Given the current economic climate, I anticipate that this will be a busy week for discussions. I think that the materials provided for this week - the chapter from Peters, the Planet Money podcast, and the documentary - illustrate how broadly the government can intervene in the economy, how important the economy is to the political prospects of the President, and ultimately how little control the government actually has over what happens in the economy.
Although scholars agree that the government has little actual control over the economy, there is still some debate over the degree to which the government can or should intervene. If you have not already seen this "music video" explaining the difference between the Keynesian and Hayek-ian perspective, I highly recommend it.
Here we see both an Austrian school (laissez-faire) and a Keynesian (interventionist) perspective on what and how much government should do to address economic downturns. During the debt ceiling debate, Senator Dick Durbin stated that the debt ceiling bill "Put [Keynes] to his final rest", signaling a huge turning point in American macroeconomic policy and a return to a more laissez-faire approach to the economy. Of course, we have since seen President Obama present the American Jobs Act, which includes a vast array of Keynesian based proposals (government investment in infrastructure and public service and subsidized employment programs).
The video does not discuss the current prominent understanding of economics, the Chicago School neo-classical perspective associated with Milton Friedman and George Stigler. These economists prefer a laissez-faire form of capitalism similar to Hayek, but arrive at that recommendation through different assumptions and methodologies. Despite Obama's portrayal by some on the right as a "socialist", many of Obama's economic advisers follow the Chicago School approach to the economy, perhaps explaining some of his recent tax and budget compromises. Despite its popularity in conservative political circles, supply-side economics is rarely discussed as a serious theoretical approach to macroeconomic policy. Even when the Laffer curve is invoked, we often ignore the fact that there are two sides to the curve, one side where government revenue rises concurrent with taxation and another where it falls in response to higher taxation.
Perhaps the biggest disagreement among economists and politicians appears to be the mechanism through which government should act on the economy. As the podcast, How Do You Create a Job? illustrates, government can create conditions that are likely to create jobs either through reducing restrictions and taxation of business or through taxing and providing more services. We see this trade-off when localities attempt to attract business, as well. The key is finding the balance that fosters the creation of good jobs and provides services that government can deliver well. As this statement from the former CEO of Intel illustrates, low-taxes alone are not a good economic development strategy.
At this point in time, the future of the economy and government's role as a regulator and participant remains uncertain. We have seen a Keynesian approach with the stimulus package, a more supply-side approach with the extension of the Bush tax-cuts, and a Corporatist approach with the bailouts. Prior to the summer, the economy appeared to be on an upswing, although it was a comparatively anemic upswing in terms of job creation and unemployment. The manufactured debt ceiling crisis (itself a lesson in agenda-setting) seems to have stalled recovery due to uncertainty and anxiety about the American political process. Suddenly, we find ourselves in the midst of a likely double-dip recession with consumer confidence at a low-point and anger from both the political left and right coming to a head. The so-called super-committee is currently in negotiations to prevent another showdown similar to the debt ceiling crisis of the summer, but early reports seem to indicate that compromise will be difficult to achieve. The President has embarked on a "jobs tour" and is making job creation his current policy priority, but as we have seen, Congress appears unwilling to pass the American Jobs Act as it is written. In response, Obama has shifted his focus to the regulatory and implementation process to implement mortgage reform and other programs that his administration believes will stimulate the economy (If you need any further evidence that the policy stages process is not as neat and tidy as theory suggests, just look at how economic policy is currently progressing). Perhaps the biggest issue with our economy at the moment is inequality; with African Americans, Latinos, low-skilled workers, and the young facing extremely high unemployment and the erosion of wealth accumulated prior to the economic collapse. It is impossible to tell what the next few months will bring, but I can almost guarantee that discussion of the economy will dominate the 2012 elections.
Tuesday, October 25, 2011
A Number's Worth a Thousand Words - Measuring Phenomena in the Polis
Numbers tend to be the gold-standard of policy analysis. Master's and doctoral policy programs rarely discuss qualitative analysis and tend to focus on the quantification of phenomena. As we learned last week, stories play a very important role in policy advocacy, but they tend to be ignored in the study of public policy. In my Master's of Public Policy program at Georgetown, for example, we took 3 required semesters of quantitative methods, but were not offered a qualitative course as an elective. Numbers are considered so important because they imply scientific analysis and objectivity. While the story of an individual is considered subjective and unrelated to the experiences of the population, a number is perceived as the objective picture of the issue as a whole.
Of course, anyone who has paid recent attention to political debate knows that both sides have numbers to support their point. Sometimes these numbers are directly contradictory. Occasionally, the number is completely made up like Senator Kyl's "not intended to be factual" statement that abortions are well over 90 percent of what planned parenthood does. Usually, both numbers contain some validity but vary in terms of how they count phenomena.
One of the major questions currently being debated is the extent of poverty in our society. In the section on security, I talked about relative versus absolute poverty and that certainly comes into play here. If you believe that relative poverty is important you would likely consider many more people to be poor than if you think absolute poverty is all that matters. We have two federal measures of poverty, the federal poverty threshold and the poverty guidelines. The federal policy threshold was developed by Mollie Orshansky in the 1970s and counts the pre-tax income, including any income provided by government assistance programs, of all family members and adjusts the count by the number and age of the family members. Non-cash benefits, benefits delivered through the tax-code and capital gains and losses are not counted. If your income falls below the poverty threshold, which is based on the cost of the basic basket of food necessary to meet dietary needs (adjusted for inflation) and an estimate (based on data from the 1960s) of what percent of their income families spend of food, then you are considered to be in poverty. The HHS poverty guidelines are used for program administration and simplify the census measure so that the age of family members is no longer taken into account.
Of course, many people find this measure to be problematic. Much of our aid to the poor is delivered through non-cash assistance and tax credits. Many scholars argue that without taking these sources of income into account the federal poverty level over-estimates the number of families in poverty. Others argue that families spend a much lower percentage of their income on food than they did in the 1960s due to the rising costs of housing and transportation so the federal poverty level under-estimates the number of people in poverty. Still others would argue that the federal poverty line doesn't take into account geographic variations in the cost of living so it under-estimates the number of people in poverty in large cities with high costs of living. When you read political and scholarly discussions of poverty in America (or of any issue) you have to pay attention to how they count who is in poverty and whether or not that measure is appropriate for the given context.
Stone also discusses some of the paradoxes of counting in the polis. Cost to government is often income to someone else. This is especially important in an era of contracted services. Whole industries have grown up to serve the needs of citizens that had once been fulfilled by government. As fiscal austerity measures are put in place, businesses who rely on government contracts will likely fail.
Averages become a paradox in the polis, as well. An average is a moving number. When a politician says "I want all students with low test scores to be brought up to the average", this becomes an impossible goal because the average test score moves (unless all high scoring students also come down to the average). All people want to be considered middle-class in America so we end up with a theoretical middle-class which bears little relationship to the actual statistical middle-class. We also end up with different definitions of the middle-class by party.
Finally, we have to remember that in the polis people adjust their behavior to adapt to measurement. There is an old adage in program evaluation that says "you get what you measure." If you measure one aspect of performance, that aspect will likely improve whereas other aspects will likely get worse. Measuring quantity of service will likely reduce the quality of service. Measuring pure numbers also creates the perverse incentives to cheat the system. The recent cheating scandal in Atlanta Public Schools illustrates how measurement can lead to corruption at both individual and systemic levels.
Numbers are often imbued with a sense of objectivity and scientific validity, but we have to remember that in the polis they tell stories just like symbols. You have to be just as skeptical when you hear a number as you are when you hear a story. Of course, just because numbers can be manipulated does not mean that they do not often have a degree of truth to them. My advice is to think about the source of the number, how it was measured and counted, and how other ways of measuring could have changed the statistic. Once you have skeptically examined the number, you can decide whether or not you think it is a valid measurement, or at least more or less valid than competing claims.
Of course, anyone who has paid recent attention to political debate knows that both sides have numbers to support their point. Sometimes these numbers are directly contradictory. Occasionally, the number is completely made up like Senator Kyl's "not intended to be factual" statement that abortions are well over 90 percent of what planned parenthood does. Usually, both numbers contain some validity but vary in terms of how they count phenomena.
One of the major questions currently being debated is the extent of poverty in our society. In the section on security, I talked about relative versus absolute poverty and that certainly comes into play here. If you believe that relative poverty is important you would likely consider many more people to be poor than if you think absolute poverty is all that matters. We have two federal measures of poverty, the federal poverty threshold and the poverty guidelines. The federal policy threshold was developed by Mollie Orshansky in the 1970s and counts the pre-tax income, including any income provided by government assistance programs, of all family members and adjusts the count by the number and age of the family members. Non-cash benefits, benefits delivered through the tax-code and capital gains and losses are not counted. If your income falls below the poverty threshold, which is based on the cost of the basic basket of food necessary to meet dietary needs (adjusted for inflation) and an estimate (based on data from the 1960s) of what percent of their income families spend of food, then you are considered to be in poverty. The HHS poverty guidelines are used for program administration and simplify the census measure so that the age of family members is no longer taken into account.
Of course, many people find this measure to be problematic. Much of our aid to the poor is delivered through non-cash assistance and tax credits. Many scholars argue that without taking these sources of income into account the federal poverty level over-estimates the number of families in poverty. Others argue that families spend a much lower percentage of their income on food than they did in the 1960s due to the rising costs of housing and transportation so the federal poverty level under-estimates the number of people in poverty. Still others would argue that the federal poverty line doesn't take into account geographic variations in the cost of living so it under-estimates the number of people in poverty in large cities with high costs of living. When you read political and scholarly discussions of poverty in America (or of any issue) you have to pay attention to how they count who is in poverty and whether or not that measure is appropriate for the given context.
