates how measurement can lead to corruption at both individual and systemic levels.
Numbers are often imbued with a sense of objectivity and scientific validity, but we have to remember that in the polis they tell stories just like symbols. You have to be just as skeptical when you hear a number as you are when you hear a story. Of course, just because numbers can be manipulated does not mean that they do not often have a degree of truth to them. My advice is to think about the source of the number, how it was measured and counted, and how other ways of measuring could have changed the statistic. Once you have skeptically examined the number, you can decide whether or not you think it is a valid measurement, or at least more or less valid than competing claims.
Of course, anyone who has paid recent attention to political debate knows that both sides have numbers to support their point. Sometimes these numbers are directly contradictory. Occasionally, the number is completely made up like Senator Kyl's "not intended to be factual" statement that abortions are well over 90 percent of what planned parenthood does. Usually, both numbers contain some validity but vary in terms of how they count phenomena.
One of the major questions currently being debated is the extent of poverty in our society. In the section on security, I talked about relative versus absolute poverty and that certainly comes into play here. If you believe that relative poverty is important you would likely consider many more people to be poor than if you think absolute poverty is all that matters. We have two federal measures of poverty, the federal poverty threshold and the poverty guidelines. The federal policy threshold was developed by Mollie Orshansky in the 1970s and counts the pre-tax income, including any income provided by government assistance programs, of all family members and adjusts the count by the number and age of the family members. Non-cash benefits, benefits delivered through the tax-code and capital gains and losses are not counted. If your income falls below the poverty threshold, which is based on the cost of the basic basket of food necessary to meet dietary needs (adjusted for inflation) and an estimate (based on data from the 1960s) of what percent of their income families spend of food, then you are considered to be in poverty. The HHS poverty guidelines are used for program administration and simplify the census measure so that the age of family members is no longer taken into account.
Of course, many people find this measure to be problematic. Much of our aid to the poor is delivered through non-cash assistance and tax credits. Many scholars argue that without taking these sources of income into account the federal poverty level over-estimates the number of families in poverty. Others argue that families spend a much lower percentage of their income on food than they did in the 1960s due to the rising costs of housing and transportation so the federal poverty level under-estimates the number of people in poverty. Still others would argue that the federal poverty line doesn't take into account geographic variations in the cost of living so it under-estimates the number of people in poverty in large cities with high costs of living. When you read political and scholarly discussions of poverty in America (or of any issue) you have to pay attention to how they count who is in poverty and whether or not that measure is appropriate for the given context.
Stone also discusses some of the paradoxes of counting in the polis. Cost to government is often income to someone else. This is especially important in an era of contracted services. Whole industries have grown up to serve the needs of citizens that had once been fulfilled by government. As fiscal austerity measures are put in place, businesses who rely on government contracts will likely fail.
Averages become a paradox in the polis, as well. An average is a moving number. When a politician says "I want all students with low test scores to be brought up to the average", this becomes an impossible goal because the average test score moves (unless all high scoring students also come down to the average). All people want to be considered middle-class in America so we end up with a theoretical middle-class which bears little relationship to the actual statistical middle-class. We also end up with different definitions of the middle-class by party.
Finally, we have to remember that in the polis people adjust their behavior to adapt to measurement. There is an old adage in program evaluation that says "you get what you measure." If you measure one aspect of performance, that aspect will likely improve whereas other aspects will likely get worse. Measuring quantity of service will likely reduce the quality of service. Measuring pure numbers also creates the perverse incentives to cheat the system. The recent cheating scandal in Atlanta Public Schools illustrates how measurement can lead to corruption at both individual and systemic levels.
Numbers are often imbued with a sense of objectivity and scientific validity, but we have to remember that in the polis they tell stories just like symbols. You have to be just as skeptical when you hear a number as you are when you hear a story. Of course, just because numbers can be manipulated does not mean that they do not often have a degree of truth to them. My advice is to think about the source of the number, how it was measured and counted, and how other ways of measuring could have changed the statistic. Once you have skeptically examined the number, you can decide whether or not you think it is a valid measurement, or at least more or less valid than competing claims.
Tuesday, October 18, 2011
Policy symbols and culture wars
This week addresses two of my favorite topics, both as a creative writer who studied poetry in graduate school, and as a doctoral student studying public administration. Our focus is on two intertwined subjects: symbols, from Stone's text, and culture wars from Peters' text. It can seem a little counter-intuitive in our field, since public administration is called on so frequently to provide technical expertise and answers to wicked problems grounded in fact. What, then, are we to do when a problem like the ones Peters describes end up in our laps? Especially since the general public does not appreciate government institutions dictating solutions to these kinds of problems (except perhaps in the courts) navigating a cultural clash can be one of the biggest challenges we will face.
In part, we must acknowledge that these issues--whether they be the debate over abortion, gay rights, environmental causes, the death penalty or other challenging topics--cannot be "solved" in the traditional sense. As Peters notes, these problems will not be resolved by throwing more money at a community, or by bargaining between groups. As public administrators, government officials can often only aid in the process that political bodies undertake, and work to treat each side in an issue as fairly as possible.
Another effort we can undertake to improve ourselves, and to improve the policy process, is to take to heart Stone's discussion of symbols, and to realize that we are affected by the same rhetoric and action that influences the general public. If we're able to dissect how policies become targeted at particular groups (people who are homeless, for example) and what that means for them, and for us as administrators of policy, we can think critically about the role that those symbols play in our own decision-making, and how we can help others to imagine other ways of relating to peers, and the broader community.
Bear in mind how the power of symbols, and the struggle of culture wars play out in this week's documentaries, which each address in their own way topics raised by Peters. You have a choice this week to watch either an episode of In the Life's "Our Bodies, Our Rights," a television program on gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender issues, or a Frontline episode "The Last Abortion Clinic."
As you go through the week's reading, also consider the ways that you may be impacted, or participating in the creation of symbols. Where do we run across broadly accepted symbols in our daily lives, and how do we know what they mean? I look forward to reading more about your thoughts!
In part, we must acknowledge that these issues--whether they be the debate over abortion, gay rights, environmental causes, the death penalty or other challenging topics--cannot be "solved" in the traditional sense. As Peters notes, these problems will not be resolved by throwing more money at a community, or by bargaining between groups. As public administrators, government officials can often only aid in the process that political bodies undertake, and work to treat each side in an issue as fairly as possible.
Another effort we can undertake to improve ourselves, and to improve the policy process, is to take to heart Stone's discussion of symbols, and to realize that we are affected by the same rhetoric and action that influences the general public. If we're able to dissect how policies become targeted at particular groups (people who are homeless, for example) and what that means for them, and for us as administrators of policy, we can think critically about the role that those symbols play in our own decision-making, and how we can help others to imagine other ways of relating to peers, and the broader community.
Bear in mind how the power of symbols, and the struggle of culture wars play out in this week's documentaries, which each address in their own way topics raised by Peters. You have a choice this week to watch either an episode of In the Life's "Our Bodies, Our Rights," a television program on gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender issues, or a Frontline episode "The Last Abortion Clinic."
As you go through the week's reading, also consider the ways that you may be impacted, or participating in the creation of symbols. Where do we run across broadly accepted symbols in our daily lives, and how do we know what they mean? I look forward to reading more about your thoughts!
Thursday, October 13, 2011
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Policy
Our documentary for the week focuses heavily on the problems associated with a punitive law enforcement strategy for minors convicted of heinous crimes. While the cases presented in the documentary When Kids Get Life are extreme and shouldn't be taken as characteristic of the experience of all convicted criminals, they illustrate the problems with a one-size fits all criminal justice policy.
As Peters mentions, most law enforcement activities tend to be carried out at the state and local level. Policies like the death penalty, automatic sentencing, diversion programs, and gun control are, for the most part, decided at lower levels of government. One exception to this rule is when a state or local government's practices are ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Relatedly, the federal government intervenes in law enforcement where it is constitutionally allowed. The power to tax, interstate commerce, and activities related to the protection of federal officials have been used to justify the activities of the FBI, ATF, DEA, Customs, Secret Service, and Border Patrol.
Two areas of criminal justice policy that have been hot-topics in the news lately are gun control and the death penalty. Last year, if you remember, the Arizona legislature passed a law allowing individuals over age 21 the right to carry a weapon on campus, but the bill was vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer. It seems certain that a similar bill will be re-introduced in the near-future. While the question of gun control has largely been left up to states and localities to decide, the second amendment limits the degree to which gun ownership can be restricted. The correct interpretation of the second amendment has been disputed throughout the history of our nation. Scholars are divided over whether or not the second amendment provides for a collective right for the states' to organize militias or an individual right to gun ownership. In the 2008 decision, District of Columbia v. Heller the Supreme Court broke with precedent on this issue and decided 5-4 that the second amendment provides for an individual right to gun ownership, striking down the DC handgun ban. Although most Americans tend to be fairly centrist on this issue and support some gun control, gun rights have served as a hot-button political topic or a so-called "wedge issue". Advocates on both sides tend to have had very personal and emotional experiences with guns and so our policies on this issue tend to be more extreme than public polling would suggest. What do you think about gun control? Should we have more restrictions on gun procurement and carrying in Arizona or fewer? Do you think concealed-carry on campus is a good idea? What concerns might you have with such a policy?
