The Complex Systems of American Government - Peters Ch. 2

In this chapter Peters discusses the structures of the American political system. The unique way that the United States' government is structured creates both barriers and opportunities in terms of public policy. The United States is a federalist system with federal, state, and local governments. Our constitution allocates powers to the federal government and the remainder is reserved for the states. For the most part, state governments determine the powers left to local governments. Many court battles arise out of conflicts concerning which level of government has jurisdiction over particular issues. Normally, federal law supersedes state law and state law supersedes local laws, but not when it concerns powers reserved for lower levels of government.You should keep this in mind when we discuss the individual mandate part of health care reform next week.

At each level, there is also a separation of powers. At both the federal and state levels power is balanced between a legislative, executive, and judicial branch (hopefully, at this point you are familiar with the idea of separation of powers and checks and balances. If not, go to Google and look it up.) We also have strong bureaucracies that act as part of the executive branch. The bureaucracy has significant powers in executing laws and making public policy. In fact, some scholars argue that the bureaucracy has more influence on how citizens experience policy than the policymakers. We will talk about this more in week five when we discuss implementation.

The interactions between the legislature, the bureaucracy and private interest groups is often referred to as an iron triangle. In some ways, iron triangles make our government more efficient. They allow policymakers and bureaucrats to specialize in areas that they care about. It creates connections between the experts in the private and public sectors, and certainly increases the degree to which technocratic expertise plays a role in our government. Unfortunately, this means that the public interest at large is largely left out of the conversation. It can lead to revolving doors, where politicians and upper level bureaucrats who leave public office are rewarded by interest groups with good positions in the private sector. It also increases pork barrel politics and log-rolling where legislation is made to serve the interests of specific policymakers, districts, and agencies.  Rather than acting as agents of the public good, bureaucrats in these agencies often become agents of the very industries they were mandated to regulate.

As I mentioned in the "What is Public Policy" post, we also have a system that encourages a blurring of the line between public and private. Since the 1980's the dominant political perspective has assumed that competition leads to better service provision, and many of the services that had been administered by government for much of the 20th century have been contracted out to non-profit and for-profit organizations. This means that government policies are often carried out by private actors, and new businesses have been created for the primary purpose of public service provision. We often refer to this as the "shadow government". Once these private employees are taken into account, we see that the federal government has increased significantly in size (and dollars) since the 1950s.

Peters emphasizes the ways in which the unique and complex American system hinders policymaking, but it also creates advantages. There is an old adage that states are the laboratories of democracy. Our federal system allows us to try public policies at the state and local level before we implement them nationally.Obama's healthcare reform bill was loosely modeled after the Massachusetts' universal health care program.  It also allows for diversity across different localities. Not everyone in this country agrees on the definition of good public policy. Our federal system allows California to make appropriate laws for its citizenry and Alabama to make appropriate laws for its citizenry.

The blurring of private and public creates a symbiotic relationship between the private and public sectors. Business owners have greater buy-in to the public sector and government can work with local non-profits who may have better training and experience in working in certain areas with certain populations. Americans tend to be less suspicious of the private sector than the public sector, which may make contracted out programs more politically palatable.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that contractor jobs are not as good as government jobs in terms of their salary, benefits, and stability. Contracted projects may also be planned primarily for short-term cost savings rather than long-term stability. Diversity in policy can lead to inequalities and a "race to the bottom" where fewer and fewer social services are offered to avoid attracting "undesirables" to a specific locality. The complexity of our system means that policymaking will often be reactive and slow to move when major changes are needed. Finally, iron triangles, log-rolling, pork barrel politics, and multiple veto points mean that the effectiveness and efficiency of policies become less important than their political palatability to interest groups and constituents.

 It is important to keep these structures in mind when we talk about substantive public policy areas and policy analysis. Are you surprised by the complexity of the American political system? Do you think this complexity helps or hinders American government in meeting the needs of its diverse citizenry? What would you change about the structure of American government to make it more effective?