Stone also discusses some of the paradoxes of counting in the polis. Cost to government is often income to someone else. This is especially important in an era of contracted services. Whole industries have grown up to serve the needs of citizens that had once been fulfilled by government. As fiscal austerity measures are put in place, businesses who rely on government contracts will likely fail.
Averages become a paradox in the polis, as well. An average is a moving number. When a politician says "I want all students with low test scores to be brought up to the average", this becomes an impossible goal because the average test score moves (unless all high scoring students also come down to the average). All people want to be considered middle-class in America so we end up with a theoretical middle-class which bears little relationship to the actual statistical middle-class. We also end up with different definitions of the middle-class by party.
Finally, we have to remember that in the polis people adjust their behavior to adapt to measurement. There is an old adage in program evaluation that says "you get what you measure." If you measure one aspect of performance, that aspect will likely improve whereas other aspects will likely get worse. Measuring quantity of service will likely reduce the quality of service. Measuring pure numbers also creates the perverse incentives to cheat the system. The recent cheating scandal in Atlanta Public Schools illustrates how measurement can lead to corruption at both individual and systemic levels.
Numbers are often imbued with a sense of objectivity and scientific validity, but we have to remember that in the polis they tell stories just like symbols. You have to be just as skeptical when you hear a number as you are when you hear a story. Of course, just because numbers can be manipulated does not mean that they do not often have a degree of truth to them. My advice is to think about the source of the number, how it was measured and counted, and how other ways of measuring could have changed the statistic. Once you have skeptically examined the number, you can decide whether or not you think it is a valid measurement, or at least more or less valid than competing claims.
Tuesday, October 18, 2011
Policy symbols and culture wars
This week addresses two of my favorite topics, both as a creative writer who studied poetry in graduate school, and as a doctoral student studying public administration. Our focus is on two intertwined subjects: symbols, from Stone's text, and culture wars from Peters' text. It can seem a little counter-intuitive in our field, since public administration is called on so frequently to provide technical expertise and answers to wicked problems grounded in fact. What, then, are we to do when a problem like the ones Peters describes end up in our laps? Especially since the general public does not appreciate government institutions dictating solutions to these kinds of problems (except perhaps in the courts) navigating a cultural clash can be one of the biggest challenges we will face.
In part, we must acknowledge that these issues--whether they be the debate over abortion, gay rights, environmental causes, the death penalty or other challenging topics--cannot be "solved" in the traditional sense. As Peters notes, these problems will not be resolved by throwing more money at a community, or by bargaining between groups. As public administrators, government officials can often only aid in the process that political bodies undertake, and work to treat each side in an issue as fairly as possible.
Another effort we can undertake to improve ourselves, and to improve the policy process, is to take to heart Stone's discussion of symbols, and to realize that we are affected by the same rhetoric and action that influences the general public. If we're able to dissect how policies become targeted at particular groups (people who are homeless, for example) and what that means for them, and for us as administrators of policy, we can think critically about the role that those symbols play in our own decision-making, and how we can help others to imagine other ways of relating to peers, and the broader community.
Bear in mind how the power of symbols, and the struggle of culture wars play out in this week's documentaries, which each address in their own way topics raised by Peters. You have a choice this week to watch either an episode of In the Life's "Our Bodies, Our Rights," a television program on gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender issues, or a Frontline episode "The Last Abortion Clinic."
As you go through the week's reading, also consider the ways that you may be impacted, or participating in the creation of symbols. Where do we run across broadly accepted symbols in our daily lives, and how do we know what they mean? I look forward to reading more about your thoughts!
In part, we must acknowledge that these issues--whether they be the debate over abortion, gay rights, environmental causes, the death penalty or other challenging topics--cannot be "solved" in the traditional sense. As Peters notes, these problems will not be resolved by throwing more money at a community, or by bargaining between groups. As public administrators, government officials can often only aid in the process that political bodies undertake, and work to treat each side in an issue as fairly as possible.
Another effort we can undertake to improve ourselves, and to improve the policy process, is to take to heart Stone's discussion of symbols, and to realize that we are affected by the same rhetoric and action that influences the general public. If we're able to dissect how policies become targeted at particular groups (people who are homeless, for example) and what that means for them, and for us as administrators of policy, we can think critically about the role that those symbols play in our own decision-making, and how we can help others to imagine other ways of relating to peers, and the broader community.
Bear in mind how the power of symbols, and the struggle of culture wars play out in this week's documentaries, which each address in their own way topics raised by Peters. You have a choice this week to watch either an episode of In the Life's "Our Bodies, Our Rights," a television program on gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender issues, or a Frontline episode "The Last Abortion Clinic."
As you go through the week's reading, also consider the ways that you may be impacted, or participating in the creation of symbols. Where do we run across broadly accepted symbols in our daily lives, and how do we know what they mean? I look forward to reading more about your thoughts!
Thursday, October 13, 2011
Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Policy
Our documentary for the week focuses heavily on the problems associated with a punitive law enforcement strategy for minors convicted of heinous crimes. While the cases presented in the documentary When Kids Get Life are extreme and shouldn't be taken as characteristic of the experience of all convicted criminals, they illustrate the problems with a one-size fits all criminal justice policy.
As Peters mentions, most law enforcement activities tend to be carried out at the state and local level. Policies like the death penalty, automatic sentencing, diversion programs, and gun control are, for the most part, decided at lower levels of government. One exception to this rule is when a state or local government's practices are ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Relatedly, the federal government intervenes in law enforcement where it is constitutionally allowed. The power to tax, interstate commerce, and activities related to the protection of federal officials have been used to justify the activities of the FBI, ATF, DEA, Customs, Secret Service, and Border Patrol.
Two areas of criminal justice policy that have been hot-topics in the news lately are gun control and the death penalty. Last year, if you remember, the Arizona legislature passed a law allowing individuals over age 21 the right to carry a weapon on campus, but the bill was vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer. It seems certain that a similar bill will be re-introduced in the near-future. While the question of gun control has largely been left up to states and localities to decide, the second amendment limits the degree to which gun ownership can be restricted. The correct interpretation of the second amendment has been disputed throughout the history of our nation. Scholars are divided over whether or not the second amendment provides for a collective right for the states' to organize militias or an individual right to gun ownership. In the 2008 decision, District of Columbia v. Heller the Supreme Court broke with precedent on this issue and decided 5-4 that the second amendment provides for an individual right to gun ownership, striking down the DC handgun ban. Although most Americans tend to be fairly centrist on this issue and support some gun control, gun rights have served as a hot-button political topic or a so-called "wedge issue". Advocates on both sides tend to have had very personal and emotional experiences with guns and so our policies on this issue tend to be more extreme than public polling would suggest. What do you think about gun control? Should we have more restrictions on gun procurement and carrying in Arizona or fewer? Do you think concealed-carry on campus is a good idea? What concerns might you have with such a policy?
Another major hot-topic at the moment is the debate over the death penalty. The Troy Davis case has appeared to mobilize a substantial number of death penalty opponents and has called into question the equity of our judicial system. While Americans remain supportive of the use of the death penalty, in general, new understandings about the reliability of eye-witness testimony, police coercion, and circumstantial evidence has provoked questions about the use of the death penalty when evidence seems uncertain. Despite the fact that one of the leading GOP Presidential candidates seems to be unconcerned that evidence overwhelmingly suggests that an innocent man was put to death while he was governor, many Americans find the death of even one innocent person at the hands of the criminal justice system to be an unacceptable outcome. What do you think of the death penalty? Should we put a moratorium on its use until we are able to improve the equity of our judicial system? Should we abolish it all together? Are the Troy Davis and Cameron Todd Willingham cases isolated unfortunate instances or symptoms of a racist and/or classist criminal justice system?
As Peters mentions, most law enforcement activities tend to be carried out at the state and local level. Policies like the death penalty, automatic sentencing, diversion programs, and gun control are, for the most part, decided at lower levels of government. One exception to this rule is when a state or local government's practices are ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Relatedly, the federal government intervenes in law enforcement where it is constitutionally allowed. The power to tax, interstate commerce, and activities related to the protection of federal officials have been used to justify the activities of the FBI, ATF, DEA, Customs, Secret Service, and Border Patrol.
Two areas of criminal justice policy that have been hot-topics in the news lately are gun control and the death penalty. Last year, if you remember, the Arizona legislature passed a law allowing individuals over age 21 the right to carry a weapon on campus, but the bill was vetoed by Governor Jan Brewer. It seems certain that a similar bill will be re-introduced in the near-future. While the question of gun control has largely been left up to states and localities to decide, the second amendment limits the degree to which gun ownership can be restricted. The correct interpretation of the second amendment has been disputed throughout the history of our nation. Scholars are divided over whether or not the second amendment provides for a collective right for the states' to organize militias or an individual right to gun ownership. In the 2008 decision, District of Columbia v. Heller the Supreme Court broke with precedent on this issue and decided 5-4 that the second amendment provides for an individual right to gun ownership, striking down the DC handgun ban. Although most Americans tend to be fairly centrist on this issue and support some gun control, gun rights have served as a hot-button political topic or a so-called "wedge issue". Advocates on both sides tend to have had very personal and emotional experiences with guns and so our policies on this issue tend to be more extreme than public polling would suggest. What do you think about gun control? Should we have more restrictions on gun procurement and carrying in Arizona or fewer? Do you think concealed-carry on campus is a good idea? What concerns might you have with such a policy?