Another major hot-topic at the moment is the debate over the death penalty. The Troy Davis case has appeared to mobilize a substantial number of death penalty opponents and has called into question the equity of our judicial system. While Americans remain supportive of the use of the death penalty, in general, new understandings about the reliability of eye-witness testimony, police coercion, and circumstantial evidence has provoked questions about the use of the death penalty when evidence seems uncertain. Despite the fact that one of the leading GOP Presidential candidates seems to be unconcerned that evidence overwhelmingly suggests that an innocent man was put to death while he was governor, many Americans find the death of even one innocent person at the hands of the criminal justice system to be an unacceptable outcome. What do you think of the death penalty? Should we put a moratorium on its use until we are able to improve the equity of our judicial system? Should we abolish it all together? Are the Troy Davis and Cameron Todd Willingham cases isolated unfortunate instances or symptoms of a racist and/or classist criminal justice system?
As Peters mentions, most law enforcement activities tend to be carried out at the state and local level. Policies like the death penalty, automatic sentencing, diversion programs, and gun control are, for the most part, decided at lower levels of government. One exception to this rule is when a state or local government's practices are ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Relatedly, the federal government intervenes in law enforcement where it is constitutionally allowed. The power to tax, interstate commerce, and activities related to the protection of federal officials have been used to justify the activities of the FBI, ATF, DEA, Customs, Secret Service, and Border Patrol.
Two areas of criminal justice policy that have been hot-topics in the news lately are gun control and the death penalty. Last year, if you remember, the Arizona legislature passed a law allowing individuals over age 21 the right to carry a weapon on campus, but the bill was vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer. It seems certain that a similar bill will be re-introduced in the near-future. While the question of gun control has largely been left up to states and localities to decide, the second amendment limits the degree to which gun ownership can be restricted. The correct interpretation of the second amendment has been disputed throughout the history of our nation. Scholars are divided over whether or not the second amendment provides for a collective right for the states' to organize militias or an individual right to gun ownership. In the 2008 decision, District of Columbia v. Heller the Supreme Court broke with precedent on this issue and decided 5-4 that the second amendment provides for an individual right to gun ownership, striking down the DC handgun ban. Although most Americans tend to be fairly centrist on this issue and support some gun control, gun rights have served as a hot-button political topic or a so-called "wedge issue". Advocates on both sides tend to have had very personal and emotional experiences with guns and so our policies on this issue tend to be more extreme than public polling would suggest. What do you think about gun control? Should we have more restrictions on gun procurement and carrying in Arizona or fewer? Do you think concealed-carry on campus is a good idea? What concerns might you have with such a policy?
Another major hot-topic at the moment is the debate over the death penalty. The Troy Davis case has appeared to mobilize a substantial number of death penalty opponents and has called into question the equity of our judicial system. While Americans remain supportive of the use of the death penalty, in general, new understandings about the reliability of eye-witness testimony, police coercion, and circumstantial evidence has provoked questions about the use of the death penalty when evidence seems uncertain. Despite the fact that one of the leading GOP Presidential candidates seems to be unconcerned that evidence overwhelmingly suggests that an innocent man was put to death while he was governor, many Americans find the death of even one innocent person at the hands of the criminal justice system to be an unacceptable outcome. What do you think of the death penalty? Should we put a moratorium on its use until we are able to improve the equity of our judicial system? Should we abolish it all together? Are the Troy Davis and Cameron Todd Willingham cases isolated unfortunate instances or symptoms of a racist and/or classist criminal justice system?
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Defense Policy
As I mentioned on twitter, the substantive readings for the week combine a lot of policy issues that have been "hot topics" over the past few years. Although I like Peters' reasoning for combining defense policy and law enforcement into one chapter, I think it makes sense for me to talk about them separately. I know a little more about law enforcement and criminal justice policy than defense policy, but I think that I can pull together our readings from Stone and some of the current issues in defense policy to help you think about this policy arena.
I think that even the most libertarian-minded individuals would agree that the basis of the social contract is that government should provide for the people's defense. Civil defense is a classic example of a collective good, for which the market cannot provide. For all those except the most extreme pacifists, the idea that government should provide for the protection of its citizens is not under dispute. The questions of how and to what degree remain.
For the past two weeks, we have been reading about policy goals. From Stone, we have learned that they are often subjective and vaguely defined. Security, liberty, and efficiency are often discussed as rationales for our defense policies. Most Americans would agree that our military should protect us from current and future harms in the most efficient way possible, but does that mean that we should allow pre-emptive strikes and water-boarding to ensure our safety? What about assassinations? Should we grant citizens, non-citizens, guerilla forces, and opposing military forces the same protections or do certain groups deserve more protections than others? I think the chapters in Stone about policy goals can help us think about all of these issues.
I want to take a moment to address one issue in particular, in the context of Stone. Peters discusses the all-volunteer army and military procurement as two of the problems currently facing defense policy. We have decided that contracting out not only the creation of new weapons and strategies, but also the carrying out of on-the-ground security, as the most efficient way to fight our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like the library analogy, however, we have to ask "efficient at what and for whom?" If our ultimate goal is to engage in many conflicts in a variety of so-called "theaters" then contracting out security, language, and logistics while enlisted men and women focus on combat may be the most efficient way to allocate responsibility. On the other hand, if you are concerned with a military that is more responsive to commands then contracting out services seems less efficient. If our ultimate goal is to avoid conflict whenever possible, requiring the military to carry-out all services on the ground would be the most efficient way to achieve that goal. (After all, it would require us to either reduce our conflicts to what a volunteer military can handle or institute a draft). If our goal in any individual conflict is to win at any cost, then we might consider contracting out even more services. If our goal is to win the hearts and minds of the people in the countries where our conflict takes place it may be more efficient for military personnel to be conducting fewer combat operations and more humanitarian missions and to contract out more of the security and combat duties. Some of these options may not be legal or ethical, but to say that contracting is efficient suggests an objective understanding of efficiency.
Of course, the contracting out of defense services also brings up real questions of equity. If soldiers in the military are the ones tasked with the most dangerous jobs, is it fair that military contractors far out-earn them? You may say yes if you are most concerned with process, assuming that everyone has the opportunity to either become a contractor or a soldier, because it is only the most experienced professional soldiers who will earn the higher paying contract jobs. On the other hand, you may consider that the military is more likely to recruit historically disenfranchised groups, while the contractors tend to recruit professionals. If this is how you think about the issue, then paying more to contractors is highly inequitable.
You could also think about the structural harms that contracting out may impose on the survival of our military. By incentivizing career military employees to transition to a higher paying contractor job, the reliance on contracted service may reduce the degree of expertise present in our military. Because contractors are not required to remain at their posts in dangerous circumstances, contracting out may reduce troop morale and community trust.
These are just some examples of how we can use Stone's perspective to understand one hot-topic under debate in the defense policy arena. I think the most important take-away here is that there is not one-single objective answer to the question of whether contracting out military services is equitable, efficient, or harm-inducing. Instead, we are arguing and debating our points based on our subjective understandings of each of these concepts.
I think that even the most libertarian-minded individuals would agree that the basis of the social contract is that government should provide for the people's defense. Civil defense is a classic example of a collective good, for which the market cannot provide. For all those except the most extreme pacifists, the idea that government should provide for the protection of its citizens is not under dispute. The questions of how and to what degree remain.
For the past two weeks, we have been reading about policy goals. From Stone, we have learned that they are often subjective and vaguely defined. Security, liberty, and efficiency are often discussed as rationales for our defense policies. Most Americans would agree that our military should protect us from current and future harms in the most efficient way possible, but does that mean that we should allow pre-emptive strikes and water-boarding to ensure our safety? What about assassinations? Should we grant citizens, non-citizens, guerilla forces, and opposing military forces the same protections or do certain groups deserve more protections than others? I think the chapters in Stone about policy goals can help us think about all of these issues.
I want to take a moment to address one issue in particular, in the context of Stone. Peters discusses the all-volunteer army and military procurement as two of the problems currently facing defense policy. We have decided that contracting out not only the creation of new weapons and strategies, but also the carrying out of on-the-ground security, as the most efficient way to fight our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like the library analogy, however, we have to ask "efficient at what and for whom?" If our ultimate goal is to engage in many conflicts in a variety of so-called "theaters" then contracting out security, language, and logistics while enlisted men and women focus on combat may be the most efficient way to allocate responsibility. On the other hand, if you are concerned with a military that is more responsive to commands then contracting out services seems less efficient. If our ultimate goal is to avoid conflict whenever possible, requiring the military to carry-out all services on the ground would be the most efficient way to achieve that goal. (After all, it would require us to either reduce our conflicts to what a volunteer military can handle or institute a draft). If our goal in any individual conflict is to win at any cost, then we might consider contracting out even more services. If our goal is to win the hearts and minds of the people in the countries where our conflict takes place it may be more efficient for military personnel to be conducting fewer combat operations and more humanitarian missions and to contract out more of the security and combat duties. Some of these options may not be legal or ethical, but to say that contracting is efficient suggests an objective understanding of efficiency.
Of course, the contracting out of defense services also brings up real questions of equity. If soldiers in the military are the ones tasked with the most dangerous jobs, is it fair that military contractors far out-earn them? You may say yes if you are most concerned with process, assuming that everyone has the opportunity to either become a contractor or a soldier, because it is only the most experienced professional soldiers who will earn the higher paying contract jobs. On the other hand, you may consider that the military is more likely to recruit historically disenfranchised groups, while the contractors tend to recruit professionals. If this is how you think about the issue, then paying more to contractors is highly inequitable.
You could also think about the structural harms that contracting out may impose on the survival of our military. By incentivizing career military employees to transition to a higher paying contractor job, the reliance on contracted service may reduce the degree of expertise present in our military. Because contractors are not required to remain at their posts in dangerous circumstances, contracting out may reduce troop morale and community trust.