My Thoughts on Peters Chapter 5

Policy analysts are generally concerned with problem-solving, and finding the "best" solution to a public problem. (Of course, the determination of what is best could be based on quantitative, qualitative, cost-benefit, decision, or ethical analysis.) Often, we believe that once the best solution has been found, the work of the policy analyst is done and now the solution will be handed over to the policymakers to pass and implement. This is the view of the policy analyst as scientist or technocrat, but policy analysts who stop here are often not successful at seeing their policies carried out.

In many ways, the policy analyst must become an advocate and enter the political realm. After all, if you have discovered what you think is the best solution to a problem, you will of course desire that such a solution be put into practice. This is where the policy legitimation stage becomes so important. 

The United States in particular has many branches and levels of government, each with varying degrees and types of legitimacy. A strategic policy analyst will try to find the branch and level of government with the proper legitimacy to carry-out her proposed policy. This is where Peters' modes of legitimation (Figure 5.1) comes into play. Based on her assessment of her policy as majoritarian versus non-majoritarian and appealing to elites versus the masses, she can choose the branch of government through which she will attempt to implement her policy. Further, the degree of relative legitimacy between federal, state and local governments may also influence her decision of where and how to attempt to carry-out her policy.

Policies that appeal to elites and majorities will likely see successful passage through Congress. Of course, logrolling and pork barrel politics can turn a policy that many legislators and elites feel ambiguous towards into a successful policy. At the same time, it becomes very easy for a policy that is objectionable to a very small number of legislators to be vetoed in Congress. This is particularly true in the Senate where the tradition of unanimous consent allows for one strenuously opposed Senator to hold up a bill for a substantial period of time. 

For policies that tend to be nonmajoritarian and appeal to elites, a policy analyst would likely try to carry-out her preferred policy through the bureaucratic rule-making process or the courts. Policies that are overly technical are rarely completely formed by legislators. The bills passed on technical issues often express the intent of the Congress on a particular issue and leaves the details to be filled in by the appropriate agency. Issues like healthcare reform and bank regulation by necessity require the skilled professionals in the respective agencies to determine detailed policy prescriptions during the rule-writing process. The podcast Writing the Rules covers this process for the bank reform legislation passed last year. As you will see, policy as it is experienced by banks and consumers is really determined by the professional bureaucrats who are more knowledgeable in the subject area than the policymakers.

On the other hand, policies concerning constitutional rights and responsibilities are likely to be carried out through the courts. It should be noted, however, that the courts do not choose to decide whether X, Y, or Z is constitutional. Policy analysts and advocates will have to create a test case to bring before the courts. The famous Scopes trial portrayed in Inherit the Wind and Roe v. Wade are famous examples of test cases created to bring an issue before the Supreme Court. Many believe that recent ballot initiatives and legislation proposed in conservative states to ban abortion are really attempts to create a new test case to challenge the Roe v. Wade decision.

This brings us to the third cell in Peters' modes of legitimation typology, policies that have mass appeal and are majoritarian. Peters' argues that these policies will have the greatest success as referendums or ballot initiatives. We have recently seen a surge in the popularity of ballot initiatives as a means for passing preferred policies. Sometimes, these initiatives are put forth in a single state, but more often than not we see initiatives put forth in many states at once. Because these policies appeal to the masses and are majoritarian, there is sometimes a fear that they will lead to "tyranny of the majority over the minority". The relationship between referendums and initiatives and court actions, is I think an interesting one that brings up issues of populism v. elitism and majority rule v. minority rights. In Arizona, we see a very interesting process occurring where elected officials are asking the courts to weigh in on the approved medical marijuana ballot-initiative. 

Peters leaves the fourth cell of his typology (Mass and Non-majoritarian) blank. He argues that protests and revolutionary movements could be placed there. I would argue that the Wisconsin collective bargaining protests would be a modern example of a mass and non-majoritarian mode of legitimation. Although increasingly uncommon in the United States, I would also include labor strikes in that cell. On the other hand, I would hardly consider the protests and revolutions occurring in the Middle East to be non-majoritarian. What would you put in that cell? The Tea Party? Communities that go "off the grid"? The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s? Riots?