Another major hot-topic at the moment is the debate over the death penalty. The Troy Davis case has appeared to mobilize a substantial number of death penalty opponents and has called into question the equity of our judicial system. While Americans remain supportive of the use of the death penalty, in general, new understandings about the reliability of eye-witness testimony, police coercion, and circumstantial evidence has provoked questions about the use of the death penalty when evidence seems uncertain. Despite the fact that one of the leading GOP Presidential candidates seems to be unconcerned that evidence overwhelmingly suggests that an innocent man was put to death while he was governor, many Americans find the death of even one innocent person at the hands of the criminal justice system to be an unacceptable outcome. What do you think of the death penalty? Should we put a moratorium on its use until we are able to improve the equity of our judicial system? Should we abolish it all together? Are the Troy Davis and Cameron Todd Willingham cases isolated unfortunate instances or symptoms of a racist and/or classist criminal justice system?
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Defense Policy
As I mentioned on twitter, the substantive readings for the week combine a lot of policy issues that have been "hot topics" over the past few years. Although I like Peters' reasoning for combining defense policy and law enforcement into one chapter, I think it makes sense for me to talk about them separately. I know a little more about law enforcement and criminal justice policy than defense policy, but I think that I can pull together our readings from Stone and some of the current issues in defense policy to help you think about this policy arena.
I think that even the most libertarian-minded individuals would agree that the basis of the social contract is that government should provide for the people's defense. Civil defense is a classic example of a collective good, for which the market cannot provide. For all those except the most extreme pacifists, the idea that government should provide for the protection of its citizens is not under dispute. The questions of how and to what degree remain.
For the past two weeks, we have been reading about policy goals. From Stone, we have learned that they are often subjective and vaguely defined. Security, liberty, and efficiency are often discussed as rationales for our defense policies. Most Americans would agree that our military should protect us from current and future harms in the most efficient way possible, but does that mean that we should allow pre-emptive strikes and water-boarding to ensure our safety? What about assassinations? Should we grant citizens, non-citizens, guerilla forces, and opposing military forces the same protections or do certain groups deserve more protections than others? I think the chapters in Stone about policy goals can help us think about all of these issues.
I want to take a moment to address one issue in particular, in the context of Stone. Peters discusses the all-volunteer army and military procurement as two of the problems currently facing defense policy. We have decided that contracting out not only the creation of new weapons and strategies, but also the carrying out of on-the-ground security, as the most efficient way to fight our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like the library analogy, however, we have to ask "efficient at what and for whom?" If our ultimate goal is to engage in many conflicts in a variety of so-called "theaters" then contracting out security, language, and logistics while enlisted men and women focus on combat may be the most efficient way to allocate responsibility. On the other hand, if you are concerned with a military that is more responsive to commands then contracting out services seems less efficient. If our ultimate goal is to avoid conflict whenever possible, requiring the military to carry-out all services on the ground would be the most efficient way to achieve that goal. (After all, it would require us to either reduce our conflicts to what a volunteer military can handle or institute a draft). If our goal in any individual conflict is to win at any cost, then we might consider contracting out even more services. If our goal is to win the hearts and minds of the people in the countries where our conflict takes place it may be more efficient for military personnel to be conducting fewer combat operations and more humanitarian missions and to contract out more of the security and combat duties. Some of these options may not be legal or ethical, but to say that contracting is efficient suggests an objective understanding of efficiency.
Of course, the contracting out of defense services also brings up real questions of equity. If soldiers in the military are the ones tasked with the most dangerous jobs, is it fair that military contractors far out-earn them? You may say yes if you are most concerned with process, assuming that everyone has the opportunity to either become a contractor or a soldier, because it is only the most experienced professional soldiers who will earn the higher paying contract jobs. On the other hand, you may consider that the military is more likely to recruit historically disenfranchised groups, while the contractors tend to recruit professionals. If this is how you think about the issue, then paying more to contractors is highly inequitable.
You could also think about the structural harms that contracting out may impose on the survival of our military. By incentivizing career military employees to transition to a higher paying contractor job, the reliance on contracted service may reduce the degree of expertise present in our military. Because contractors are not required to remain at their posts in dangerous circumstances, contracting out may reduce troop morale and community trust.
These are just some examples of how we can use Stone's perspective to understand one hot-topic under debate in the defense policy arena. I think the most important take-away here is that there is not one-single objective answer to the question of whether contracting out military services is equitable, efficient, or harm-inducing. Instead, we are arguing and debating our points based on our subjective understandings of each of these concepts.
I think that even the most libertarian-minded individuals would agree that the basis of the social contract is that government should provide for the people's defense. Civil defense is a classic example of a collective good, for which the market cannot provide. For all those except the most extreme pacifists, the idea that government should provide for the protection of its citizens is not under dispute. The questions of how and to what degree remain.
For the past two weeks, we have been reading about policy goals. From Stone, we have learned that they are often subjective and vaguely defined. Security, liberty, and efficiency are often discussed as rationales for our defense policies. Most Americans would agree that our military should protect us from current and future harms in the most efficient way possible, but does that mean that we should allow pre-emptive strikes and water-boarding to ensure our safety? What about assassinations? Should we grant citizens, non-citizens, guerilla forces, and opposing military forces the same protections or do certain groups deserve more protections than others? I think the chapters in Stone about policy goals can help us think about all of these issues.
I want to take a moment to address one issue in particular, in the context of Stone. Peters discusses the all-volunteer army and military procurement as two of the problems currently facing defense policy. We have decided that contracting out not only the creation of new weapons and strategies, but also the carrying out of on-the-ground security, as the most efficient way to fight our wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Like the library analogy, however, we have to ask "efficient at what and for whom?" If our ultimate goal is to engage in many conflicts in a variety of so-called "theaters" then contracting out security, language, and logistics while enlisted men and women focus on combat may be the most efficient way to allocate responsibility. On the other hand, if you are concerned with a military that is more responsive to commands then contracting out services seems less efficient. If our ultimate goal is to avoid conflict whenever possible, requiring the military to carry-out all services on the ground would be the most efficient way to achieve that goal. (After all, it would require us to either reduce our conflicts to what a volunteer military can handle or institute a draft). If our goal in any individual conflict is to win at any cost, then we might consider contracting out even more services. If our goal is to win the hearts and minds of the people in the countries where our conflict takes place it may be more efficient for military personnel to be conducting fewer combat operations and more humanitarian missions and to contract out more of the security and combat duties. Some of these options may not be legal or ethical, but to say that contracting is efficient suggests an objective understanding of efficiency.
Of course, the contracting out of defense services also brings up real questions of equity. If soldiers in the military are the ones tasked with the most dangerous jobs, is it fair that military contractors far out-earn them? You may say yes if you are most concerned with process, assuming that everyone has the opportunity to either become a contractor or a soldier, because it is only the most experienced professional soldiers who will earn the higher paying contract jobs. On the other hand, you may consider that the military is more likely to recruit historically disenfranchised groups, while the contractors tend to recruit professionals. If this is how you think about the issue, then paying more to contractors is highly inequitable.
You could also think about the structural harms that contracting out may impose on the survival of our military. By incentivizing career military employees to transition to a higher paying contractor job, the reliance on contracted service may reduce the degree of expertise present in our military. Because contractors are not required to remain at their posts in dangerous circumstances, contracting out may reduce troop morale and community trust.
These are just some examples of how we can use Stone's perspective to understand one hot-topic under debate in the defense policy arena. I think the most important take-away here is that there is not one-single objective answer to the question of whether contracting out military services is equitable, efficient, or harm-inducing. Instead, we are arguing and debating our points based on our subjective understandings of each of these concepts.
Free to be You and Me - My Thoughts on Stone Ch. 5 - Liberty
Liberty is probably the central American value. Freedom is an inherent aspect of the American Revolution and an important part of the American story. We are fairly certain that we know what we mean when we say liberty or freedom, but when we take such a grand ideal and operationalize it into policy action, it is just as complex as all of the other values. In the United States, we tend to focus on negative liberty or freedom from restraint. This is the idea behind our Bill of Rights. Government cannot restrict your ability to practice religion as you choose or to speak your mind. We could also take the lead of some European countries and define liberty as positive rights or rights to the prerequisites of freedom. A right to health care would be one such right, as would the right to a basic living wage. The right to a basic education and the right to emergency medical care are two such positive forms of liberty that we practice in America, but negative liberty is still dominant in the United States.
Stone asks two important questions about liberty on p. 109. "When, if ever should community or social purpose be allowed to trump individual choice? Under what circumstances should public policy ever limit individual privacy and autonomy?" Many political theorists would turn to the work of John Stuart Mill to answer these questions, as does Stone. Mill's On Liberty argues that society can only restrict an individual's liberty if it causes harm to others. This brings to mind the "fist-swinging" analogy. I can swing my fist around in the air as much as I want as long as you are not close enough that I would hit you.