These are just some examples of how we can use Stone's perspective to understand one hot-topic under debate in the defense policy arena. I think the most important take-away here is that there is not one-single objective answer to the question of whether contracting out military services is equitable, efficient, or harm-inducing. Instead, we are arguing and debating our points based on our subjective understandings of each of these concepts.
Free to be You and Me - My Thoughts on Stone Ch. 5 - Liberty
Liberty is probably the central American value. Freedom is an inherent aspect of the American Revolution and an important part of the American story. We are fairly certain that we know what we mean when we say liberty or freedom, but when we take such a grand ideal and operationalize it into policy action, it is just as complex as all of the other values. In the United States, we tend to focus on negative liberty or freedom from restraint. This is the idea behind our Bill of Rights. Government cannot restrict your ability to practice religion as you choose or to speak your mind. We could also take the lead of some European countries and define liberty as positive rights or rights to the prerequisites of freedom. A right to health care would be one such right, as would the right to a basic living wage. The right to a basic education and the right to emergency medical care are two such positive forms of liberty that we practice in America, but negative liberty is still dominant in the United States.
Stone asks two important questions about liberty on p. 109. "When, if ever should community or social purpose be allowed to trump individual choice? Under what circumstances should public policy ever limit individual privacy and autonomy?" Many political theorists would turn to the work of John Stuart Mill to answer these questions, as does Stone. Mill's On Liberty argues that society can only restrict an individual's liberty if it causes harm to others. This brings to mind the "fist-swinging" analogy. I can swing my fist around in the air as much as I want as long as you are not close enough that I would hit you.
This can be considered the standard of bodily harm. It sounds like a simple standard to uphold, but as you know by now, nothing is ever simple in the polis. There are bodily harms that affect some people more than others, for example air pollution affects asthmatics, young children, and the elderly more than the general population. There are bodily harms that accumulate over time, for example exposure to small doses of toxic chemicals may not be hazardous in the short-term but may cause cancer in the long-term. There are indirect bodily harms, for example a budget crisis could lead to a lay-off of air traffic controllers, which could cause the remaining controllers to be overworked, which could lead one to falling asleep on the job, which could lead to an accident. We then must also ask the question, which action should we take to prevent these harms. Do we keep asthmatic children inside for recess on bad air quality days, regulate air pollution, or both? Both of these solutions restrict someone's liberty. The problem of bodily harm is rarely ever the simple issue of one person intentionally causing an immediate harm to another.
Of course, if you think about our criminal justice policies, causing bodily harm is not the only standard of harm that we use as an excuse to restrict liberty. We are also not allowed to inflict material harms on others. We cannot take our neighbor's new big screen television, even if they are on vacation, it is not being used and there is no way we would inflict any bodily harm on them. This would not only be illegal but it violates the norms and values of society.
Stone discusses two types of material harm on page 112: harm that destroys property and harm that destroys the market value of property. The latter reminds me of proposition 2, which Phoenix residents rejected in the last local election. The brief summary of the proposition is that it would have allowed the re-zoning of a plot of land so that a gas station could be built on a vacant lot in East Phoenix. Neighborhood residents opposed the station because they argued that it would bring crime to the area. In other words, it would indirectly harm them. While it does seem like a bizarre issue to bring to referendum, it seems like a perfect issue to discuss in this context.
Residents of the neighborhood could also have argued that the gas station would have amenity effects. They could have said that the 24 hour gas station would make the neighborhood less pleasing because the lights will be on all of the time and it will bring late night traffic to the area. Certainly, a gas station is not aesthetically pleasing. It could have also been argued that a gas station is more aesthetically pleasing than a vacant lot. Of course as Stone points out, now that we are dealing with harms that are not physical we are engaging in argument, debate, and claims-making.
The most abstract harms are emotional, psychological, moral and spiritual harms. Many of these harms would not have been recognized 50 years ago. Should we restrict an individual's liberty because it causes stress to another individual or group of individuals? What if it violates the religious or spiritual beliefs of another individual? Should a pharmacist be able to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions because it's against his or her religious beliefs? Should a group Muslims be able to build an Arabic cultural center a few blocks from Ground Zero? Should Westboro Baptist Church be able to protest the funerals of soldiers killed in battle? Although emotional, psychological, religious, and spiritual harms are relatively new issues, they have certainly been hot policy topics over the past few years. Of course, if we granted protections based on these harms, we would likely be harming others; specifically women seeking birth control, the Muslim community, and the families and friends of military heroes. We must find the delicate balance here.
Of course, in the polis we also have harms and liberties related to community. Mill argued that there are some community duties that individuals can be compelled to perform. We often restrict the liberty of individuals for the good of the social order. Citizens have to pay taxes, serve on juries, and obey the laws. In America, all males 18 and older have to register for the draft. Structural harms are a community harm that affects the ability of a community to successfully function. Stone uses the example of school vouchers as a structural harm because it reduces integration and the visibility of the public education system. Another structural harm could be google books because it reduces the use of the library by relatively well-off citizens and makes the library less important as a community meeting place. Of course, in both of these cases, removing the structural harm would likely cause individual harms. Accumulative harms are actions that are not harmful in isolation but become harmful when everyone in a community does them. The individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act is based on this logic. If one healthy person does not buy insurance then it won't raise premiums by much, but if every healthy person does not buy insurance than premiums will sky-rocket and the health insurance industry will go broke. Finally, we can extend individual harms to examine their effects on the community. Remember, in the polis all actions have ripple effects. Here again, we must strike a delicate balance.
Stone firmly believes that we cannot restrict our understanding of harm and liberty to the individual. Corporate actors including businesses, churches, non-profits, and government agencies can harm people and be harmed. Further, because they generally have a much larger reach than an individual, the harms they cause can have a greater impact on the community as a whole.
Once again, Stone ends her chapter with a discussion of trade-offs. This time we have two: liberty and security, and liberty and equity. Starting with liberty and security, Stone presents the traditional or conservative understanding of the relationship between the two: security creates dependence, self-sufficiency is necessary for liberty, and government paternalism reduces freedom. She then presents her understanding: individuals cannot make free choices unless they have basic security, no one is ever truly self-sufficient, and policy can make determinations about who is competent to care for him or herself and who is not. The liberty and equality trade-off is presented similarly. The traditional or conservative understanding is that redistribution for the sake of equality reduces the liberty of the well-off, either you have complete liberty or none at all, and coercion by public policy reduces liberty. She believes that equalizing power, wealth and knowledge leads to positive liberty, liberty is measured in degrees, and society's control of some problems can expand human freedom. I am guessing that if you have not agreed with Stone's argument in the previous chapters, you will not agree this time. Either way, I hope you have taken the time to understand both arguments.
Stone asks two important questions about liberty on p. 109. "When, if ever should community or social purpose be allowed to trump individual choice? Under what circumstances should public policy ever limit individual privacy and autonomy?" Many political theorists would turn to the work of John Stuart Mill to answer these questions, as does Stone. Mill's On Liberty argues that society can only restrict an individual's liberty if it causes harm to others. This brings to mind the "fist-swinging" analogy. I can swing my fist around in the air as much as I want as long as you are not close enough that I would hit you.
This can be considered the standard of bodily harm. It sounds like a simple standard to uphold, but as you know by now, nothing is ever simple in the polis. There are bodily harms that affect some people more than others, for example air pollution affects asthmatics, young children, and the elderly more than the general population. There are bodily harms that accumulate over time, for example exposure to small doses of toxic chemicals may not be hazardous in the short-term but may cause cancer in the long-term. There are indirect bodily harms, for example a budget crisis could lead to a lay-off of air traffic controllers, which could cause the remaining controllers to be overworked, which could lead one to falling asleep on the job, which could lead to an accident. We then must also ask the question, which action should we take to prevent these harms. Do we keep asthmatic children inside for recess on bad air quality days, regulate air pollution, or both? Both of these solutions restrict someone's liberty. The problem of bodily harm is rarely ever the simple issue of one person intentionally causing an immediate harm to another.
Of course, if you think about our criminal justice policies, causing bodily harm is not the only standard of harm that we use as an excuse to restrict liberty. We are also not allowed to inflict material harms on others. We cannot take our neighbor's new big screen television, even if they are on vacation, it is not being used and there is no way we would inflict any bodily harm on them. This would not only be illegal but it violates the norms and values of society.
Stone discusses two types of material harm on page 112: harm that destroys property and harm that destroys the market value of property. The latter reminds me of proposition 2, which Phoenix residents rejected in the last local election. The brief summary of the proposition is that it would have allowed the re-zoning of a plot of land so that a gas station could be built on a vacant lot in East Phoenix. Neighborhood residents opposed the station because they argued that it would bring crime to the area. In other words, it would indirectly harm them. While it does seem like a bizarre issue to bring to referendum, it seems like a perfect issue to discuss in this context.
Residents of the neighborhood could also have argued that the gas station would have amenity effects. They could have said that the 24 hour gas station would make the neighborhood less pleasing because the lights will be on all of the time and it will bring late night traffic to the area. Certainly, a gas station is not aesthetically pleasing. It could have also been argued that a gas station is more aesthetically pleasing than a vacant lot. Of course as Stone points out, now that we are dealing with harms that are not physical we are engaging in argument, debate, and claims-making.
The most abstract harms are emotional, psychological, moral and spiritual harms. Many of these harms would not have been recognized 50 years ago. Should we restrict an individual's liberty because it causes stress to another individual or group of individuals? What if it violates the religious or spiritual beliefs of another individual? Should a pharmacist be able to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions because it's against his or her religious beliefs? Should a group Muslims be able to build an Arabic cultural center a few blocks from Ground Zero? Should Westboro Baptist Church be able to protest the funerals of soldiers killed in battle? Although emotional, psychological, religious, and spiritual harms are relatively new issues, they have certainly been hot policy topics over the past few years. Of course, if we granted protections based on these harms, we would likely be harming others; specifically women seeking birth control, the Muslim community, and the families and friends of military heroes. We must find the delicate balance here.
Of course, in the polis we also have harms and liberties related to community. Mill argued that there are some community duties that individuals can be compelled to perform. We often restrict the liberty of individuals for the good of the social order. Citizens have to pay taxes, serve on juries, and obey the laws. In America, all males 18 and older have to register for the draft. Structural harms are a community harm that affects the ability of a community to successfully function. Stone uses the example of school vouchers as a structural harm because it reduces integration and the visibility of the public education system. Another structural harm could be google books because it reduces the use of the library by relatively well-off citizens and makes the library less important as a community meeting place. Of course, in both of these cases, removing the structural harm would likely cause individual harms. Accumulative harms are actions that are not harmful in isolation but become harmful when everyone in a community does them. The individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act is based on this logic. If one healthy person does not buy insurance then it won't raise premiums by much, but if every healthy person does not buy insurance than premiums will sky-rocket and the health insurance industry will go broke. Finally, we can extend individual harms to examine their effects on the community. Remember, in the polis all actions have ripple effects. Here again, we must strike a delicate balance.
Stone firmly believes that we cannot restrict our understanding of harm and liberty to the individual. Corporate actors including businesses, churches, non-profits, and government agencies can harm people and be harmed. Further, because they generally have a much larger reach than an individual, the harms they cause can have a greater impact on the community as a whole.
Once again, Stone ends her chapter with a discussion of trade-offs. This time we have two: liberty and security, and liberty and equity. Starting with liberty and security, Stone presents the traditional or conservative understanding of the relationship between the two: security creates dependence, self-sufficiency is necessary for liberty, and government paternalism reduces freedom. She then presents her understanding: individuals cannot make free choices unless they have basic security, no one is ever truly self-sufficient, and policy can make determinations about who is competent to care for him or herself and who is not. The liberty and equality trade-off is presented similarly. The traditional or conservative understanding is that redistribution for the sake of equality reduces the liberty of the well-off, either you have complete liberty or none at all, and coercion by public policy reduces liberty. She believes that equalizing power, wealth and knowledge leads to positive liberty, liberty is measured in degrees, and society's control of some problems can expand human freedom. I am guessing that if you have not agreed with Stone's argument in the previous chapters, you will not agree this time. Either way, I hope you have taken the time to understand both arguments.
Efficient at what and for whom? - Stone Ch. 3
Since the late 1970's and early 1980's making government more efficient has been a primary goal of policymakers and administrators. Efficiency has often been treated as a goal in itself leading to the privatization and marketization of government services to avoid the inefficient bureaucratic process. As Stone points out, however, efficiency is not really a goal, it's a process-based measure that strives to get the most output out of a given input. It says nothing about an ultimate outcome. There always has to be something you want to do efficiently, or more efficiently. Again here, Stone reminds us that efficiency is comparative. The only way we can judge whether or not a process is efficient is in comparison to another process.
Stone takes some time to problematize what we think of as efficiency. She uses the story of a library from Wildavsky and Pressman's Implementation. Wildavsky and Pressman believe they have a handle on what makes a library efficient, but Stone argues that this is too simplistic. It may not just be a count of books that is important but the quality of books. It may not be the variety of books that's important as much as having a sufficient number of the most in demand books. It may in fact not be the books at all that are most important, but the services being provided by the librarians. The problem is that Pressman and Wildavsky do not really explore how they would define the ultimate goal of the library. Is it to educate residents, provide residents with entertainment, help schoolchildren learn, increase literacy, help residents with job search and skills, or all of the above? Pressman and Wildavsky define the goal of a library solely in terms of an output, the number of books they provide to the community. This comes close to using efficiency as a goal in and of itself.
When we talk about efficiency as an ideal in the United States, we are usually defining it in market-based terms. From pp. 66-71 Stone gives us a lesson in critical economics. Although we tend to elevate economics as the best of the social sciences in America, we must remember that economics makes a lot of assumptions about human behavior that are not always true. Stone believes that these assumptions generally fail when it comes to public policy and we should be relying on the model of the polis more often. Things in the polis are not as simple as they are in the market. She repeats a lot of the contrasts between the two models that she discusses in chapter one. Ultimately, she arrives at the conclusion that markets can only be considered the ultimate form of efficiency if you define efficiency objectively. As she showed us with the library example, efficiency is often subjective.
The reason I assigned chapters 2 and 4 or chapters 3 and 5 and not just any two of the four chapters is that Stone discusses trade-offs between these goals at the end of each chapter. In America, we tend to believe that equality and efficiency are trade-offs. In debates about jobs, the economy, social welfare, education, and even healthcare; we hear the argument that increasing equality will make our economy less efficient. Again, we are relying on the straightforward assumptions of neo-classical economic theory here. If we assume that individuals are motivated solely by basic needs and individual well-being then this trade-off makes sense. If we instead believe that basic security, self-esteem, and community well-being are necessary for productivity then there may not be such a straight-forward trade-off.
What do you think? Can you think of an example where efficiency is subjective? Do you think efficiency and equity are trade-offs or does some degree of equity improve efficiency?
Stone takes some time to problematize what we think of as efficiency. She uses the story of a library from Wildavsky and Pressman's Implementation. Wildavsky and Pressman believe they have a handle on what makes a library efficient, but Stone argues that this is too simplistic. It may not just be a count of books that is important but the quality of books. It may not be the variety of books that's important as much as having a sufficient number of the most in demand books. It may in fact not be the books at all that are most important, but the services being provided by the librarians. The problem is that Pressman and Wildavsky do not really explore how they would define the ultimate goal of the library. Is it to educate residents, provide residents with entertainment, help schoolchildren learn, increase literacy, help residents with job search and skills, or all of the above? Pressman and Wildavsky define the goal of a library solely in terms of an output, the number of books they provide to the community. This comes close to using efficiency as a goal in and of itself.
When we talk about efficiency as an ideal in the United States, we are usually defining it in market-based terms. From pp. 66-71 Stone gives us a lesson in critical economics. Although we tend to elevate economics as the best of the social sciences in America, we must remember that economics makes a lot of assumptions about human behavior that are not always true. Stone believes that these assumptions generally fail when it comes to public policy and we should be relying on the model of the polis more often. Things in the polis are not as simple as they are in the market. She repeats a lot of the contrasts between the two models that she discusses in chapter one. Ultimately, she arrives at the conclusion that markets can only be considered the ultimate form of efficiency if you define efficiency objectively. As she showed us with the library example, efficiency is often subjective.
The reason I assigned chapters 2 and 4 or chapters 3 and 5 and not just any two of the four chapters is that Stone discusses trade-offs between these goals at the end of each chapter. In America, we tend to believe that equality and efficiency are trade-offs. In debates about jobs, the economy, social welfare, education, and even healthcare; we hear the argument that increasing equality will make our economy less efficient. Again, we are relying on the straightforward assumptions of neo-classical economic theory here. If we assume that individuals are motivated solely by basic needs and individual well-being then this trade-off makes sense. If we instead believe that basic security, self-esteem, and community well-being are necessary for productivity then there may not be such a straight-forward trade-off.
What do you think? Can you think of an example where efficiency is subjective? Do you think efficiency and equity are trade-offs or does some degree of equity improve efficiency?
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
The American Welfare State
Our substantive topic for the week is what I refer to as social welfare policy and what Peters refers to as income maintenance policy. What's the difference? I would say that social policy is broadly a set of policies that regulate social relationships between citizens. This category of policy includes social welfare policies as well as social policies dealing with issues of gender and sexuality like abortion and gay marriage. Social welfare policies deal with regulating relationships of economic inequality and tend to be redistributive policies. Income maintenance policies are, in my view, the sub-set of social welfare policies that subsidize income. I would argue, for example, that Medicaid is a social welfare policy but would not consider it an income maintenance policy because it is an in-kind benefit. The combination of these redistributive social policies make-up the institution we call the welfare state or welfare system. Of course, you'll see that in Peters' discussion of welfare he does not draw a clear line between income maintenance and in-kind benefits. He discusses policies that could be considered health care and education policies in this chapter.
For simplicity's sake, I am going to focus on two types of "income maintenance" programs, Social Security and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which is the program we usually refer to when we talk about welfare. Both Social Security and TANF have a similar goal, they attempt to redistribute income from taxpayers to individuals or families who are in need of income support. Of course, this is how we think of welfare and not at all how we think of Social Security. The major difference is the structure of the two programs. Social Security is structured as a social insurance program, while TANF is structured as a means-tested program. The welfare systems of some countries like the Scandinavian countries only include social insurance programs. In the United States, we have a mixed welfare state made up of means-tested programs like TANF, food-stamps, and Medicaid, social insurance programs like Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Medicare, and corporate and non-profit provided benefits like health insurance, shelters, and soup kitchens.
Social insurance programs like Social Security use the logic of insurance pools that we discussed when we talked about healthcare reform. The idea is that we have uncertainty about how long we will live, if we may become disabled, or if we may lose our jobs. Because we cannot accurately predict these things, and all of us are at risk, we join together into an insurance pool where the workers provide for the disabled, retired, and unemployed with the understanding that we will be provided for when we find ourselves in such a state. By design, social insurance programs have no income eligibility criteria. This ensures that everyone has a stake in the continuation of the program because everyone feels as though they benefit. Of course, we have this idea that we pay for our own Social Security when we are working and get it back when we retire, but this is not actually how the system works.