This can be considered the standard of bodily harm. It sounds like a simple standard to uphold, but as you know by now, nothing is ever simple in the polis. There are bodily harms that affect some people more than others, for example air pollution affects asthmatics, young children, and the elderly more than the general population. There are bodily harms that accumulate over time, for example exposure to small doses of toxic chemicals may not be hazardous in the short-term but may cause cancer in the long-term. There are indirect bodily harms, for example a budget crisis could lead to a lay-off of air traffic controllers, which could cause the remaining controllers to be overworked, which could lead one to falling asleep on the job, which could lead to an accident. We then must also ask the question, which action should we take to prevent these harms. Do we keep asthmatic children inside for recess on bad air quality days, regulate air pollution, or both? Both of these solutions restrict someone's liberty. The problem of bodily harm is rarely ever the simple issue of one person intentionally causing an immediate harm to another.
Of course, if you think about our criminal justice policies, causing bodily harm is not the only standard of harm that we use as an excuse to restrict liberty. We are also not allowed to inflict material harms on others. We cannot take our neighbor's new big screen television, even if they are on vacation, it is not being used and there is no way we would inflict any bodily harm on them. This would not only be illegal but it violates the norms and values of society.
Stone discusses two types of material harm on page 112: harm that destroys property and harm that destroys the market value of property. The latter reminds me of proposition 2, which Phoenix residents rejected in the last local election. The brief summary of the proposition is that it would have allowed the re-zoning of a plot of land so that a gas station could be built on a vacant lot in East Phoenix. Neighborhood residents opposed the station because they argued that it would bring crime to the area. In other words, it would indirectly harm them. While it does seem like a bizarre issue to bring to referendum, it seems like a perfect issue to discuss in this context.
Residents of the neighborhood could also have argued that the gas station would have amenity effects. They could have said that the 24 hour gas station would make the neighborhood less pleasing because the lights will be on all of the time and it will bring late night traffic to the area. Certainly, a gas station is not aesthetically pleasing. It could have also been argued that a gas station is more aesthetically pleasing than a vacant lot. Of course as Stone points out, now that we are dealing with harms that are not physical we are engaging in argument, debate, and claims-making.
The most abstract harms are emotional, psychological, moral and spiritual harms. Many of these harms would not have been recognized 50 years ago. Should we restrict an individual's liberty because it causes stress to another individual or group of individuals? What if it violates the religious or spiritual beliefs of another individual? Should a pharmacist be able to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions because it's against his or her religious beliefs? Should a group Muslims be able to build an Arabic cultural center a few blocks from Ground Zero? Should Westboro Baptist Church be able to protest the funerals of soldiers killed in battle? Although emotional, psychological, religious, and spiritual harms are relatively new issues, they have certainly been hot policy topics over the past few years. Of course, if we granted protections based on these harms, we would likely be harming others; specifically women seeking birth control, the Muslim community, and the families and friends of military heroes. We must find the delicate balance here.
Of course, in the polis we also have harms and liberties related to community. Mill argued that there are some community duties that individuals can be compelled to perform. We often restrict the liberty of individuals for the good of the social order. Citizens have to pay taxes, serve on juries, and obey the laws. In America, all males 18 and older have to register for the draft. Structural harms are a community harm that affects the ability of a community to successfully function. Stone uses the example of school vouchers as a structural harm because it reduces integration and the visibility of the public education system. Another structural harm could be google books because it reduces the use of the library by relatively well-off citizens and makes the library less important as a community meeting place. Of course, in both of these cases, removing the structural harm would likely cause individual harms. Accumulative harms are actions that are not harmful in isolation but become harmful when everyone in a community does them. The individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act is based on this logic. If one healthy person does not buy insurance then it won't raise premiums by much, but if every healthy person does not buy insurance than premiums will sky-rocket and the health insurance industry will go broke. Finally, we can extend individual harms to examine their effects on the community. Remember, in the polis all actions have ripple effects. Here again, we must strike a delicate balance.
Stone firmly believes that we cannot restrict our understanding of harm and liberty to the individual. Corporate actors including businesses, churches, non-profits, and government agencies can harm people and be harmed. Further, because they generally have a much larger reach than an individual, the harms they cause can have a greater impact on the community as a whole.
Once again, Stone ends her chapter with a discussion of trade-offs. This time we have two: liberty and security, and liberty and equity. Starting with liberty and security, Stone presents the traditional or conservative understanding of the relationship between the two: security creates dependence, self-sufficiency is necessary for liberty, and government paternalism reduces freedom. She then presents her understanding: individuals cannot make free choices unless they have basic security, no one is ever truly self-sufficient, and policy can make determinations about who is competent to care for him or herself and who is not. The liberty and equality trade-off is presented similarly. The traditional or conservative understanding is that redistribution for the sake of equality reduces the liberty of the well-off, either you have complete liberty or none at all, and coercion by public policy reduces liberty. She believes that equalizing power, wealth and knowledge leads to positive liberty, liberty is measured in degrees, and society's control of some problems can expand human freedom. I am guessing that if you have not agreed with Stone's argument in the previous chapters, you will not agree this time. Either way, I hope you have taken the time to understand both arguments.
Stone asks two important questions about liberty on p. 109. "When, if ever should community or social purpose be allowed to trump individual choice? Under what circumstances should public policy ever limit individual privacy and autonomy?" Many political theorists would turn to the work of John Stuart Mill to answer these questions, as does Stone. Mill's On Liberty argues that society can only restrict an individual's liberty if it causes harm to others. This brings to mind the "fist-swinging" analogy. I can swing my fist around in the air as much as I want as long as you are not close enough that I would hit you.
This can be considered the standard of bodily harm. It sounds like a simple standard to uphold, but as you know by now, nothing is ever simple in the polis. There are bodily harms that affect some people more than others, for example air pollution affects asthmatics, young children, and the elderly more than the general population. There are bodily harms that accumulate over time, for example exposure to small doses of toxic chemicals may not be hazardous in the short-term but may cause cancer in the long-term. There are indirect bodily harms, for example a budget crisis could lead to a lay-off of air traffic controllers, which could cause the remaining controllers to be overworked, which could lead one to falling asleep on the job, which could lead to an accident. We then must also ask the question, which action should we take to prevent these harms. Do we keep asthmatic children inside for recess on bad air quality days, regulate air pollution, or both? Both of these solutions restrict someone's liberty. The problem of bodily harm is rarely ever the simple issue of one person intentionally causing an immediate harm to another.
Of course, if you think about our criminal justice policies, causing bodily harm is not the only standard of harm that we use as an excuse to restrict liberty. We are also not allowed to inflict material harms on others. We cannot take our neighbor's new big screen television, even if they are on vacation, it is not being used and there is no way we would inflict any bodily harm on them. This would not only be illegal but it violates the norms and values of society.
Stone discusses two types of material harm on page 112: harm that destroys property and harm that destroys the market value of property. The latter reminds me of proposition 2, which Phoenix residents rejected in the last local election. The brief summary of the proposition is that it would have allowed the re-zoning of a plot of land so that a gas station could be built on a vacant lot in East Phoenix. Neighborhood residents opposed the station because they argued that it would bring crime to the area. In other words, it would indirectly harm them. While it does seem like a bizarre issue to bring to referendum, it seems like a perfect issue to discuss in this context.
Residents of the neighborhood could also have argued that the gas station would have amenity effects. They could have said that the 24 hour gas station would make the neighborhood less pleasing because the lights will be on all of the time and it will bring late night traffic to the area. Certainly, a gas station is not aesthetically pleasing. It could have also been argued that a gas station is more aesthetically pleasing than a vacant lot. Of course as Stone points out, now that we are dealing with harms that are not physical we are engaging in argument, debate, and claims-making.
The most abstract harms are emotional, psychological, moral and spiritual harms. Many of these harms would not have been recognized 50 years ago. Should we restrict an individual's liberty because it causes stress to another individual or group of individuals? What if it violates the religious or spiritual beliefs of another individual? Should a pharmacist be able to refuse to fill birth control prescriptions because it's against his or her religious beliefs? Should a group Muslims be able to build an Arabic cultural center a few blocks from Ground Zero? Should Westboro Baptist Church be able to protest the funerals of soldiers killed in battle? Although emotional, psychological, religious, and spiritual harms are relatively new issues, they have certainly been hot policy topics over the past few years. Of course, if we granted protections based on these harms, we would likely be harming others; specifically women seeking birth control, the Muslim community, and the families and friends of military heroes. We must find the delicate balance here.
Of course, in the polis we also have harms and liberties related to community. Mill argued that there are some community duties that individuals can be compelled to perform. We often restrict the liberty of individuals for the good of the social order. Citizens have to pay taxes, serve on juries, and obey the laws. In America, all males 18 and older have to register for the draft. Structural harms are a community harm that affects the ability of a community to successfully function. Stone uses the example of school vouchers as a structural harm because it reduces integration and the visibility of the public education system. Another structural harm could be google books because it reduces the use of the library by relatively well-off citizens and makes the library less important as a community meeting place. Of course, in both of these cases, removing the structural harm would likely cause individual harms. Accumulative harms are actions that are not harmful in isolation but become harmful when everyone in a community does them. The individual mandate in the Affordable Care Act is based on this logic. If one healthy person does not buy insurance then it won't raise premiums by much, but if every healthy person does not buy insurance than premiums will sky-rocket and the health insurance industry will go broke. Finally, we can extend individual harms to examine their effects on the community. Remember, in the polis all actions have ripple effects. Here again, we must strike a delicate balance.
Stone firmly believes that we cannot restrict our understanding of harm and liberty to the individual. Corporate actors including businesses, churches, non-profits, and government agencies can harm people and be harmed. Further, because they generally have a much larger reach than an individual, the harms they cause can have a greater impact on the community as a whole.