The genius of social insurance programs is that they build civic trust and a sense of community, and there are strong incentives to continue the program. The first generation who was eligible for Social Security received the best deal because they paid very little into the system and received benefits, but the last generation to pay fully into the system without receiving benefits will be the ultimate losers. Many people in their 20's and early 30's believe that Social Security will not be around for them. This is somewhat disturbing because it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The small, technical changes Peters discusses in the chapter can make Social Security solvent, but convincing the young that they will not receive Social Security is one way to eliminate the program without a lot of political risk. Politicians usually make changes to Social Security and Medicare that take effect many years in the future because of the perception that young people do not vote and when they do, they are not paying attention to programs that they will not receive for years to come.
We think about means-tested programs very differently. To qualify for a means-tested programs you have to be low-income and have few assets. Although in theory social mobility means that one has an equal chance of moving downward in class as upward in class, Americans do not believe that being in poverty is something we are all at risk of. We tend to believe that people who qualify for these programs are poor because they have made bad decisions. Means-tested programs tend to be stigmatizing and degrading, and easy political targets. Although we had a welfare rights movement in the 1960's, individuals who qualify for means-tested programs tend to be difficult to mobilize because of the stigma of receipt and the lack of political power held by recipients. On the other hand, means-tested programs at least attempt to target benefits to those most in-need.
The story of welfare is a little more complicated than the story of Social Security. No major changes (aside from expansions to new groups) have been made to Social Security since its creation during the New Deal. In contrast, welfare has been radically changed. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the pre-cursor to TANF, was created at the same time as Social Security. It was created to support widows with children in a time where women were expected to be homemakers and caretakers rather than labor market participants. The program was an entitlement so anyone who qualified had a legal right to receive benefits. This meant that as family structure changed and there were more single-parent households the program became more expensive. As the recipients of those households were portrayed increasingly as lazy, African-American lifetime recipients (which bore little relationship to the reality of program recipients) the program became increasingly unpopular.
In 1996, Bill Clinton's administration "Reformed welfare as we know it" through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The reforms repealed AFDC and replaced it with TANF. TANF can be considered a "workfare" program where the emphasis is on labor market participation. It also decoupled the receipt of benefits like food-stamps and Medicaid from receipt of TANF (previously, all of these programs had been packaged together). Under TANF, families can only receive benefits for up to two years at any one time and five years over a lifetime. To receive benefits recipients have to either get a job or engage in activities that prepare them for work. Immigrants were basically ruled ineligible to receive either TANF or food stamps. Child support enforcement was an important part of the reform, forcing women receiving TANF to identify and provide information about the fathers of their children to the state. There were also substantial provisions providing funding for marriage promotion among recipients. Finally, TANF provided states with a lot more discretion in program administration than they had under AFDC. States differ significantly in terms of the inclusion and adequacy of their TANF programs.
When PRWORA was passed, opponents of reforms predicted dire consequences. They argued that children would be dying on the streets and poverty and crime would be at all time highs. They also predicted that states would engage in a "race to the bottom" with all states providing the bare minimum to avoid attracting undesirable residents. In reality none of this came to pass. This has been attributed to a few different factors. 1) PRWORA was passed during the late 1990s when the economy was doing well and there was high demand for low-wage, unskilled labor in most states. 2) Bill Clinton also passed a substantial increase to the Earned Income Tax Credit which significantly subsidizes the wages of low-wage families. 3) "Liberal" states provide generous benefits for cultural and social reasons, not just purely self-interested economic reasons. I think we are starting to see some of the problems with TANF in a poor economy. Despite the increase in need due to high, long-term, unemployment associated with the 2008 recession, TANF use has changed very little. This shows that the program has for some reason become unresponsive to family needs. If you want to read more on TANF during the recession, here is a good policy brief on the topic.
Social Security and TANF represent two sides of the coin for addressing poverty. Thanks to Medicare and Social Security, elderly poverty (by official measures) has all but disappeared in the United States. In contrast, child poverty continues to increase. Should we create a social insurance program like a family allowance to address poverty? Should our poverty alleviation policies change in response to the business-cycle? What's the best way to ensure that Social Security persists as an effective social insurance policy targeted at the elderly? Are you convinced that Social Security will not be around when you retire?
For simplicity's sake, I am going to focus on two types of "income maintenance" programs, Social Security and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which is the program we usually refer to when we talk about welfare. Both Social Security and TANF have a similar goal, they attempt to redistribute income from taxpayers to individuals or families who are in need of income support. Of course, this is how we think of welfare and not at all how we think of Social Security. The major difference is the structure of the two programs. Social Security is structured as a social insurance program, while TANF is structured as a means-tested program. The welfare systems of some countries like the Scandinavian countries only include social insurance programs. In the United States, we have a mixed welfare state made up of means-tested programs like TANF, food-stamps, and Medicaid, social insurance programs like Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Medicare, and corporate and non-profit provided benefits like health insurance, shelters, and soup kitchens.
Social insurance programs like Social Security use the logic of insurance pools that we discussed when we talked about healthcare reform. The idea is that we have uncertainty about how long we will live, if we may become disabled, or if we may lose our jobs. Because we cannot accurately predict these things, and all of us are at risk, we join together into an insurance pool where the workers provide for the disabled, retired, and unemployed with the understanding that we will be provided for when we find ourselves in such a state. By design, social insurance programs have no income eligibility criteria. This ensures that everyone has a stake in the continuation of the program because everyone feels as though they benefit. Of course, we have this idea that we pay for our own Social Security when we are working and get it back when we retire, but this is not actually how the system works.
The genius of social insurance programs is that they build civic trust and a sense of community, and there are strong incentives to continue the program. The first generation who was eligible for Social Security received the best deal because they paid very little into the system and received benefits, but the last generation to pay fully into the system without receiving benefits will be the ultimate losers. Many people in their 20's and early 30's believe that Social Security will not be around for them. This is somewhat disturbing because it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The small, technical changes Peters discusses in the chapter can make Social Security solvent, but convincing the young that they will not receive Social Security is one way to eliminate the program without a lot of political risk. Politicians usually make changes to Social Security and Medicare that take effect many years in the future because of the perception that young people do not vote and when they do, they are not paying attention to programs that they will not receive for years to come.
We think about means-tested programs very differently. To qualify for a means-tested programs you have to be low-income and have few assets. Although in theory social mobility means that one has an equal chance of moving downward in class as upward in class, Americans do not believe that being in poverty is something we are all at risk of. We tend to believe that people who qualify for these programs are poor because they have made bad decisions. Means-tested programs tend to be stigmatizing and degrading, and easy political targets. Although we had a welfare rights movement in the 1960's, individuals who qualify for means-tested programs tend to be difficult to mobilize because of the stigma of receipt and the lack of political power held by recipients. On the other hand, means-tested programs at least attempt to target benefits to those most in-need.
The story of welfare is a little more complicated than the story of Social Security. No major changes (aside from expansions to new groups) have been made to Social Security since its creation during the New Deal. In contrast, welfare has been radically changed. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the pre-cursor to TANF, was created at the same time as Social Security. It was created to support widows with children in a time where women were expected to be homemakers and caretakers rather than labor market participants. The program was an entitlement so anyone who qualified had a legal right to receive benefits. This meant that as family structure changed and there were more single-parent households the program became more expensive. As the recipients of those households were portrayed increasingly as lazy, African-American lifetime recipients (which bore little relationship to the reality of program recipients) the program became increasingly unpopular.
In 1996, Bill Clinton's administration "Reformed welfare as we know it" through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The reforms repealed AFDC and replaced it with TANF. TANF can be considered a "workfare" program where the emphasis is on labor market participation. It also decoupled the receipt of benefits like food-stamps and Medicaid from receipt of TANF (previously, all of these programs had been packaged together). Under TANF, families can only receive benefits for up to two years at any one time and five years over a lifetime. To receive benefits recipients have to either get a job or engage in activities that prepare them for work. Immigrants were basically ruled ineligible to receive either TANF or food stamps. Child support enforcement was an important part of the reform, forcing women receiving TANF to identify and provide information about the fathers of their children to the state. There were also substantial provisions providing funding for marriage promotion among recipients. Finally, TANF provided states with a lot more discretion in program administration than they had under AFDC. States differ significantly in terms of the inclusion and adequacy of their TANF programs.
When PRWORA was passed, opponents of reforms predicted dire consequences. They argued that children would be dying on the streets and poverty and crime would be at all time highs. They also predicted that states would engage in a "race to the bottom" with all states providing the bare minimum to avoid attracting undesirable residents. In reality none of this came to pass. This has been attributed to a few different factors. 1) PRWORA was passed during the late 1990s when the economy was doing well and there was high demand for low-wage, unskilled labor in most states. 2) Bill Clinton also passed a substantial increase to the Earned Income Tax Credit which significantly subsidizes the wages of low-wage families. 3) "Liberal" states provide generous benefits for cultural and social reasons, not just purely self-interested economic reasons. I think we are starting to see some of the problems with TANF in a poor economy. Despite the increase in need due to high, long-term, unemployment associated with the 2008 recession, TANF use has changed very little. This shows that the program has for some reason become unresponsive to family needs. If you want to read more on TANF during the recession, here is a good policy brief on the topic.
Social Security and TANF represent two sides of the coin for addressing poverty. Thanks to Medicare and Social Security, elderly poverty (by official measures) has all but disappeared in the United States. In contrast, child poverty continues to increase. Should we create a social insurance program like a family allowance to address poverty? Should our poverty alleviation policies change in response to the business-cycle? What's the best way to ensure that Social Security persists as an effective social insurance policy targeted at the elderly? Are you convinced that Social Security will not be around when you retire?
Needs and Security - Stone Ch. 4
Normally when you hear the word security, what do you think of? I know my first thought is homeland security or a security guard. Generally it connotes bodily safety, but in this chapter Stone uses a broader definition of security. This is the same type of security that we use when we discuss Social Security or the goal of financial security. Basically, it's the idea that different dimensions of need are met.
Stone tries to challenge us on our decisions about the degree to which government should meet the basic needs of its citizens. There are some policy analysts and policymakers who think that government is responsible for providing only defense and some who think government should be assisting individuals in their goals of self-esteem and self-actualization. Most people fall somewhere in the middle. This chapter should remind you of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Unlike Maslow, however, Stone does not discuss the dimensions of need as a hierarchy where needs are met in succession, but as a group of needs that everyone must fulfill. Surely, Stone would not argue that one cannot survive without basic food, shelter, and water, but I think she would also argue that companionship, respect, and self-esteem are crucial to long-term human survival.
Taking needs one step beyond the extreme libertarian ideal that government should only provide for the basic defense, most Americans believe that we do not want people starving and dying on the streets. They would agree that either through direct services or support of non-profit efforts government should make sure that people have basic food and shelter. This seems simple, but defining what we mean in this case is difficult. Is it acceptable to provide citizens with the cheapest basic nutrition they need to function or do we want to make sure that they can be productive? Should we only provide them with one type of food, day in and day out or should we make sure that they can have a balanced diet? Should we allow enough so they can participate in cultural traditions like turkey dinner on Thanksgiving and BBQs at fourth of July? What about those people with dietary or religious restrictions on what they can and cannot eat? We have the same problems when we think about basic shelter. Is a shack okay because many poor individuals around the world live in shacks or do we need to provide our citizens with running water and safe, stable, indoor housing?
Much of our political disagreement about these basic needs has to do with a divide over whether absolute needs are the most important dimension of need or whether relative needs matter too. Some policy analysts who believe that only absolute need matters argue that poverty does not exist in America because the poorest in America are better off than most residents of developing countries. They also point out that America's poorest citizens are far better off than many of the wealthy were 100 years ago. In contrast, scholars who focus on relative needs find it unacceptable that in a country of such wealth, children still grow up hungry living in rat infested housing. Of course, for the first time since the turn of the 20th century in America the youngest generation of adults is not predicted to do better than their parents. It will be interesting to see how the debate between relative and absolute need is framed in the future.
Most of our social policies address the issue of relative need. The same can be said for defense policy. It does not matter how powerful our weapons are in comparison to the past or in absolute terms. What matters is how powerful our weapons are relative to other nation-states. It's interesting to think about education needs in these terms. The number of comparisons we make between our education system and that of Japan or the European Union illustrates that once again we define relative needs as most important.
Increasingly, we have decided that government needs to go beyond providing for current needs and actually attempt to prevent our future needs. Many of the safety regulations government has in place are there to prevent our future needs. For example, food regulations are meant to prevent our future need for medical care due to ingesting rotten food. When we talk about communities or individuals "at-risk", we are engaging in a discussion about the degree to which they need to be protected so that they will not need services X,Y, or Z in the future.
Of course, returning to Maslow's pyramid, humans also have relational needs. We are social beings. Dignity, respect, self-esteem, and belonging are important to us. Many government programs have been criticized because while they may meet all the other needs, they reduce the relational security of participants. The idea that we should have policies that empower citizens and build community has been around since the 1960s, but we have struggled to create programs that do this in any meaningful way.
One of the paradoxes of public policy (and of human behavior in general) is that needs can never be completely fulfilled. Once one need is met, new needs are created. Interestingly, this is one point on which Marxists, Liberals, and Conservatives all agree, though of course they differ in their explanation of the causes. Because we cannot define an objective level of need that must be met, we engage primarily in argument, debate, and as Stone puts it, "Claims-making" (p. 98). On pages 98-104 Stone walks us through how this "claims-making" plays out in different stages of the policy process.
Stone ends her chapter with a question about trade-offs, this time between security and efficiency. If you believe there is a trade-off you would argue three points: 1) humans are motivated by basic needs and making them secure removes their motivation to be productive, 2) providing security relies on the service sector which is the least efficient sector of the economy, and 3) technological changes necessarily make some people worse off. Instead, Stone would argue that 1) basic needs are not what motivates us and providing security makes us more productive, 2) the service sector is deemed inefficient only because of the way we have defined efficiency, and 3) macroeconomic policies can and should mitigate any suffering due to advancements in technology that create economic change (p. 107). Here's a nice little video from RSAnimate about human motivation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc.
I leave it to you to decide if you are convinced by Stone's argument. Are humans driven by basic needs, or do we need to know those basic needs are satisfied before we can be productive? Does relative poverty matter or should we only be concerned about absolute poverty? Do we need to concern ourselves with the symbolic, goal actualization, and community needs of the poor? What should government's role be in all of this?
Stone tries to challenge us on our decisions about the degree to which government should meet the basic needs of its citizens. There are some policy analysts and policymakers who think that government is responsible for providing only defense and some who think government should be assisting individuals in their goals of self-esteem and self-actualization. Most people fall somewhere in the middle. This chapter should remind you of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Unlike Maslow, however, Stone does not discuss the dimensions of need as a hierarchy where needs are met in succession, but as a group of needs that everyone must fulfill. Surely, Stone would not argue that one cannot survive without basic food, shelter, and water, but I think she would also argue that companionship, respect, and self-esteem are crucial to long-term human survival.
Taking needs one step beyond the extreme libertarian ideal that government should only provide for the basic defense, most Americans believe that we do not want people starving and dying on the streets. They would agree that either through direct services or support of non-profit efforts government should make sure that people have basic food and shelter. This seems simple, but defining what we mean in this case is difficult. Is it acceptable to provide citizens with the cheapest basic nutrition they need to function or do we want to make sure that they can be productive? Should we only provide them with one type of food, day in and day out or should we make sure that they can have a balanced diet? Should we allow enough so they can participate in cultural traditions like turkey dinner on Thanksgiving and BBQs at fourth of July? What about those people with dietary or religious restrictions on what they can and cannot eat? We have the same problems when we think about basic shelter. Is a shack okay because many poor individuals around the world live in shacks or do we need to provide our citizens with running water and safe, stable, indoor housing?
Much of our political disagreement about these basic needs has to do with a divide over whether absolute needs are the most important dimension of need or whether relative needs matter too. Some policy analysts who believe that only absolute need matters argue that poverty does not exist in America because the poorest in America are better off than most residents of developing countries. They also point out that America's poorest citizens are far better off than many of the wealthy were 100 years ago. In contrast, scholars who focus on relative needs find it unacceptable that in a country of such wealth, children still grow up hungry living in rat infested housing. Of course, for the first time since the turn of the 20th century in America the youngest generation of adults is not predicted to do better than their parents. It will be interesting to see how the debate between relative and absolute need is framed in the future.
Most of our social policies address the issue of relative need. The same can be said for defense policy. It does not matter how powerful our weapons are in comparison to the past or in absolute terms. What matters is how powerful our weapons are relative to other nation-states. It's interesting to think about education needs in these terms. The number of comparisons we make between our education system and that of Japan or the European Union illustrates that once again we define relative needs as most important.
Increasingly, we have decided that government needs to go beyond providing for current needs and actually attempt to prevent our future needs. Many of the safety regulations government has in place are there to prevent our future needs. For example, food regulations are meant to prevent our future need for medical care due to ingesting rotten food. When we talk about communities or individuals "at-risk", we are engaging in a discussion about the degree to which they need to be protected so that they will not need services X,Y, or Z in the future.
Of course, returning to Maslow's pyramid, humans also have relational needs. We are social beings. Dignity, respect, self-esteem, and belonging are important to us. Many government programs have been criticized because while they may meet all the other needs, they reduce the relational security of participants. The idea that we should have policies that empower citizens and build community has been around since the 1960s, but we have struggled to create programs that do this in any meaningful way.
One of the paradoxes of public policy (and of human behavior in general) is that needs can never be completely fulfilled. Once one need is met, new needs are created. Interestingly, this is one point on which Marxists, Liberals, and Conservatives all agree, though of course they differ in their explanation of the causes. Because we cannot define an objective level of need that must be met, we engage primarily in argument, debate, and as Stone puts it, "Claims-making" (p. 98). On pages 98-104 Stone walks us through how this "claims-making" plays out in different stages of the policy process.
Stone ends her chapter with a question about trade-offs, this time between security and efficiency. If you believe there is a trade-off you would argue three points: 1) humans are motivated by basic needs and making them secure removes their motivation to be productive, 2) providing security relies on the service sector which is the least efficient sector of the economy, and 3) technological changes necessarily make some people worse off. Instead, Stone would argue that 1) basic needs are not what motivates us and providing security makes us more productive, 2) the service sector is deemed inefficient only because of the way we have defined efficiency, and 3) macroeconomic policies can and should mitigate any suffering due to advancements in technology that create economic change (p. 107). Here's a nice little video from RSAnimate about human motivation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc.
I leave it to you to decide if you are convinced by Stone's argument. Are humans driven by basic needs, or do we need to know those basic needs are satisfied before we can be productive? Does relative poverty matter or should we only be concerned about absolute poverty? Do we need to concern ourselves with the symbolic, goal actualization, and community needs of the poor? What should government's role be in all of this?