Once again, Stone ends her chapter with a discussion of trade-offs. This time we have two: liberty and security, and liberty and equity. Starting with liberty and security, Stone presents the traditional or conservative understanding of the relationship between the two: security creates dependence, self-sufficiency is necessary for liberty, and government paternalism reduces freedom. She then presents her understanding: individuals cannot make free choices unless they have basic security, no one is ever truly self-sufficient, and policy can make determinations about who is competent to care for him or herself and who is not. The liberty and equality trade-off is presented similarly. The traditional or conservative understanding is that redistribution for the sake of equality reduces the liberty of the well-off, either you have complete liberty or none at all, and coercion by public policy reduces liberty. She believes that equalizing power, wealth and knowledge leads to positive liberty, liberty is measured in degrees, and society's control of some problems can expand human freedom. I am guessing that if you have not agreed with Stone's argument in the previous chapters, you will not agree this time. Either way, I hope you have taken the time to understand both arguments.
Efficient at what and for whom? - Stone Ch. 3
Since the late 1970's and early 1980's making government more efficient has been a primary goal of policymakers and administrators. Efficiency has often been treated as a goal in itself leading to the privatization and marketization of government services to avoid the inefficient bureaucratic process. As Stone points out, however, efficiency is not really a goal, it's a process-based measure that strives to get the most output out of a given input. It says nothing about an ultimate outcome. There always has to be something you want to do efficiently, or more efficiently. Again here, Stone reminds us that efficiency is comparative. The only way we can judge whether or not a process is efficient is in comparison to another process.
Stone takes some time to problematize what we think of as efficiency. She uses the story of a library from Wildavsky and Pressman's Implementation. Wildavsky and Pressman believe they have a handle on what makes a library efficient, but Stone argues that this is too simplistic. It may not just be a count of books that is important but the quality of books. It may not be the variety of books that's important as much as having a sufficient number of the most in demand books. It may in fact not be the books at all that are most important, but the services being provided by the librarians. The problem is that Pressman and Wildavsky do not really explore how they would define the ultimate goal of the library. Is it to educate residents, provide residents with entertainment, help schoolchildren learn, increase literacy, help residents with job search and skills, or all of the above? Pressman and Wildavsky define the goal of a library solely in terms of an output, the number of books they provide to the community. This comes close to using efficiency as a goal in and of itself.
When we talk about efficiency as an ideal in the United States, we are usually defining it in market-based terms. From pp. 66-71 Stone gives us a lesson in critical economics. Although we tend to elevate economics as the best of the social sciences in America, we must remember that economics makes a lot of assumptions about human behavior that are not always true. Stone believes that these assumptions generally fail when it comes to public policy and we should be relying on the model of the polis more often. Things in the polis are not as simple as they are in the market. She repeats a lot of the contrasts between the two models that she discusses in chapter one. Ultimately, she arrives at the conclusion that markets can only be considered the ultimate form of efficiency if you define efficiency objectively. As she showed us with the library example, efficiency is often subjective.
The reason I assigned chapters 2 and 4 or chapters 3 and 5 and not just any two of the four chapters is that Stone discusses trade-offs between these goals at the end of each chapter. In America, we tend to believe that equality and efficiency are trade-offs. In debates about jobs, the economy, social welfare, education, and even healthcare; we hear the argument that increasing equality will make our economy less efficient. Again, we are relying on the straightforward assumptions of neo-classical economic theory here. If we assume that individuals are motivated solely by basic needs and individual well-being then this trade-off makes sense. If we instead believe that basic security, self-esteem, and community well-being are necessary for productivity then there may not be such a straight-forward trade-off.
What do you think? Can you think of an example where efficiency is subjective? Do you think efficiency and equity are trade-offs or does some degree of equity improve efficiency?
Stone takes some time to problematize what we think of as efficiency. She uses the story of a library from Wildavsky and Pressman's Implementation. Wildavsky and Pressman believe they have a handle on what makes a library efficient, but Stone argues that this is too simplistic. It may not just be a count of books that is important but the quality of books. It may not be the variety of books that's important as much as having a sufficient number of the most in demand books. It may in fact not be the books at all that are most important, but the services being provided by the librarians. The problem is that Pressman and Wildavsky do not really explore how they would define the ultimate goal of the library. Is it to educate residents, provide residents with entertainment, help schoolchildren learn, increase literacy, help residents with job search and skills, or all of the above? Pressman and Wildavsky define the goal of a library solely in terms of an output, the number of books they provide to the community. This comes close to using efficiency as a goal in and of itself.
When we talk about efficiency as an ideal in the United States, we are usually defining it in market-based terms. From pp. 66-71 Stone gives us a lesson in critical economics. Although we tend to elevate economics as the best of the social sciences in America, we must remember that economics makes a lot of assumptions about human behavior that are not always true. Stone believes that these assumptions generally fail when it comes to public policy and we should be relying on the model of the polis more often. Things in the polis are not as simple as they are in the market. She repeats a lot of the contrasts between the two models that she discusses in chapter one. Ultimately, she arrives at the conclusion that markets can only be considered the ultimate form of efficiency if you define efficiency objectively. As she showed us with the library example, efficiency is often subjective.
The reason I assigned chapters 2 and 4 or chapters 3 and 5 and not just any two of the four chapters is that Stone discusses trade-offs between these goals at the end of each chapter. In America, we tend to believe that equality and efficiency are trade-offs. In debates about jobs, the economy, social welfare, education, and even healthcare; we hear the argument that increasing equality will make our economy less efficient. Again, we are relying on the straightforward assumptions of neo-classical economic theory here. If we assume that individuals are motivated solely by basic needs and individual well-being then this trade-off makes sense. If we instead believe that basic security, self-esteem, and community well-being are necessary for productivity then there may not be such a straight-forward trade-off.
What do you think? Can you think of an example where efficiency is subjective? Do you think efficiency and equity are trade-offs or does some degree of equity improve efficiency?
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
The American Welfare State
Our substantive topic for the week is what I refer to as social welfare policy and what Peters refers to as income maintenance policy. What's the difference? I would say that social policy is broadly a set of policies that regulate social relationships between citizens. This category of policy includes social welfare policies as well as social policies dealing with issues of gender and sexuality like abortion and gay marriage. Social welfare policies deal with regulating relationships of economic inequality and tend to be redistributive policies. Income maintenance policies are, in my view, the sub-set of social welfare policies that subsidize income. I would argue, for example, that Medicaid is a social welfare policy but would not consider it an income maintenance policy because it is an in-kind benefit. The combination of these redistributive social policies make-up the institution we call the welfare state or welfare system. Of course, you'll see that in Peters' discussion of welfare he does not draw a clear line between income maintenance and in-kind benefits. He discusses policies that could be considered health care and education policies in this chapter.
For simplicity's sake, I am going to focus on two types of "income maintenance" programs, Social Security and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which is the program we usually refer to when we talk about welfare. Both Social Security and TANF have a similar goal, they attempt to redistribute income from taxpayers to individuals or families who are in need of income support. Of course, this is how we think of welfare and not at all how we think of Social Security. The major difference is the structure of the two programs. Social Security is structured as a social insurance program, while TANF is structured as a means-tested program. The welfare systems of some countries like the Scandinavian countries only include social insurance programs. In the United States, we have a mixed welfare state made up of means-tested programs like TANF, food-stamps, and Medicaid, social insurance programs like Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Medicare, and corporate and non-profit provided benefits like health insurance, shelters, and soup kitchens.
Social insurance programs like Social Security use the logic of insurance pools that we discussed when we talked about healthcare reform. The idea is that we have uncertainty about how long we will live, if we may become disabled, or if we may lose our jobs. Because we cannot accurately predict these things, and all of us are at risk, we join together into an insurance pool where the workers provide for the disabled, retired, and unemployed with the understanding that we will be provided for when we find ourselves in such a state. By design, social insurance programs have no income eligibility criteria. This ensures that everyone has a stake in the continuation of the program because everyone feels as though they benefit. Of course, we have this idea that we pay for our own Social Security when we are working and get it back when we retire, but this is not actually how the system works.
The genius of social insurance programs is that they build civic trust and a sense of community, and there are strong incentives to continue the program. The first generation who was eligible for Social Security received the best deal because they paid very little into the system and received benefits, but the last generation to pay fully into the system without receiving benefits will be the ultimate losers. Many people in their 20's and early 30's believe that Social Security will not be around for them. This is somewhat disturbing because it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The small, technical changes Peters discusses in the chapter can make Social Security solvent, but convincing the young that they will not receive Social Security is one way to eliminate the program without a lot of political risk. Politicians usually make changes to Social Security and Medicare that take effect many years in the future because of the perception that young people do not vote and when they do, they are not paying attention to programs that they will not receive for years to come.
We think about means-tested programs very differently. To qualify for a means-tested programs you have to be low-income and have few assets. Although in theory social mobility means that one has an equal chance of moving downward in class as upward in class, Americans do not believe that being in poverty is something we are all at risk of. We tend to believe that people who qualify for these programs are poor because they have made bad decisions. Means-tested programs tend to be stigmatizing and degrading, and easy political targets. Although we had a welfare rights movement in the 1960's, individuals who qualify for means-tested programs tend to be difficult to mobilize because of the stigma of receipt and the lack of political power held by recipients. On the other hand, means-tested programs at least attempt to target benefits to those most in-need.