Equity and Cake - Stone Ch. 2
As someone who studies redistributive public policy, this is probably my favorite chapter in Stone's book. The cake analogy Stone presents on pp. 39-41 is an ingenious way to present different and often competing visions of equity. Depending on one's perspective, each of these forms of equity could in turn be argued as completely inequitable. Stone discusses eight ways that we can define equity:
Membership-based Forms of Equity
1) Equal slices but unequal invitations - In the book, Stone gives equal size slices to all of her students, but what about those students who missed class that day? What about the students who tried to enroll in the class but could not get off the wait-list? What about the students who had to work full-time and couldn't fit her class into their schedule? They all missed out on cake. In the realm of public policy, social insurance programs like Medicare, which are available to all citizens and some documented immigrants but not non-residents and certain immigrants, fall under this category. It is likely that most Americans think that Medicare is fairly distributed, but the elderly legal resident who has worked in the US for nine years (just one year short of qualifying for Medicare) who finds herself hospitalized would likely find the system unfair and arbitrary.
2) Unequal slices for unequal ranks but equal slices for equal ranks - In Stone's example, she gives big slices with extra frosting to full professors, assistant professors get slivers, and undergraduates get crumbs. This is a basic rank- or merit-based system of equity. You can think of either military or union pay-scales as examples of this type of equity. The career civil-servant likely thinks that the rank-based system is fair, while the new employee who feels she has contributed great ideas to the organization would likely disagree. Some would argue that market-based pay-scales fall under this category, but others argue that arbitrary factors and discrimination are more important in market-based pay structures than merit.
3) Unequal slices but equal blocs - In the chapter, Stone uses a somewhat silly example, in which, male students claim that women have traditionally had greater access to chocolate cake so men as a group should have an equal share of the cake. While this is a somewhat silly example for chocolate cake, it is often the argument made for quota based affirmative action. Although quota systems for college admission have been ruled unconstitutional, we can think of quota systems as a form of group-based equity. Americans tend to be very uncomfortable with this form of equity.
Item-based forms of Equity
4) Unequal slices but equal meals - In Stone's example, the distribution of the cake is tied to a previous luncheon event where not everyone was given equal amounts of food. Some of the students got extra shrimp cocktail and better cuts of roast beef. In the policy realm, this form of equity goes beyond the current good being provided and looks at the full experience of individuals. An example of this form of equity in the policy arena is the GI Bill. It ties in-kind and financial rewards to past military service. Although Stone argues that this viewpoint is characteristic of redistributive policy, we rarely think of these policies as reparations for unequal circumstances, in our current political context (The first edition of this book was written in 1988). Instead, the culture of poverty thesis has seemingly won out as the dominant explanation for poverty in the United States. We'll discuss these different perspectives in-depth when we talk about income maintenance policies.
5) Unequal slices but equal value to recipients - In the cake analogy, Stone cuts her cake so that those who don't like chocolate cake or who are allergic to cake get small or no pieces and those who love chocolate cake get bigger pieces. This definition of equity is tailored to meet the individual needs of recipients. Assuming funding large enough to sufficiently cover individual needs, market-based programs like school vouchers could fall under this definition of equity. Programs serving individuals with disabilities like the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Vocational Rehabilitation must be tailored to the needs of the individual and they could fall under this definition, as well. This form of equity is characteristic of a welfare economics perspective. Those who love cake will be willing to trade more potato chips for cake and those who hate cake will be very willing to trade their cake for potato chips. If they get together these two groups will trade their cake for potato chips making everyone better off.
Membership-based Forms of Equity
1) Equal slices but unequal invitations - In the book, Stone gives equal size slices to all of her students, but what about those students who missed class that day? What about the students who tried to enroll in the class but could not get off the wait-list? What about the students who had to work full-time and couldn't fit her class into their schedule? They all missed out on cake. In the realm of public policy, social insurance programs like Medicare, which are available to all citizens and some documented immigrants but not non-residents and certain immigrants, fall under this category. It is likely that most Americans think that Medicare is fairly distributed, but the elderly legal resident who has worked in the US for nine years (just one year short of qualifying for Medicare) who finds herself hospitalized would likely find the system unfair and arbitrary.
2) Unequal slices for unequal ranks but equal slices for equal ranks - In Stone's example, she gives big slices with extra frosting to full professors, assistant professors get slivers, and undergraduates get crumbs. This is a basic rank- or merit-based system of equity. You can think of either military or union pay-scales as examples of this type of equity. The career civil-servant likely thinks that the rank-based system is fair, while the new employee who feels she has contributed great ideas to the organization would likely disagree. Some would argue that market-based pay-scales fall under this category, but others argue that arbitrary factors and discrimination are more important in market-based pay structures than merit.
3) Unequal slices but equal blocs - In the chapter, Stone uses a somewhat silly example, in which, male students claim that women have traditionally had greater access to chocolate cake so men as a group should have an equal share of the cake. While this is a somewhat silly example for chocolate cake, it is often the argument made for quota based affirmative action. Although quota systems for college admission have been ruled unconstitutional, we can think of quota systems as a form of group-based equity. Americans tend to be very uncomfortable with this form of equity.
Item-based forms of Equity
4) Unequal slices but equal meals - In Stone's example, the distribution of the cake is tied to a previous luncheon event where not everyone was given equal amounts of food. Some of the students got extra shrimp cocktail and better cuts of roast beef. In the policy realm, this form of equity goes beyond the current good being provided and looks at the full experience of individuals. An example of this form of equity in the policy arena is the GI Bill. It ties in-kind and financial rewards to past military service. Although Stone argues that this viewpoint is characteristic of redistributive policy, we rarely think of these policies as reparations for unequal circumstances, in our current political context (The first edition of this book was written in 1988). Instead, the culture of poverty thesis has seemingly won out as the dominant explanation for poverty in the United States. We'll discuss these different perspectives in-depth when we talk about income maintenance policies.
5) Unequal slices but equal value to recipients - In the cake analogy, Stone cuts her cake so that those who don't like chocolate cake or who are allergic to cake get small or no pieces and those who love chocolate cake get bigger pieces. This definition of equity is tailored to meet the individual needs of recipients. Assuming funding large enough to sufficiently cover individual needs, market-based programs like school vouchers could fall under this definition of equity. Programs serving individuals with disabilities like the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Vocational Rehabilitation must be tailored to the needs of the individual and they could fall under this definition, as well. This form of equity is characteristic of a welfare economics perspective. Those who love cake will be willing to trade more potato chips for cake and those who hate cake will be very willing to trade their cake for potato chips. If they get together these two groups will trade their cake for potato chips making everyone better off.
Process-based forms of Equity
6) Unequal slices but equal starting resources - In Stone's analogy, everyone gets a fork and they have at it. This is the definition of equity that Americans tend to be most comfortable with. It is a process based form of equity that allows for unequal outcomes. The logic behind the Harlem Children's Zone is to ensure that the children of Harlem have the same resources as children from wealthier neighborhoods from birth to age 18. If inequality persists despite the provision of equal resources, we attribute that to personal preference.
7) Unequal slices but equal statistical chances - In Stone's analogy, she only had enough batter to make a cupcake so she puts everyone's name in a hat and gives the cupcake to the winner. This is the classic lottery system. In the policy arena, charter schools in low-income areas are mandated to use lotteries rather than merit based admissions to receive public funding. Every child who applies has an equal statistical chance of admittance to the school.
8) Unequal slices but equal votes - In Stone's analogy, she yet again has only a cupcake and the students vote to determine who among them will be the Cupcake Eater. This is the logic of democracy. In the policy realm, each of us who are citizens get an equal vote in referendums, ballot initiatives, and elections. We may not end up with the outcomes we prefer, but because the process is seen as fair, we accept the outcome as equitable.
It is important to note that all of these forms of equity can lead to very unequal outcomes, and that one person's equity is another's unfairness. Even the first example, which is the closest to equality leaves people who are not members without. We should also note that each form of equity has three elements: the item being distributed, the process of distribution, and the recipients of the item. Each of these different definitions focuses on one of these elements.
I think that we sometimes forget that equity is an important goal and value in American society. A certain vision of equity underlies the foundation of our society, as the Declaration of Independence states "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." Of course, we can look back at the world of the founding fathers and see that these differing definitions of equity came into play back then, as well. Most notably, membership in the group of recipients was restricted to white, land-owning males. As we gear up for the 2012 elections, I believe that you will hear a lot of competing understandings of equity. I think it will be useful to think about which form of equity you believe is most appropriate for a particular context, and how different items, different definitions of recipients, and different processes lead to different forms of equity. We've heard a lot about tax reform so far in this primary cycle. Can you think of examples of how differing forms of equity lead to different recommendations for a fair tax system?
6) Unequal slices but equal starting resources - In Stone's analogy, everyone gets a fork and they have at it. This is the definition of equity that Americans tend to be most comfortable with. It is a process based form of equity that allows for unequal outcomes. The logic behind the Harlem Children's Zone is to ensure that the children of Harlem have the same resources as children from wealthier neighborhoods from birth to age 18. If inequality persists despite the provision of equal resources, we attribute that to personal preference.
7) Unequal slices but equal statistical chances - In Stone's analogy, she only had enough batter to make a cupcake so she puts everyone's name in a hat and gives the cupcake to the winner. This is the classic lottery system. In the policy arena, charter schools in low-income areas are mandated to use lotteries rather than merit based admissions to receive public funding. Every child who applies has an equal statistical chance of admittance to the school.