The story of welfare is a little more complicated than the story of Social Security. No major changes (aside from expansions to new groups) have been made to Social Security since its creation during the New Deal. In contrast, welfare has been radically changed. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the pre-cursor to TANF, was created at the same time as Social Security. It was created to support widows with children in a time where women were expected to be homemakers and caretakers rather than labor market participants. The program was an entitlement so anyone who qualified had a legal right to receive benefits. This meant that as family structure changed and there were more single-parent households the program became more expensive. As the recipients of those households were portrayed increasingly as lazy, African-American lifetime recipients (which bore little relationship to the reality of program recipients) the program became increasingly unpopular.
In 1996, Bill Clinton's administration "Reformed welfare as we know it" through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The reforms repealed AFDC and replaced it with TANF. TANF can be considered a "workfare" program where the emphasis is on labor market participation. It also decoupled the receipt of benefits like food-stamps and Medicaid from receipt of TANF (previously, all of these programs had been packaged together). Under TANF, families can only receive benefits for up to two years at any one time and five years over a lifetime. To receive benefits recipients have to either get a job or engage in activities that prepare them for work. Immigrants were basically ruled ineligible to receive either TANF or food stamps. Child support enforcement was an important part of the reform, forcing women receiving TANF to identify and provide information about the fathers of their children to the state. There were also substantial provisions providing funding for marriage promotion among recipients. Finally, TANF provided states with a lot more discretion in program administration than they had under AFDC. States differ significantly in terms of the inclusion and adequacy of their TANF programs.
When PRWORA was passed, opponents of reforms predicted dire consequences. They argued that children would be dying on the streets and poverty and crime would be at all time highs. They also predicted that states would engage in a "race to the bottom" with all states providing the bare minimum to avoid attracting undesirable residents. In reality none of this came to pass. This has been attributed to a few different factors. 1) PRWORA was passed during the late 1990s when the economy was doing well and there was high demand for low-wage, unskilled labor in most states. 2) Bill Clinton also passed a substantial increase to the Earned Income Tax Credit which significantly subsidizes the wages of low-wage families. 3) "Liberal" states provide generous benefits for cultural and social reasons, not just purely self-interested economic reasons. I think we are starting to see some of the problems with TANF in a poor economy. Despite the increase in need due to high, long-term, unemployment associated with the 2008 recession, TANF use has changed very little. This shows that the program has for some reason become unresponsive to family needs. If you want to read more on TANF during the recession, here is a good policy brief on the topic.
Social Security and TANF represent two sides of the coin for addressing poverty. Thanks to Medicare and Social Security, elderly poverty (by official measures) has all but disappeared in the United States. In contrast, child poverty continues to increase. Should we create a social insurance program like a family allowance to address poverty? Should our poverty alleviation policies change in response to the business-cycle? What's the best way to ensure that Social Security persists as an effective social insurance policy targeted at the elderly? Are you convinced that Social Security will not be around when you retire?
For simplicity's sake, I am going to focus on two types of "income maintenance" programs, Social Security and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which is the program we usually refer to when we talk about welfare. Both Social Security and TANF have a similar goal, they attempt to redistribute income from taxpayers to individuals or families who are in need of income support. Of course, this is how we think of welfare and not at all how we think of Social Security. The major difference is the structure of the two programs. Social Security is structured as a social insurance program, while TANF is structured as a means-tested program. The welfare systems of some countries like the Scandinavian countries only include social insurance programs. In the United States, we have a mixed welfare state made up of means-tested programs like TANF, food-stamps, and Medicaid, social insurance programs like Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and Medicare, and corporate and non-profit provided benefits like health insurance, shelters, and soup kitchens.
Social insurance programs like Social Security use the logic of insurance pools that we discussed when we talked about healthcare reform. The idea is that we have uncertainty about how long we will live, if we may become disabled, or if we may lose our jobs. Because we cannot accurately predict these things, and all of us are at risk, we join together into an insurance pool where the workers provide for the disabled, retired, and unemployed with the understanding that we will be provided for when we find ourselves in such a state. By design, social insurance programs have no income eligibility criteria. This ensures that everyone has a stake in the continuation of the program because everyone feels as though they benefit. Of course, we have this idea that we pay for our own Social Security when we are working and get it back when we retire, but this is not actually how the system works.
The genius of social insurance programs is that they build civic trust and a sense of community, and there are strong incentives to continue the program. The first generation who was eligible for Social Security received the best deal because they paid very little into the system and received benefits, but the last generation to pay fully into the system without receiving benefits will be the ultimate losers. Many people in their 20's and early 30's believe that Social Security will not be around for them. This is somewhat disturbing because it can become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The small, technical changes Peters discusses in the chapter can make Social Security solvent, but convincing the young that they will not receive Social Security is one way to eliminate the program without a lot of political risk. Politicians usually make changes to Social Security and Medicare that take effect many years in the future because of the perception that young people do not vote and when they do, they are not paying attention to programs that they will not receive for years to come.
We think about means-tested programs very differently. To qualify for a means-tested programs you have to be low-income and have few assets. Although in theory social mobility means that one has an equal chance of moving downward in class as upward in class, Americans do not believe that being in poverty is something we are all at risk of. We tend to believe that people who qualify for these programs are poor because they have made bad decisions. Means-tested programs tend to be stigmatizing and degrading, and easy political targets. Although we had a welfare rights movement in the 1960's, individuals who qualify for means-tested programs tend to be difficult to mobilize because of the stigma of receipt and the lack of political power held by recipients. On the other hand, means-tested programs at least attempt to target benefits to those most in-need.
The story of welfare is a little more complicated than the story of Social Security. No major changes (aside from expansions to new groups) have been made to Social Security since its creation during the New Deal. In contrast, welfare has been radically changed. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the pre-cursor to TANF, was created at the same time as Social Security. It was created to support widows with children in a time where women were expected to be homemakers and caretakers rather than labor market participants. The program was an entitlement so anyone who qualified had a legal right to receive benefits. This meant that as family structure changed and there were more single-parent households the program became more expensive. As the recipients of those households were portrayed increasingly as lazy, African-American lifetime recipients (which bore little relationship to the reality of program recipients) the program became increasingly unpopular.
In 1996, Bill Clinton's administration "Reformed welfare as we know it" through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The reforms repealed AFDC and replaced it with TANF. TANF can be considered a "workfare" program where the emphasis is on labor market participation. It also decoupled the receipt of benefits like food-stamps and Medicaid from receipt of TANF (previously, all of these programs had been packaged together). Under TANF, families can only receive benefits for up to two years at any one time and five years over a lifetime. To receive benefits recipients have to either get a job or engage in activities that prepare them for work. Immigrants were basically ruled ineligible to receive either TANF or food stamps. Child support enforcement was an important part of the reform, forcing women receiving TANF to identify and provide information about the fathers of their children to the state. There were also substantial provisions providing funding for marriage promotion among recipients. Finally, TANF provided states with a lot more discretion in program administration than they had under AFDC. States differ significantly in terms of the inclusion and adequacy of their TANF programs.
When PRWORA was passed, opponents of reforms predicted dire consequences. They argued that children would be dying on the streets and poverty and crime would be at all time highs. They also predicted that states would engage in a "race to the bottom" with all states providing the bare minimum to avoid attracting undesirable residents. In reality none of this came to pass. This has been attributed to a few different factors. 1) PRWORA was passed during the late 1990s when the economy was doing well and there was high demand for low-wage, unskilled labor in most states. 2) Bill Clinton also passed a substantial increase to the Earned Income Tax Credit which significantly subsidizes the wages of low-wage families. 3) "Liberal" states provide generous benefits for cultural and social reasons, not just purely self-interested economic reasons. I think we are starting to see some of the problems with TANF in a poor economy. Despite the increase in need due to high, long-term, unemployment associated with the 2008 recession, TANF use has changed very little. This shows that the program has for some reason become unresponsive to family needs. If you want to read more on TANF during the recession, here is a good policy brief on the topic.
Social Security and TANF represent two sides of the coin for addressing poverty. Thanks to Medicare and Social Security, elderly poverty (by official measures) has all but disappeared in the United States. In contrast, child poverty continues to increase. Should we create a social insurance program like a family allowance to address poverty? Should our poverty alleviation policies change in response to the business-cycle? What's the best way to ensure that Social Security persists as an effective social insurance policy targeted at the elderly? Are you convinced that Social Security will not be around when you retire?
Needs and Security - Stone Ch. 4
Normally when you hear the word security, what do you think of? I know my first thought is homeland security or a security guard. Generally it connotes bodily safety, but in this chapter Stone uses a broader definition of security. This is the same type of security that we use when we discuss Social Security or the goal of financial security. Basically, it's the idea that different dimensions of need are met.
Stone tries to challenge us on our decisions about the degree to which government should meet the basic needs of its citizens. There are some policy analysts and policymakers who think that government is responsible for providing only defense and some who think government should be assisting individuals in their goals of self-esteem and self-actualization. Most people fall somewhere in the middle. This chapter should remind you of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Unlike Maslow, however, Stone does not discuss the dimensions of need as a hierarchy where needs are met in succession, but as a group of needs that everyone must fulfill. Surely, Stone would not argue that one cannot survive without basic food, shelter, and water, but I think she would also argue that companionship, respect, and self-esteem are crucial to long-term human survival.
Taking needs one step beyond the extreme libertarian ideal that government should only provide for the basic defense, most Americans believe that we do not want people starving and dying on the streets. They would agree that either through direct services or support of non-profit efforts government should make sure that people have basic food and shelter. This seems simple, but defining what we mean in this case is difficult. Is it acceptable to provide citizens with the cheapest basic nutrition they need to function or do we want to make sure that they can be productive? Should we only provide them with one type of food, day in and day out or should we make sure that they can have a balanced diet? Should we allow enough so they can participate in cultural traditions like turkey dinner on Thanksgiving and BBQs at fourth of July? What about those people with dietary or religious restrictions on what they can and cannot eat? We have the same problems when we think about basic shelter. Is a shack okay because many poor individuals around the world live in shacks or do we need to provide our citizens with running water and safe, stable, indoor housing?
Much of our political disagreement about these basic needs has to do with a divide over whether absolute needs are the most important dimension of need or whether relative needs matter too. Some policy analysts who believe that only absolute need matters argue that poverty does not exist in America because the poorest in America are better off than most residents of developing countries. They also point out that America's poorest citizens are far better off than many of the wealthy were 100 years ago. In contrast, scholars who focus on relative needs find it unacceptable that in a country of such wealth, children still grow up hungry living in rat infested housing. Of course, for the first time since the turn of the 20th century in America the youngest generation of adults is not predicted to do better than their parents. It will be interesting to see how the debate between relative and absolute need is framed in the future.
Most of our social policies address the issue of relative need. The same can be said for defense policy. It does not matter how powerful our weapons are in comparison to the past or in absolute terms. What matters is how powerful our weapons are relative to other nation-states. It's interesting to think about education needs in these terms. The number of comparisons we make between our education system and that of Japan or the European Union illustrates that once again we define relative needs as most important.
Increasingly, we have decided that government needs to go beyond providing for current needs and actually attempt to prevent our future needs. Many of the safety regulations government has in place are there to prevent our future needs. For example, food regulations are meant to prevent our future need for medical care due to ingesting rotten food. When we talk about communities or individuals "at-risk", we are engaging in a discussion about the degree to which they need to be protected so that they will not need services X,Y, or Z in the future.
Of course, returning to Maslow's pyramid, humans also have relational needs. We are social beings. Dignity, respect, self-esteem, and belonging are important to us. Many government programs have been criticized because while they may meet all the other needs, they reduce the relational security of participants. The idea that we should have policies that empower citizens and build community has been around since the 1960s, but we have struggled to create programs that do this in any meaningful way.
One of the paradoxes of public policy (and of human behavior in general) is that needs can never be completely fulfilled. Once one need is met, new needs are created. Interestingly, this is one point on which Marxists, Liberals, and Conservatives all agree, though of course they differ in their explanation of the causes. Because we cannot define an objective level of need that must be met, we engage primarily in argument, debate, and as Stone puts it, "Claims-making" (p. 98). On pages 98-104 Stone walks us through how this "claims-making" plays out in different stages of the policy process.
Stone ends her chapter with a question about trade-offs, this time between security and efficiency. If you believe there is a trade-off you would argue three points: 1) humans are motivated by basic needs and making them secure removes their motivation to be productive, 2) providing security relies on the service sector which is the least efficient sector of the economy, and 3) technological changes necessarily make some people worse off. Instead, Stone would argue that 1) basic needs are not what motivates us and providing security makes us more productive, 2) the service sector is deemed inefficient only because of the way we have defined efficiency, and 3) macroeconomic policies can and should mitigate any suffering due to advancements in technology that create economic change (p. 107). Here's a nice little video from RSAnimate about human motivation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc.
I leave it to you to decide if you are convinced by Stone's argument. Are humans driven by basic needs, or do we need to know those basic needs are satisfied before we can be productive? Does relative poverty matter or should we only be concerned about absolute poverty? Do we need to concern ourselves with the symbolic, goal actualization, and community needs of the poor? What should government's role be in all of this?
Stone tries to challenge us on our decisions about the degree to which government should meet the basic needs of its citizens. There are some policy analysts and policymakers who think that government is responsible for providing only defense and some who think government should be assisting individuals in their goals of self-esteem and self-actualization. Most people fall somewhere in the middle. This chapter should remind you of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Unlike Maslow, however, Stone does not discuss the dimensions of need as a hierarchy where needs are met in succession, but as a group of needs that everyone must fulfill. Surely, Stone would not argue that one cannot survive without basic food, shelter, and water, but I think she would also argue that companionship, respect, and self-esteem are crucial to long-term human survival.
Taking needs one step beyond the extreme libertarian ideal that government should only provide for the basic defense, most Americans believe that we do not want people starving and dying on the streets. They would agree that either through direct services or support of non-profit efforts government should make sure that people have basic food and shelter. This seems simple, but defining what we mean in this case is difficult. Is it acceptable to provide citizens with the cheapest basic nutrition they need to function or do we want to make sure that they can be productive? Should we only provide them with one type of food, day in and day out or should we make sure that they can have a balanced diet? Should we allow enough so they can participate in cultural traditions like turkey dinner on Thanksgiving and BBQs at fourth of July? What about those people with dietary or religious restrictions on what they can and cannot eat? We have the same problems when we think about basic shelter. Is a shack okay because many poor individuals around the world live in shacks or do we need to provide our citizens with running water and safe, stable, indoor housing?
Much of our political disagreement about these basic needs has to do with a divide over whether absolute needs are the most important dimension of need or whether relative needs matter too. Some policy analysts who believe that only absolute need matters argue that poverty does not exist in America because the poorest in America are better off than most residents of developing countries. They also point out that America's poorest citizens are far better off than many of the wealthy were 100 years ago. In contrast, scholars who focus on relative needs find it unacceptable that in a country of such wealth, children still grow up hungry living in rat infested housing. Of course, for the first time since the turn of the 20th century in America the youngest generation of adults is not predicted to do better than their parents. It will be interesting to see how the debate between relative and absolute need is framed in the future.
Most of our social policies address the issue of relative need. The same can be said for defense policy. It does not matter how powerful our weapons are in comparison to the past or in absolute terms. What matters is how powerful our weapons are relative to other nation-states. It's interesting to think about education needs in these terms. The number of comparisons we make between our education system and that of Japan or the European Union illustrates that once again we define relative needs as most important.
Increasingly, we have decided that government needs to go beyond providing for current needs and actually attempt to prevent our future needs. Many of the safety regulations government has in place are there to prevent our future needs. For example, food regulations are meant to prevent our future need for medical care due to ingesting rotten food. When we talk about communities or individuals "at-risk", we are engaging in a discussion about the degree to which they need to be protected so that they will not need services X,Y, or Z in the future.
Of course, returning to Maslow's pyramid, humans also have relational needs. We are social beings. Dignity, respect, self-esteem, and belonging are important to us. Many government programs have been criticized because while they may meet all the other needs, they reduce the relational security of participants. The idea that we should have policies that empower citizens and build community has been around since the 1960s, but we have struggled to create programs that do this in any meaningful way.
One of the paradoxes of public policy (and of human behavior in general) is that needs can never be completely fulfilled. Once one need is met, new needs are created. Interestingly, this is one point on which Marxists, Liberals, and Conservatives all agree, though of course they differ in their explanation of the causes. Because we cannot define an objective level of need that must be met, we engage primarily in argument, debate, and as Stone puts it, "Claims-making" (p. 98). On pages 98-104 Stone walks us through how this "claims-making" plays out in different stages of the policy process.
Stone ends her chapter with a question about trade-offs, this time between security and efficiency. If you believe there is a trade-off you would argue three points: 1) humans are motivated by basic needs and making them secure removes their motivation to be productive, 2) providing security relies on the service sector which is the least efficient sector of the economy, and 3) technological changes necessarily make some people worse off. Instead, Stone would argue that 1) basic needs are not what motivates us and providing security makes us more productive, 2) the service sector is deemed inefficient only because of the way we have defined efficiency, and 3) macroeconomic policies can and should mitigate any suffering due to advancements in technology that create economic change (p. 107). Here's a nice little video from RSAnimate about human motivation: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u6XAPnuFjJc.
I leave it to you to decide if you are convinced by Stone's argument. Are humans driven by basic needs, or do we need to know those basic needs are satisfied before we can be productive? Does relative poverty matter or should we only be concerned about absolute poverty? Do we need to concern ourselves with the symbolic, goal actualization, and community needs of the poor? What should government's role be in all of this?
Equity and Cake - Stone Ch. 2
As someone who studies redistributive public policy, this is probably my favorite chapter in Stone's book. The cake analogy Stone presents on pp. 39-41 is an ingenious way to present different and often competing visions of equity. Depending on one's perspective, each of these forms of equity could in turn be argued as completely inequitable. Stone discusses eight ways that we can define equity:
Membership-based Forms of Equity
1) Equal slices but unequal invitations - In the book, Stone gives equal size slices to all of her students, but what about those students who missed class that day? What about the students who tried to enroll in the class but could not get off the wait-list? What about the students who had to work full-time and couldn't fit her class into their schedule? They all missed out on cake. In the realm of public policy, social insurance programs like Medicare, which are available to all citizens and some documented immigrants but not non-residents and certain immigrants, fall under this category. It is likely that most Americans think that Medicare is fairly distributed, but the elderly legal resident who has worked in the US for nine years (just one year short of qualifying for Medicare) who finds herself hospitalized would likely find the system unfair and arbitrary.
2) Unequal slices for unequal ranks but equal slices for equal ranks - In Stone's example, she gives big slices with extra frosting to full professors, assistant professors get slivers, and undergraduates get crumbs. This is a basic rank- or merit-based system of equity. You can think of either military or union pay-scales as examples of this type of equity. The career civil-servant likely thinks that the rank-based system is fair, while the new employee who feels she has contributed great ideas to the organization would likely disagree. Some would argue that market-based pay-scales fall under this category, but others argue that arbitrary factors and discrimination are more important in market-based pay structures than merit.