8) Unequal slices but equal votes - In Stone's analogy, she yet again has only a cupcake and the students vote to determine who among them will be the Cupcake Eater. This is the logic of democracy. In the policy realm, each of us who are citizens get an equal vote in referendums, ballot initiatives, and elections. We may not end up with the outcomes we prefer, but because the process is seen as fair, we accept the outcome as equitable.
It is important to note that all of these forms of equity can lead to very unequal outcomes, and that one person's equity is another's unfairness. Even the first example, which is the closest to equality leaves people who are not members without. We should also note that each form of equity has three elements: the item being distributed, the process of distribution, and the recipients of the item. Each of these different definitions focuses on one of these elements.
I think that we sometimes forget that equity is an important goal and value in American society. A certain vision of equity underlies the foundation of our society, as the Declaration of Independence states "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." Of course, we can look back at the world of the founding fathers and see that these differing definitions of equity came into play back then, as well. Most notably, membership in the group of recipients was restricted to white, land-owning males. As we gear up for the 2012 elections, I believe that you will hear a lot of competing understandings of equity. I think it will be useful to think about which form of equity you believe is most appropriate for a particular context, and how different items, different definitions of recipients, and different processes lead to different forms of equity. We've heard a lot about tax reform so far in this primary cycle. Can you think of examples of how differing forms of equity lead to different recommendations for a fair tax system?
Tuesday, September 27, 2011
Do We Live in the Market or the Polis?
This week we switch gears to Deborah Stone's perspective on policymaking. Deborah Stone is a post-modern and interpretive policy scholar. This can be a difficult perspective for some people to grasp. It assumes that policy is really about story-telling, ideas, and argument. Policy analysts, policymakers, and citizens are not as concerned with trying to create efficient policies, but are instead using metaphors to try and make issues seem like one thing rather than another thing. The choice of these metaphors is strategic and meant to reinforce the worldview of the analyst, citizen, or policymaker.
Let's step back for a minute. What is Stone's book arguing against? She is arguing against the predominant view of policy choice as rational choice. The rational model stems from the market-based model of society. We have talked a little about this previously. In the rational model, the decision-maker goes through logical steps to make her decision. First she identifies the objectives or goals she wants to achieve, then she identifies alternative courses of action and the possible consequences of all the alternatives. She evaluates these possible consequences and selects the best alternatives. This should sound like the decision analysis process that Peters presented in chapter 4 (p. 89). Stone argues that this process is "missing the point" because politics is everything. Even in the rational model, decisions are ultimately political with the steps serving as rationalizations for the preferred choice.
In chapter one, Stone emphasizes the difference between the market model of society and the political model of society, which she calls the polis. Polis is the Greek word for city-state and she will use this term throughout the book to describe the model that she believes is closest to how the policy process really works.
We have talked a little bit about market failure in this class (see the notes on health insurance). Market failure occurs when individuals cannot use the rational decision-making process or when using the rational decision-making process does not lead to optimal societal outcomes. Some forms of market failure are commons problems, imperfect information, and externalities. These situations are seen as rare problems in the market model. In the polis, these are facts of life. This is because community is the major unit of analysis in the polis, not the individual. Everything we do has effects on the community and individuals think about both their self-interest and their community (or more appropriately communities) in their decision-making process. Tying the community interest to the self-interest of community members is the major policy issue in the polis. Information is never perfect in the polis by design. It is strategically manipulated and withheld by everyone. (Think about the last time you applied for a job, asked your professor for an extension, experienced a conflict with a loved one. My guess is that you strategically withheld certain information in these cases, as did the other party. It is socially expected to do so.)
There are two other major differences between the market and the polis. In the market, all resources are scarce and competition is the means of success. In the polis, many resources like social connections and advocacy skills grow with use. Stone calls this the law of passion. Stone published the first edition of her book in 1988, and we have since seen the introduction of these types of "anti-rivalrous" goods into market models. Open source software is the common example in the market because as more people use it, it becomes better and expands. The market also assumes that all individuals have equal power in transactions. In the polis, power is derived from all of the other components. Stone explains this much better than I can on page 32, "I save power for last because it is derived by all the other elements. Power cannot be defined without reference to them. It is a phenomenon of communities. Its purpose is always to subordinate individual self-interest to other interests - sometimes to other individual or group interests, sometimes to the public interest. It operates through influences, cooperation, and loyalty. It is based also on the strategic control of information. And finally, it is a resource that obeys the laws of passion rather than the laws of matter."
In summary:
The characteristics of the market model of society are:
Individuals are rationally self-interested utility maximizers. They make exchanges when trade is mutually beneficial Trading is not a necessity but a net benefit\ Competition for scarce resources They try to minimize costs and maximize benefits Competition leads to better outcomes for society.
The characteristics of the polis model of society are (from Stone p. 32):
Community is the major unit of composition with ideas, wills, goals etc. outside of the individual. There is a public interest beyond individual interests. Most policy problems are commons problems. Influence sometimes verging on coercion, cooperation, and loyalty are the major forms of interaction. Groups and organizations are the building blocks of the community. Information is never perfect. Some resources are scarce and rivalrous, but many are anti-rivalrous and abundant.
Stone believes that the polis model more closely represents the way we make and understand public policy.
It is important to keep these two models of society in mind as we continue with Stone. She uses a lot of examples from social policy - most notably, welfare and affirmative action - because of her background and interests as a scholar, but also because we can see the differences between these two models very clearly in the social policy arena. That does not mean that we cannot apply Stone to other substantive policy areas, and we will do just that as the course progresses.
So far, what do you think? Is this all just "touchy-feely" stuff or is Stone onto something? Do you think we are living in the market, the polis, or do you see evidence of both? Can you think of areas of policymaking where we rely on the polis model rather than the market model? Have you heard any politicians or scholars (aside from Stone) reference ideas from the polis model?
Let's step back for a minute. What is Stone's book arguing against? She is arguing against the predominant view of policy choice as rational choice. The rational model stems from the market-based model of society. We have talked a little about this previously. In the rational model, the decision-maker goes through logical steps to make her decision. First she identifies the objectives or goals she wants to achieve, then she identifies alternative courses of action and the possible consequences of all the alternatives. She evaluates these possible consequences and selects the best alternatives. This should sound like the decision analysis process that Peters presented in chapter 4 (p. 89). Stone argues that this process is "missing the point" because politics is everything. Even in the rational model, decisions are ultimately political with the steps serving as rationalizations for the preferred choice.
In chapter one, Stone emphasizes the difference between the market model of society and the political model of society, which she calls the polis. Polis is the Greek word for city-state and she will use this term throughout the book to describe the model that she believes is closest to how the policy process really works.
We have talked a little bit about market failure in this class (see the notes on health insurance). Market failure occurs when individuals cannot use the rational decision-making process or when using the rational decision-making process does not lead to optimal societal outcomes. Some forms of market failure are commons problems, imperfect information, and externalities. These situations are seen as rare problems in the market model. In the polis, these are facts of life. This is because community is the major unit of analysis in the polis, not the individual. Everything we do has effects on the community and individuals think about both their self-interest and their community (or more appropriately communities) in their decision-making process. Tying the community interest to the self-interest of community members is the major policy issue in the polis. Information is never perfect in the polis by design. It is strategically manipulated and withheld by everyone. (Think about the last time you applied for a job, asked your professor for an extension, experienced a conflict with a loved one. My guess is that you strategically withheld certain information in these cases, as did the other party. It is socially expected to do so.)
There are two other major differences between the market and the polis. In the market, all resources are scarce and competition is the means of success. In the polis, many resources like social connections and advocacy skills grow with use. Stone calls this the law of passion. Stone published the first edition of her book in 1988, and we have since seen the introduction of these types of "anti-rivalrous" goods into market models. Open source software is the common example in the market because as more people use it, it becomes better and expands. The market also assumes that all individuals have equal power in transactions. In the polis, power is derived from all of the other components. Stone explains this much better than I can on page 32, "I save power for last because it is derived by all the other elements. Power cannot be defined without reference to them. It is a phenomenon of communities. Its purpose is always to subordinate individual self-interest to other interests - sometimes to other individual or group interests, sometimes to the public interest. It operates through influences, cooperation, and loyalty. It is based also on the strategic control of information. And finally, it is a resource that obeys the laws of passion rather than the laws of matter."
In summary:
The characteristics of the market model of society are:
Individuals are rationally self-interested utility maximizers. They make exchanges when trade is mutually beneficial Trading is not a necessity but a net benefit\ Competition for scarce resources They try to minimize costs and maximize benefits Competition leads to better outcomes for society.
The characteristics of the polis model of society are (from Stone p. 32):
Community is the major unit of composition with ideas, wills, goals etc. outside of the individual. There is a public interest beyond individual interests. Most policy problems are commons problems. Influence sometimes verging on coercion, cooperation, and loyalty are the major forms of interaction. Groups and organizations are the building blocks of the community. Information is never perfect. Some resources are scarce and rivalrous, but many are anti-rivalrous and abundant.
Stone believes that the polis model more closely represents the way we make and understand public policy.
It is important to keep these two models of society in mind as we continue with Stone. She uses a lot of examples from social policy - most notably, welfare and affirmative action - because of her background and interests as a scholar, but also because we can see the differences between these two models very clearly in the social policy arena. That does not mean that we cannot apply Stone to other substantive policy areas, and we will do just that as the course progresses.
So far, what do you think? Is this all just "touchy-feely" stuff or is Stone onto something? Do you think we are living in the market, the polis, or do you see evidence of both? Can you think of areas of policymaking where we rely on the polis model rather than the market model? Have you heard any politicians or scholars (aside from Stone) reference ideas from the polis model?
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