3) Unequal slices but equal blocs - In the chapter, Stone uses a somewhat silly example, in which, male students claim that women have traditionally had greater access to chocolate cake so men as a group should have an equal share of the cake. While this is a somewhat silly example for chocolate cake, it is often the argument made for quota based affirmative action. Although quota systems for college admission have been ruled unconstitutional, we can think of quota systems as a form of group-based equity. Americans tend to be very uncomfortable with this form of equity.
Item-based forms of Equity
4) Unequal slices but equal meals - In Stone's example, the distribution of the cake is tied to a previous luncheon event where not everyone was given equal amounts of food. Some of the students got extra shrimp cocktail and better cuts of roast beef. In the policy realm, this form of equity goes beyond the current good being provided and looks at the full experience of individuals. An example of this form of equity in the policy arena is the GI Bill. It ties in-kind and financial rewards to past military service. Although Stone argues that this viewpoint is characteristic of redistributive policy, we rarely think of these policies as reparations for unequal circumstances, in our current political context (The first edition of this book was written in 1988). Instead, the culture of poverty thesis has seemingly won out as the dominant explanation for poverty in the United States. We'll discuss these different perspectives in-depth when we talk about income maintenance policies.
5) Unequal slices but equal value to recipients - In the cake analogy, Stone cuts her cake so that those who don't like chocolate cake or who are allergic to cake get small or no pieces and those who love chocolate cake get bigger pieces. This definition of equity is tailored to meet the individual needs of recipients. Assuming funding large enough to sufficiently cover individual needs, market-based programs like school vouchers could fall under this definition of equity. Programs serving individuals with disabilities like the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Vocational Rehabilitation must be tailored to the needs of the individual and they could fall under this definition, as well. This form of equity is characteristic of a welfare economics perspective. Those who love cake will be willing to trade more potato chips for cake and those who hate cake will be very willing to trade their cake for potato chips. If they get together these two groups will trade their cake for potato chips making everyone better off.
Membership-based Forms of Equity
1) Equal slices but unequal invitations - In the book, Stone gives equal size slices to all of her students, but what about those students who missed class that day? What about the students who tried to enroll in the class but could not get off the wait-list? What about the students who had to work full-time and couldn't fit her class into their schedule? They all missed out on cake. In the realm of public policy, social insurance programs like Medicare, which are available to all citizens and some documented immigrants but not non-residents and certain immigrants, fall under this category. It is likely that most Americans think that Medicare is fairly distributed, but the elderly legal resident who has worked in the US for nine years (just one year short of qualifying for Medicare) who finds herself hospitalized would likely find the system unfair and arbitrary.
2) Unequal slices for unequal ranks but equal slices for equal ranks - In Stone's example, she gives big slices with extra frosting to full professors, assistant professors get slivers, and undergraduates get crumbs. This is a basic rank- or merit-based system of equity. You can think of either military or union pay-scales as examples of this type of equity. The career civil-servant likely thinks that the rank-based system is fair, while the new employee who feels she has contributed great ideas to the organization would likely disagree. Some would argue that market-based pay-scales fall under this category, but others argue that arbitrary factors and discrimination are more important in market-based pay structures than merit.
3) Unequal slices but equal blocs - In the chapter, Stone uses a somewhat silly example, in which, male students claim that women have traditionally had greater access to chocolate cake so men as a group should have an equal share of the cake. While this is a somewhat silly example for chocolate cake, it is often the argument made for quota based affirmative action. Although quota systems for college admission have been ruled unconstitutional, we can think of quota systems as a form of group-based equity. Americans tend to be very uncomfortable with this form of equity.
Item-based forms of Equity
4) Unequal slices but equal meals - In Stone's example, the distribution of the cake is tied to a previous luncheon event where not everyone was given equal amounts of food. Some of the students got extra shrimp cocktail and better cuts of roast beef. In the policy realm, this form of equity goes beyond the current good being provided and looks at the full experience of individuals. An example of this form of equity in the policy arena is the GI Bill. It ties in-kind and financial rewards to past military service. Although Stone argues that this viewpoint is characteristic of redistributive policy, we rarely think of these policies as reparations for unequal circumstances, in our current political context (The first edition of this book was written in 1988). Instead, the culture of poverty thesis has seemingly won out as the dominant explanation for poverty in the United States. We'll discuss these different perspectives in-depth when we talk about income maintenance policies.
5) Unequal slices but equal value to recipients - In the cake analogy, Stone cuts her cake so that those who don't like chocolate cake or who are allergic to cake get small or no pieces and those who love chocolate cake get bigger pieces. This definition of equity is tailored to meet the individual needs of recipients. Assuming funding large enough to sufficiently cover individual needs, market-based programs like school vouchers could fall under this definition of equity. Programs serving individuals with disabilities like the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and Vocational Rehabilitation must be tailored to the needs of the individual and they could fall under this definition, as well. This form of equity is characteristic of a welfare economics perspective. Those who love cake will be willing to trade more potato chips for cake and those who hate cake will be very willing to trade their cake for potato chips. If they get together these two groups will trade their cake for potato chips making everyone better off.
Process-based forms of Equity
6) Unequal slices but equal starting resources - In Stone's analogy, everyone gets a fork and they have at it. This is the definition of equity that Americans tend to be most comfortable with. It is a process based form of equity that allows for unequal outcomes. The logic behind the Harlem Children's Zone is to ensure that the children of Harlem have the same resources as children from wealthier neighborhoods from birth to age 18. If inequality persists despite the provision of equal resources, we attribute that to personal preference.
7) Unequal slices but equal statistical chances - In Stone's analogy, she only had enough batter to make a cupcake so she puts everyone's name in a hat and gives the cupcake to the winner. This is the classic lottery system. In the policy arena, charter schools in low-income areas are mandated to use lotteries rather than merit based admissions to receive public funding. Every child who applies has an equal statistical chance of admittance to the school.
8) Unequal slices but equal votes - In Stone's analogy, she yet again has only a cupcake and the students vote to determine who among them will be the Cupcake Eater. This is the logic of democracy. In the policy realm, each of us who are citizens get an equal vote in referendums, ballot initiatives, and elections. We may not end up with the outcomes we prefer, but because the process is seen as fair, we accept the outcome as equitable.
It is important to note that all of these forms of equity can lead to very unequal outcomes, and that one person's equity is another's unfairness. Even the first example, which is the closest to equality leaves people who are not members without. We should also note that each form of equity has three elements: the item being distributed, the process of distribution, and the recipients of the item. Each of these different definitions focuses on one of these elements.
I think that we sometimes forget that equity is an important goal and value in American society. A certain vision of equity underlies the foundation of our society, as the Declaration of Independence states "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." Of course, we can look back at the world of the founding fathers and see that these differing definitions of equity came into play back then, as well. Most notably, membership in the group of recipients was restricted to white, land-owning males. As we gear up for the 2012 elections, I believe that you will hear a lot of competing understandings of equity. I think it will be useful to think about which form of equity you believe is most appropriate for a particular context, and how different items, different definitions of recipients, and different processes lead to different forms of equity. We've heard a lot about tax reform so far in this primary cycle. Can you think of examples of how differing forms of equity lead to different recommendations for a fair tax system?
6) Unequal slices but equal starting resources - In Stone's analogy, everyone gets a fork and they have at it. This is the definition of equity that Americans tend to be most comfortable with. It is a process based form of equity that allows for unequal outcomes. The logic behind the Harlem Children's Zone is to ensure that the children of Harlem have the same resources as children from wealthier neighborhoods from birth to age 18. If inequality persists despite the provision of equal resources, we attribute that to personal preference.
7) Unequal slices but equal statistical chances - In Stone's analogy, she only had enough batter to make a cupcake so she puts everyone's name in a hat and gives the cupcake to the winner. This is the classic lottery system. In the policy arena, charter schools in low-income areas are mandated to use lotteries rather than merit based admissions to receive public funding. Every child who applies has an equal statistical chance of admittance to the school.
8) Unequal slices but equal votes - In Stone's analogy, she yet again has only a cupcake and the students vote to determine who among them will be the Cupcake Eater. This is the logic of democracy. In the policy realm, each of us who are citizens get an equal vote in referendums, ballot initiatives, and elections. We may not end up with the outcomes we prefer, but because the process is seen as fair, we accept the outcome as equitable.
It is important to note that all of these forms of equity can lead to very unequal outcomes, and that one person's equity is another's unfairness. Even the first example, which is the closest to equality leaves people who are not members without. We should also note that each form of equity has three elements: the item being distributed, the process of distribution, and the recipients of the item. Each of these different definitions focuses on one of these elements.
I think that we sometimes forget that equity is an important goal and value in American society. A certain vision of equity underlies the foundation of our society, as the Declaration of Independence states "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." Of course, we can look back at the world of the founding fathers and see that these differing definitions of equity came into play back then, as well. Most notably, membership in the group of recipients was restricted to white, land-owning males. As we gear up for the 2012 elections, I believe that you will hear a lot of competing understandings of equity. I think it will be useful to think about which form of equity you believe is most appropriate for a particular context, and how different items, different definitions of recipients, and different processes lead to different forms of equity. We've heard a lot about tax reform so far in this primary cycle. Can you think of examples of how differing forms of equity lead to different recommendations for a fair tax system?
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